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 CHAPTER ONE 
 THE PROBLEM OF OPENNESS 
 What does it mean to have an open mind?  Is it desirable? Are we therefore to 
avoid its opposite, a closed mind? Is the metaphor of open and closed appropriate to 
understanding how the mind functions?  If so, then how is it to be accomplished?  How 
shall we proceed in producing an open mind or avoiding its opposite a closed mind?  Can 
it be too much of a good thing, can one be too open-minded?  The terms open and closed 
are commonly used as if the meanings of the terms were clear and the expectant goods 
associated with being open preferred.  
 Perhaps one of the most cogent and clear accounts of the meaning of an open 
mind is given to us by professional educator William Hare.  In his book Open-
mindedness and Education
1
  Hare sets out to explicitly define, explain, and defend a 
positive view of open-mindedness over and against popularized ambiguities and 
controversies over the term.  Hare argues open-mindedness is essentially attitudinal and 
necessary for what it means to be educated.  In his In Defense of Open-Mindedness,
2
 
Hare claims that there is pervasive agreement that open mindedness is understood as the 
ability to consider and revise one’s view in light of contrary 
                                                 
1
 William Hare, Open-Mindedness and Education (Kingston and Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s Press, 1979), ix-xi. 
 
2
 William Hare, In Defense of Open-Mindedness (Kingston and Montreal: 
McGill-Queen’s Press, 1980), 3. 
2 
 
evidence.
3
  Hare adopts and develops this view with the addition of focusing on openness 
as an issue of disposition.  A person with this sort of disposition is one who has an 
orientation that is open to reflecting and considering the views they already hold over and 
against other considerations, such as new evidence or differing theories.
4
   Its opposite, a 
closed mind, has generally been defined as one that has been subject to indoctrination. 
Indoctrination is likewise dispositional and understood as having rigidly fixed ideas.
5
  As 
such, an individual that has been indoctrinated is either unable to comprehend his own 
position with any degree of reflexivity or aspiration towards objectivity.   If these 
individuals encounter new possibilities regarding the position they hold, they are 
unwilling to change their own views.  For Hare, indoctrination is de facto closed 
mindedness.
6
 
 Additionally for Hare, commitment to discursive rationality is at the same time a 
commitment and agreement with open mindedness.  Discursive rationality understood in 
terms of a dialectical development  means that one, in order to be open, must be able to 
understand and willing to revise one’s views in light of new material.7  This generally 
may assume that the original position is already a rational account, and evaluating it in 
light of the new requires the same rational ability; however, open mindedness is not 
                                                 
3
 Hare, 3. 
4
 William Hare, Open-Mindedness and Education 1979, .9. 
5
 Hare, 27. 
6
 Hare, 8. 
7
 Hare, 12. 
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equivalent or necessary to being rational.  As such, one may dispositionally be open 
minded while holding views that are irrational in the sense of containing inconsistencies 
or contradictions.  The importance for Hare is that one is open to reviewing and 
correcting one’s own views in light of rationality.  On the other hand, being closed 
minded is a way of being irrational.  Being either incapable or unwilling to consider new 
evidence or claims of reasons is to be irrational.
8
  
 However Hare admits there is some ambiguity to the exact meaning of open 
mindedness.  He argues that being open minded is understood as a trait and such attempts 
to establish often remain vague.  As such, traits that describe desirable behaviors that are 
not always a constant state, and even so can be employed more or less better thus making 
the exact moment of employment difficult to identify.  Having a disposition that is open, 
or being open minded, does not admit of a precision to know whether, when or how much 
a door is open or it is closed.
9
  The vagueness in the trait is applicable in certain contexts 
and can be employed more or less by some degree.  But Hare thinks this ambiguity is an 
inherent necessity, and as such makes the concept of open-mindedness difficult to define 
but likewise useful
10
 
 If one is to understand what it means to have an open or closed mind, then we 
must consider Hare’s account simply because he has distilled the conversation and 
continues to describe the importance of the concepts and the underlying values that the 
                                                 
8
 Hare, 13. 
9
 William Hare, In Defense of Open-mindedness, 1980, 6. 
10
 William Hare, Open-Mindedness and Education 1979, 15. 
4 
 
issue presupposes.  Additionally and in its educational context, Hare addresses the extent 
of how openness should be normatively applied.  This provides us a baseline for 
understanding the concepts even though there is still some ambiguity in understanding 
precisely how the moment of openness occurs.
11
  While Hare’s attempt to define and 
defend the concept is notable, other considerations regarding the ambiguity of the terms 
openness and closedness and their effect in our educational institutions have arisen.    
 This particular problem of ambiguity was raised and asserted in Allan Bloom’s 
popular 1987 book titled The Closing of the American Mind.
12
  Bloom argues that there is 
a “recent education of openness” that parades itself as virtue of tolerance of all views, a 
cultural relativism that short circuits a student’s ability and desire to make any sound 
distinctions and one that allows all views to be considered as equal.
13
  He opposes this 
kind of openness and therefore plays upon the ambiguity of the terms by ironically 
pointing out that the recent cultural openness is nothing more than a great closing. 
 The impetus for Bloom’s book comes from years of teaching at the collegiate 
level and observing a notable change of orientation on the part of his students.  In his 
view it had once seemed that students came to the university with the desire to learn what 
was most valuable and good in life with the objective to pursue and implement that good, 
but during the years of his professorate Bloom observed a gradual cultural shift towards 
relativism so that students began to espouse the belief that all values, ideas and truths 
                                                 
11
 Hare, 15. 
12
 Allan Bloom, The Closing of the American Mind, (New York: Simon and 
Schuster,1987) 
 
13
 Bloom, 26-27. 
5 
 
have equal merit.
14
  According to Bloom what had changed in the university, and hence 
in culture, was a shift towards a different understanding of truth and values.  Whereas it 
had once been the assumption of the academic tradition that a rational pursuit would 
show the best way for humans to live, now academia seemed supportive of the idea that 
there is no best way to live but simply different ways, differing preferences and values.  
In other words, all approaches have equal merit and the need to tolerate other cultures has 
become of the highest priority such that reason or good judgment must take a back seat.  
Bloom asserts that something had indeed changed in our culture and more specifically in 
the orientation of our higher educational institutions and has resulted in a cultural 
relativism.
15
 
 For Bloom, this spells trouble.  For as he see it, this shift toward value neutrality 
undermines the ability of the student to reason, which requires making clear distinctions 
and evaluating those values that are best, an assumption operating within the university 
system since the time of Socrates and encapsulated in the Enlightenment.
16
  In fact, for 
Bloom, the greatness of the university rests on its goal to expose students to the tradition 
of questioning ideas and reasoning through their positions so that they might come to 
know and choose in a more informed way.  The very idea of the university in Bloom’s 
mind is that one does not see all view points as equal, but some as better than others, and 
those that are better are worthy to be chosen and promoted.   According to Bloom, such 
                                                 
14
 Bloom, 34. 
15
 Bloom, 25. 
 
16
 Bloom, 37. 
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an educational tradition and its values have provided conditions for and aided the 
flourishing of American democracy.
17
  
 As Bloom sees it, the causes for this shift towards cultural relativism are multi-
nefarious.  In three sections Bloom reflects on his experience as seen in his view of 
students both past and present, a cultural trend that he refers to as American nihilism, and 
finally his experience and assessment regarding how the university has been affected and 
hence has changed from its ancient and historical position of holding rationality in the 
highest regard to a much lesser position.  
 When Bloom began his teaching career, he thought that the uniqueness of the 
American student was that they entered the university bright-eyed and eager to learn as if 
in essence they were a “clean slate”, as opposed to their European counterparts who were 
steeped in an old tradition.
18
  He eventually realized that American students had little 
cultural moorings, i.e. traditions, from which they might pursue those questions of a 
qualitative life.
19
  He noticed that students he was now observing lacked the values that 
were easily derived from their own heritage of political history, which created and 
bolstered the American commitment to freedom and equality.
20
  Additionally these 
students also lacked the religious orientation and tradition those earlier generations had 
brought to their studies.
21
  Bloom concluded that it was essentially these traditions that 
                                                 
17
 Bloom, 142, 251. 
 
18
 Bloom, 48. 
 
19
 Bloom, 54. 
 
20
 Bloom, 55. 
 
21
 Bloom, 56. 
7 
 
had provided a favorable orientation toward reason and critical discrimination among 
values.  According to Bloom, the problem was decay in the transmission of values that 
stemmed from the average family and paralleled the general decay that he saw in the 
humanities as well as in the culture at large.
22
  The lack of literary tradition that had 
provided America students with a clean slate in his view was now manifesting itself as a 
lack in specific value orientation.  The clean slate looked to be more of an empty slate 
where students no longer had the heroes of literary history and a tradition that was once 
inspiring.  Instead, the students were notably without such figures, trusting and even 
extolled by their professors toward their own unique formation rather than looking to 
cultural icons and models of greatness.
23
  They did indeed come with a clean slate but 
one of their own making; they came to the university ready to create their own set of 
values and place it among the others.  
 According to Bloom a lack of cultural literacy was replaced with an infusion and 
ubiquity of available music.  It seemed that these students lacked few moments in their 
lives where there was not an immediate availability of music.  Bloom sees this ability to 
have music readily available as coinciding with the vacuum of intellectual life.  With the 
lack of the intellectual component, students were led to sensual pursuits and an 
orientation to nothing more than what is “new and startling”.24  Coupled with this, their 
parents and family unit, the last bastion of guidance for youth, were to blame for the lack 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
22
 Bloom, 58. 
 
23
 Bloom, 66-67. 
24
 Bloom, 69. 
8 
 
of instilling foundational moral values.
25
  The result according to Bloom is that students’ 
orientations have shifted toward a self centeredness that affects all aspects of their 
relationships.
26
   
 Standing at the forefront of the American cultural malaise, as Bloom states in his 
second section of his book, is Nietzsche’s proclamation that our values were groundless 
with his declaration that God was dead; the romantic ties that once secured our traditions 
and cultural values no longer existed.
27
  While Nietzsche had hoped for the coming of the 
last man – he or those who would bring about a new and creative set of values - He was 
also concerned as well, as Bloom was, that in this void of values posed potential disaster 
for the human spirit and this would result in the decay of human inspiration, creativity, 
and more generally, culture.   With Nietzsche came a critique of all values and reason’s 
ability to provide an absolute foundation.  Reason accordingly had been the tool that 
provided one with the ability to claim that some values are better than others; it was a 
way of assuring which values were good and true.
28
   Now, as Nietzsche declared, reason 
was suspect, its sources more human than divine.  With the advent of God’s death, that 
creative and moral impetus, conviction was dead.  This theme was most prominently seen 
in the figures of Freud and Weber, who predicted without a grounding community from 
which values might spring, reason would become merely calculative, leaving individuals 
                                                 
25
 Bloom, 76. 
26
 Bloom, 88. 
27
 Bloom, 143. 
28
 Bloom, 39. 
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empty from pursuits of the facile and indulgent sensuality.
29
  Additionally, given the 
leveling of values with the death of God, the state of nature concepts produced by 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau, created a political atmosphere, notably in America, where 
democracy was understood in terms of egalitarianism.   Hence freedom without values 
seemingly took on a negative role and resulted in the type of person that Rousseau had 
referred to as the bourgeois, that lack-luster soulless individual who would be directed 
only by self interest manifested in terms of material pursuits.
30
 
 In his third and final section of his book, Bloom reflects on the change the 
American university has undergone and its relationship with and the effect on culture.  
Bloom reiterates and traces the intellectual history of the above theme of nihilism 
beginning with Socrates up to Nietzsche ending in Heidegger.  Socrates, according to 
Bloom, symbolizes the university par excellence.
31
  He is the outsider that calls into 
question those with pretense to knowledge that they must come to critically reflect and 
examine their assumptions in order to become more reasonable in order to pursue virtue.  
This is best demonstrated and made famous in Plato’s “Allegory of the Cave.”32  As such 
the university should be understood as founded on this Socratic imperative to know, 
reason and create competence, contiguous with the ideals of the Enlightenment.
33
  As 
                                                 
29
 Bloom, 150. 
30
 Bloom, 157. 
31
 Bloom, 268, 307. 
32
 Bloom, 256. 
33
 Bloom, 256, 298. 
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such, the ideal for the university was to sit freely outside of the political spectrum, yet set 
the course and direction of a liberal democracy as seen in the ideals of Plato’s Republic.34  
 However, the university’s success is perhaps also its moment of dénouement 
indicating the difficulty that democratization brings with it.
35
  Unfortunately the 
Enlightenment brought Nietzsche’s attack against Socratic rationality and translated it as 
a form of cultural imperialism.
36
  Accordingly, if one was to take the Nietzsche’s notion 
of historical consciousnesses seriously, it follows that all scholarship and thinking that 
had presupposed the achievement of objectivity was deluded.
37
  This had a huge affect on 
the German university and as Bloom saw it, the impact was to be felt by the rest of 
western culture.  Instead of the enlightened university and the humanities, specifically 
philosophy, directing the course for society as was the ideal, the humanities were 
relegated to the side and became departments that studied differing cultures, histories and 
ideas without the intention of discovering what is good or best in them.
38
 The lack of 
guidance in values by the humanities encouraged and promoted the elevation of what was 
useful and hence the natural science departments came to the forefront, supplanting the 
humanities.  And so, understandably, the sciences brought a lack in the profession to 
                                                 
34
 Bloom, 259- 266. 
35
 Bloom, 261. 
36
 Bloom, 34,39. 
37
 Bloom, 307. 
38
 Bloom, 309. 
11 
 
guide and set the moral compass of the students as well as the nation.
39
  The results 
would be foreboding.  Bloom indicates that by the time Heidegger comes on the scene in 
the context of the German university, his rektoratsrede 
40
became an address that was 
simply an admittance that the youth of the country “had already made an irreversible 
commitment to the future” and the country had seemingly little choice but to follow.41 
 Comparably and disturbingly similar, Bloom thought that this is our current crisis 
in the university and on large in culture.  It is more than a crisis of educational specifics 
such as lack of funding, or poor administration, but a crisis that is on a deeper 
philosophical level.  With Nietzsche and historicism came a cultural relativism that 
accepted the leveling of all values.  Our educational institutions no longer asserted a force 
in effecting culture to a greater and more virtuous behavior by promoting the best values, 
earned as it were through rigorous study.  Instead our situation results in a parallel 
between Heidegger’s rektoratsrede acknowledging the cultural youth movement of the 
1930’s in Germany and the decade of the 1960’s in America.42  
 One result of Bloom’s articulation is noted in the title and what we have already 
referred to as the problem of openness.  The result of Bloom’s thesis begs the more 
general problem of openness.  In his introduction, Bloom gives us two notions of 
openness.  The first is a positive and more essential openness that invites one to explore 
                                                 
39
 Bloom, 356,348-351. 
40
 Rektoratsrede translates as the rector’s address. This was Heidegger’s inaugural 
speech for the acceptance of directorship to the University of Heidelberg in May 1933. 
 
41
 Bloom, 311-312. 
42
 Bloom, 311. 
12 
 
and reason with some of history’s greatest thinkers in the university context with the 
intent to discover what is most valuable in life.  According to Bloom, this sense of 
openness is not simply to become academics, but is meant for us to discover via reason 
and discriminating judgment what is best by engaging in historical and philosophical 
literature of the past.  For Bloom this conversation with the past was not to be understood 
as a cultic revival of its former glories such as he thinks some adherence to the Great 
Books tradition creates.
43
  Rather it is to learn from the past thinkers who wrestled with 
those perennial issues so that we discover and understand the excellences we already 
espouse or would aspire to.  In keeping with this Enlightenment ideal, Bloom sees the 
goal of the university to instill these academic values in the student, and therefore direct 
and affect the culture at large.   
 The other kind of openness, a more negative conception, is the entire concern and 
point of Bloom’s book.  Americans, culturally and, more specifically, philosophically, 
have moved towards openness as a political and moral imperative.  To be open is to 
accept all cultures and views as having equal value, with the implication that the 
philosophical justification that ultimately no such morality or ideology is better than any 
others.  There is no authoritative standard on which to claim cultural superiority and so 
our democratic ethos is directed to tolerate and treat equal all such value claims.  Hence 
openness understood this way results in a type of openness that erases evaluative 
distinctions and claims to superiority.  Accordingly for Bloom, this moral opening is 
                                                 
43
 Bloom, 54. 
13 
 
rather an intellectual closing and, as he sees it, one that has put our higher education 
institutions, as well as the culture, into jeopardy. 
 It is with Bloom and his ironic use of an openness that closes that we are 
confronted with another aspect and problem of what it means to be open, particularly 
with relativism and its tendency toward a loss of measuring value, as a type of openness 
that causes some consternation in what Bloom thinks it means to be educated and the 
positive effects that it should have on culture.   The ironic sense of openness that Bloom 
is referring to is on a cultural level and therefore not directly applicable to Hare’s clear 
account of closedness understood as a dogmatic adherence.  Hare’s account depends 
upon holding to a clearly reasoned account and how one attitude is to be measured in 
light of the ability to reason.   Bloom’s account suggests something far more insidious 
was occurring in the name of openness - a cultural democratic value shift in America and 
its universities to disregard the use of reason as a means of discriminating among ideas.  
The cause for this alarm being the acceptance of certain schools of thought that 
undermined our ability to rationally evaluate, choose and prefer something that is better.   
However, Bloom’s articulation of his fears, along with his account has not gone 
unnoticed; his approach has had its critics. 
 Martha Nussbaum, in her review of Bloom’s book, finds an implicit elitism 
regarding his lack of surveying the entirety of the university scene as Bloom accounts for 
only a small and elite segment of the college and university setting.
44
  She claims that not 
only is his treatment limited, but his results are dubious as well as his lack of accounting 
                                                 
44
 Martha Nussbaum, Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in 
Liberal Education. (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press), 1997. 
 
14 
 
for multicultural and feminist issues. Nussbaum finds Bloom’s thesis not only highly 
questionable, but lacking in the kind of academic support and rigor that Bloom seems to 
hold in high regard.
45
  Perhaps the central difference between Nussbaum and Bloom is 
the democratic conception of the university.  She sees it as a place for everyone to 
develop their “rational powers,” whereas Bloom believes that it is only suited for a few 
“special natures.”46  This rejection of Bloom on the part of Nussbaum helped spawn her 
book Cultivating Humanity: A Classical Defense of Reform in Liberal Education, an 
account and survey of university and colleges all over the country.  In her book, 
Nussbaum articulates a positive and well researched view of the academy as it is from 
many points across America.  Her findings and conclusion show that there are many good 
institutions and individuals engaged in promoting rigorous academic skills, as well as 
Socratic approaches to dialogue with the intent to create values.  While Nussbaum extols 
the virtue and defense of how liberal educational values are intended to and do in fact 
cultivate humanity, she gives only slight concern to the problem of relativism.
47
  
Nussbaum admits there may be issues surrounding relativism but she does not, however, 
see it as cause for alarm, but merely a perennial problem that with good guidance belongs 
as a possible debate of many positions that should take place in a healthy democratic 
university.
48
 
                                                 
45
 Nussbaum, 24. 
46
 Nussbaum, 25. 
47
 Nussbaum, 41. 
48
 Nussbaum, 109. 
15 
 
 Bloom’s book was closely followed by a reprinting of Mortimer Adler’s 1977 
work, Reforming Education, but the 1988 edition had a new subtitle, The Opening of the 
American Mind, an explicit response to Bloom’s book.49  While Adler concedes that 
relativism is an issue regarding critical thinking, he finds Bloom’s entire historical 
narrative problematic as relativism was and has been a perennial issue prior to Bloom’s 
account.
50
  Adler argues polemically against Bloom regarding the causes of relativism 
and goes so far as to claim, like Nussbaum, that Bloom’s heritage in pedagogy had elitist 
and anti-democratic tendencies.
51
  Adler instead extols the virtues of what he defines as a 
truly democratic education through the employment of the dialectic method, over and 
against the doctrinal method employed by Bloom and his mentor, Leo Strauss.  If 
relativism is indeed an issue, Adler thinks curricula employing the dialectical method in 
tandem with the Great Books are and always will be the best way to counter the problem 
of moral skepticism and relativism.
52
  
 In 1996 Lawrence Levine published The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, 
Culture and History, yet another entry into this conversation and the critique of values 
that were clashing in American higher education.   Levine argues directly against Bloom 
that American universities have been historically open places that have changed and 
                                                 
49
 Mortimer Adler, Reforming Education: The Opening of the American Mind, 
(New York: Macmillan Publishing Company1988), vix. 
 
50
 Adler, xxix, xxx.  Additionally one may consider the Sophists as an early 
account. 
 
51
 Adler,  xxvi. 
52
 Adler, xxxiii. 
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developed largely because of the influx of differing cultures and immigrants.  In a very 
affirmative position, the greatness and success of American higher education has been the 
result of its historical development.  This positive development Levine indicates, is a 
direct result of the plurality of ideas, the openness to these differences and a struggle to 
sift out and develop the best curricula resulted in the success that is American higher 
education.
53
  Contrary to both Bloom and Adler, Levine argues as a historian specifically 
against a conservative cultural myth that our educational institutions were created around 
and based on the “classic canon,” suggesting that institutions of higher learning have 
abandoned this tradition to the moral and intellectual detriment of our culture.  This 
conservative myth sought to limit the types of things that are taught in the university and 
thus preserve a static and singular version of culture.
54
 Levine argues that historically the 
opposite is true, particularly, the strength of the American university has operated and 
developed diametrically opposed to this kind of limiting.  Being open and struggling with 
new and challenging traditions brought by immigrants, the influx of ideas and texts has 
brought about a flourishing in American education.   He claims if we simply look to the 
historical development of education, we will see that such fears about our institutions are 
unjustified, as are Blooms conclusions and his adherents.
55
 
 Similarly such concerns regarding openness and American education have not 
gone away, but have seemed to expand.  A book entitled Closed Minds? Politics and 
                                                 
53
 Lawrence Levine, The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture and 
History, (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996) xxvi – xix. 
 
54
 Levine, 47. 
55
 Levine, 170-174. 
17 
 
Ideology in American Universities, by Smith, Mayer and Fritschler was published in 2008 
by the Brookings Institution.  This book seeks to determine the extent of political or 
ideological bias that exists in American universities.  This project founded on the 
criticism that American universities are the home of liberal bias, and that professors 
indoctrinate their students, the authors endeavor to establish whether such fears are well 
founded.  To their surprise little is found on the part of their investigation that would 
show significant levels of bias in either a liberal or conservative direction as regarding 
pedagogy.  They generally conclude that due to professors’ drive toward research 
specialization and students’ focus on vocationalism, there is little or no significance to the 
claim that universities have particular leanings to the left, much less to the right.  Rather, 
the authors find a surprising lack of traditional discussion of civics and civic education, 
those conversations that might expose political orientations.  In their estimation this has 
resulted in students lacking the notion of what a liberal education was originally 
supposed to produce: good citizens.
56
 
 Though the book Closed Minds does not directly implicate Bloom’s book as a 
impetus toward a cause of universities having a left bias, it nevertheless is important to 
note the suggestive influence of Bloom’s thesis that the universities have moved toward 
the left, with the ironic use of openness in tow.  Regardless, this cultural concern over the 
fear of universities leaning left, noted specifically in Levine, most likely prompted a 
Brookings study formulated towards investigating whether American universities do 
indeed have a leftist bias and the concern over the claim that students are being 
                                                 
56
 Lee A. Fritschler,  Jeremy D. Mayer,  Bruce Smith, Closed Minds?: Politics 
and Ideology in American Universities, (Washington D.C.: Brooking Institution Press, 
2008.). 
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indoctrinated toward the left.  It would seem however, that the Brookings study confirms 
the merits of Nussbaum and Levine in the general orientation of the universities.   
 Before concluding we might take a moment and look toward the field of 
educational theory and try to ascertain what dialogue already exists.  In some sense we 
have already initiated a conversation as it has occurred among educational theorists who 
are not engaged specifically in the field of educational theory but who are well known 
theorist-practioners.  The credentials of Allan Bloom, Mortimer Adler and Martha 
Nussbaum have already been put forth.  But the controversy generated from Bloom’s 
book concentrated on issues relating to the type of curricula to be used and to the extent 
relativism is understood as a problem.  While the term openness has been often appealed 
to, the treatment of the subject of openness has been general.  This may beg the question 
whether or not there is an account of some of the work that has been done touching the 
issue of openness in other areas and disciplines.  It has been asserted that there is very 
little that exists in the way of explicitly defining and examining the issue of openness or 
closedness and certainly nothing regarding the present thesis that would connect 
reification with a closed mind.  We must of course re-mention that William Hare’s work 
is the exception.  He is explicitly an educational theorist and has spent considerable time 
examining the topic.  While his addition exists in this present inquiry as a primary source 
on the topic, his treatment of openness and closedness is a dispositional issue and does 
not offer the cognitive account I put forth.
57
  Aside from Hare, however, there exists 
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19 
 
some literature that speaks to the topic generally and to authors within the field that are 
relevant to the larger question of openness. I will begin with a general and representative 
account of some who have covered the topic and narrow to those in the educational field 
as we proceed. 
 A study of openness and closedness as it relates to the mind is detailed in the book 
by psychologist Milton Rokeach.  In his book The Open and Closed Mind: Investigations 
into the Nature of Belief Systems and Personality Systems,
58
 Rokeach seeks to investigate 
the general structures of belief systems, particularly the way the mind manifests as either 
opened or closed in an account to uncover potential structural patterns so that we might 
better predict and understand the nature of belief and thought.  Because Rokeach comes 
at his problems psychologically, he tries to explain the difference between a closed mind 
and an open one by the way a person believes and not necessarily the content of that 
belief.  Rokeach attempts to measure these belief systems based on a continuum or what 
he refers to the “dogmatism scale.”59  Those who are closed have and hold strongly 
dogmatic beliefs while those who are less dogmatic are considered, by degree, more 
open, or having lower instances of dogmatism.
60
  He asserts that belief systems stem from 
two general motives, the need to understand and the need to protect the ego from those 
things that threaten it.  In the most positive sense, an open mind or system of beliefs is 
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measured by how freely a person will deliberate on the intrinsic merits of alternative 
ideas or information.  Ideally, the open minded person will consider the intrinsic merit of 
opposing or novel views, evidence and sources, assessing each on their perceived 
credibility. On the other hand, Rokeach identifies a closed mind as one that is 
threatened.
61
  A closed mind will tend to accept or reject things based on several factors.  
Such threats are based on perceptions of how the issues correlate positively or negatively 
with chosen authorities, general intolerance to novelty, how isolated one may feel, 
anxiety over the future, how one will be perceived by others after accepting the idea, and 
the need for certainty.  Rokeach asserts that a threatened mind will lead to a dogmatic 
stance, and hence a closed system of beliefs.  A closed mind then is a correlative to a 
closed system of beliefs.  It is how a mind behaves when threatened.  A closed mind is 
understood in terms of dogmatism.
62
  
 The idea of dogmatism or even indoctrination has continued to be a prominent 
theme when talking about closedness.  We have already identified one of the most 
relevant contributions to this inquiry, William Hare’s Open-mindedness and Education.63  
In this same context, then, Hare sets about explicitly to define, explain and defend a 
positive view of open-mindedness over and against popularized ambiguities of the term. 
Hare argues that open-mindedness is attitudinal and a necessity for what it means to be 
educated; however, in terms of what a closed mind is, Hare, similar to Rokeach, defines a 
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closed mind as one that has been subject to indoctrination, so that the individual cannot 
even see his own position with any degree of objectivity.  For Hare, indoctrination is de 
facto closed mindedness.  Admittedly for Hare, to be open-minded is to be able to 
consider and revise one’s views.  So if a person is or has been indoctrinated, they are 
considered unable to be in a position to examine their own views, much less consider 
opposing views.
64
  Secondly, a person may be closed minded out of willfulness.  That is, 
while they might be able to consider opposing views, they may be unwilling to do so.  
This suggests that an open mind, for Hare, is the ability to detach oneself from one’s 
views and examine them in an objective manner.
65
  In other words, one must be willing to 
consider the other view point and be “open” to evaluating it and against one’s own.   
 Similarly, Elmer Thiessen in his book Teaching for Commitment
66
 explores the 
idea how religious indoctrination manifests and interacts with liberal education and 
scientific and democratic ideals.  Agreeing with Hare, Thiessen assumes that 
indoctrination results in a person being closed minded.  As he explores this is in a 
religious context, Thiessen posits the ideal of critical openness as the cure for dogmatism.  
Similarly, as in Rokeach and Hare, the ideal of critical openness suggest that an open 
mind is one that can examine the assumptions of its own thinking while at the same time 
consider evidence or the arguments of other views and can change accordingly if 
necessary.  Thiessen goes back to the very roots of the Enlightenment to argue that 
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critical openness is inherent in the Enlightenment’s ideal of education and is a component 
to critical thinking.  Over and against this notion, closedness is understood as non-
rationally held beliefs.  In contra-distinction to the above, a closed mind does not 
consider the evidence or arguments of other views but will hold on to its view 
regardless.
67
 
 The above is a good sample of the type of discussion that exists on openness and 
closedness as referring to the disposition.
68
 Perhaps what is important to note is the trend 
of viewing closedness as relating to indoctrination or at the very least an unwillingness to 
examine other views regardless of the weight of evidence.  This unwillingness suggests 
that disposition or attitude plays an essential role in understanding how a mind is or 
becomes closed.  Though Rokeach’s psychological investigation suggests ”threat” as a 
strong motivational influence, all three agree that openness requires a volitional 
component on the part of the subject to be open dispositionally in order to examine new 
evidence, that is, the willingness to consider new or additional evidence in light of 
present assumptions is the consummate objective of knowledge.  Openness and 
closedness in this sense indicates the conditions of the subject’s disposition.   
 This notion of dispositional openness is only furthered by numerous references in 
other sources.  Perhaps influenced by Rokeach, the realm of psychology has used the idea 
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of openness as a facet scale in the NEO Personality Inventory.  Here “openness” is 
understood as “openness to experience.”69  In assessing a personality, the test tries to 
account for the extent to which a person is or is not “open” and described in sub facets of 
Fantasy or the imaginative, Aesthetics, Feelings, Actions in terms of willingness to try 
new things or going new places, and finally Ideas or intellectual curiosity.
70
   
 The field of research is also a venue that has accommodated this notion of 
openness. In his text, Openness in research: the tension between self and other, I. Maso, 
argues that openness is to be understood as a dispositional requirement in conducting 
social science research.
71
   
 But these examples above are only indirectly relatable to this inquiry.  The above 
review attempts to acknowledge as a whole the problems and issues surrounding these 
terms. As we see, openness and closedness is indeed pervasively used but with often only 
intuitive understanding of how it is meant or in dispositional terms defined in light of 
dogma.  As such, there is literature that attempts to delineate what is meant by openness 
and closedness with the educational context as we see in Hare, Rokeach and Theissen, 
specifically in defining closedness as indoctrination.  There is of course even more 
literature from across the spectrum that makes use of openness as a condition to human 
nature that perhaps more actively involves our disposition and thus has an application in 
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research.  But the above, while a sampling, does not add to the discussion on how to 
understand the notion of closedness for which we are presently arguing.   
Narrowing our research within the field of recent educational theory publications yields 
similar results.
72
 What follows are two examples that deal with the topic at hand and yet 
consider the ideas of openness and closedness similarly as we have seen above. 
 One such typical example of the treatment of openness is Andrew Metcalf and 
Anne Game’s, “Significance and Dialogue in Teaching and Learning.”73  In this article 
Metcalf and Game emphasize the importance dialogue plays in reducing the propensity of 
people who take defensive positions based on identity and instead are opened up though 
conversation and exchange.
74
  It is argued that dialogue itself along with attempts to 
understand the other provide this moment of openness that is required for growth and 
development.
75
   
 While the article provides some relevancy to the notion of openness, the treatment 
of what exactly is understood as “openness” is lacking and as such is typical of the 
literature the author has found.  However, one relevant element that Metcalf and Game 
define is the ability for dialogue to suspend “the senses of time space and ontologies on 
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which identities are based.”76  Metcalf and Game argue under a Hegelian logic of identity 
that provides the possibility of relations.  Identities can only develop within the 
confrontation of difference in a context of exchange.  This notion of interacting from 
difference and exchange provides the movement that is definitional in “education as a 
transformative rather than a simply accumulative process.”77  This transformative 
experience, they argue, occurs in dialogue and causes shifts in one’s ontologies.  Similar 
to my project and especially in light of the authors’ appeal to Hegel, these shifts from one 
understanding or from one ontology to another are rightly understood as reified forms 
that consciousness has taken in the process of transforming from one less adequate to a 
more substantial form of consciousness.
78
    
 Metcalf and Game’s concern for the necessity for “shifting ontologies” become 
exceedingly important when we consider D.C. Philips article, “Dealing Competently  
with the Serious Issue of the Day:  How Dewey (and Popper) Failed”.  Philips argues that 
both Dewey and Popper had become dissatisfied with philosophy of their day in that the 
field of philosophy had become incapable of addressing any number of the pressing 
social and political issues.
79
  While both might have seemed optimistic that this could be 
remedied, Philips argues that they both fail to show how to resolve the problem of 
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individuals who hold on to positions fanatically and as such without regard to being 
open.
80
  Philips points to the issues that both thinkers identify the cause of this lack of 
openness as the inability to have rational dialogue.   Philips contends that both Dewey 
and Popper’s optimism fails because the position of the fanatic is so stringently defined 
and closed, that education and reason are lost values to them and have little to no effect.
81
  
 Philip’s article is perhaps one of the few that does not simply address the idea of 
closedness in terms of simple dogmatism, although he is identifying the fanatic in those 
terms.  What Philips provides is a healthy skepticism of education and philosophy’s 
abilities, at least so conceived, in having any substantial impact in directly affecting a 
closed, fanatical position.  Notably, the problems of dogmatism and the fanatic are 
closely associated.  What makes Philip’s article interesting in light of Metcalf and 
Games’ is that the former argues that dialogue is the transformer of experience.  Philips, 
along with Dewey and Popper, would agree with this under the condition that those 
engaged in dialogue are already open to having such an exchange, which will exclude 
those who Philips identifies as closed, i.e. the fanatic.  What Philips provides in terms of 
openness and closedness is simply an understanding of the terms as they have been 
defined above.  Closedness in the case of fanaticism is not just being closed to new 
evidence and reason, but is a dispositional quality of being unwilling to engage in that 
possibility.  
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 What we are not seeing is any attempt to identify the cognitive structures that 
either are a part of the volitional and emotive dispositional elements of dogmatists, or that 
may be considered and exist separately from this particular problem.  This is then the 
point of the present inquiry and project:  to show the cognitive element that adds or is a 
performative closure on the part of the mind.  To this extent, no one has made an explicit 
argument that reification as static closures creates a closed mind.  This thesis will of 
course be developed in the following pages. 
 The lack of scholarship then seems to suggest some questions, such as “Why isn’t 
there more on this subject?” or “Does this subject as such have any pertinent value?”  
This project began with the assertion that we are commonly engaged in using the terms 
open and closedness when speaking of people as this is common in our casual discourse.  
Additionally, we as educational theorists should address and define these terms 
intelligently.  But if we merely consider Philip’s article of all those sources we have 
reviewed, the dual problem of philosophy and education’s struggle to stem fanaticism 
still makes itself felt in our world.  It would seem that it is imperative to explore this topic 
even by way of negation, if it means resolving the problem of being closed and what it 
has caused in the social political sphere.   
 But this brief review of literature suggests the need for more attention to the entire 
subject, especially considering recent fundamentalism that demonstrates closedness as 
one of its main features.  While these sources give some attention to the concepts of 
openness and closedness, we are left with a general and unsatisfying account of how to 
actualize the ideal of being open in the right way and avoid closed mindedness.   
28 
 
 While the notion of disposition is provocative and begs exploring, especially in 
light of how one’s dispositional stance might become closed, it is the literature that has 
not refined or explored intimately how this stance is to be achieved.  While a broad 
exploration of educative disposition might then be warranted, limitation and narrow focus 
on achieving amplification on smaller inquiries can be more productive than the broad 
and undefined characteristics that have been suggested.  Explicitly then, the intent of this 
project is to not follow brush stokes that have appeared vague and general, but to limit 
our investigation to analysis of one feature of closedness that is not accounted for in a 
dispositional approach.  For convenience sake, a look at how reification plays into the 
problem of disposition is to suggest that this analysis is more cognitive than volitional, 
more oriented on operational aspects of thinking and learning rather than on how an 
emotional stance can be encourage or created.  Examination and defining the stasis that 
occurs under the concept of reification will be our starting points in the next chapter with 
explanation on how it better informs our understanding of closedness. 
 In conclusion, for one to bring up the problems in understanding what is meant by 
the terms of an open and closed mind, we would again be amiss not mentioning the work 
of William Hare.  As such it should stand noted in relatively high account regarding the 
general inquiry of what it means to have an open mind.  However, we are recognizing a 
different problem that has not arisen explicitly in terms of Hare’s inquiry, but has taken 
root as it were in ‘full’ Bloom.  As we have seen, Bloom has given us an account of the 
state of American education that is characterized as having abandoned discriminating 
reason with an allegedly leaning left orientation.  Of the many variables traced in 
Bloom’s thesis, it is perhaps Nietzsche who is at the center with his lamentation that the 
29 
 
old gods are dead and with the concern of what will replace them.   The distinct concern 
and anxiety with cultural relativity spawned from certain academic philosophies, such as 
Nietzsche’s influence, and the acceptance of historicism.  This alleged relativity seen as 
having in some certain aspects, resulted from these philosophies have become to some 
extent accepted and morphed in a democratic context as a moral postulate of cultural 
‘openness’.     
 Bloom’s critics rightly urge us to reconsider the validity of his claims, particularly 
the fear of relativism.  His critics more or less see relativism as a ubiquitous phenomenon 
that finds its early articulation in the Athenian sophists and perennially in the course of 
history, especially in the decades prior to when Bloom identifies the trouble in American 
institutions.
82
   In light of this we might ask if Bloom asserts a special claim in that we 
have a particular problem with America.  Does our democratic form produced a unique 
moral relativism?  The critics above may have some concern and agree that relativism is 
a problem when it disregards rational commitment.  But this agreement is largely 
overshadowed by the disagreement of the severity of the problem and moreover what 
Bloom identifies as the causes.  It is the elitism and nostalgia for the imagined golden 
days of the university that seems to unify the critics against Bloom.  More strongly 
contested is the democratic value that other voices – the multiculturalists, feminists, and 
even relativists – have been and must continue to be a part of our American higher 
educational institutions.  
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 Yet we are reminded not only by the Brookings study, but by Levine’s 
identification of a political atmosphere in which such fear and concern over relativism 
has had a profound effect.  This effect is demonstrated in Lynn Cheney’s 1992 report as 
the chairman of the National Endowment for the Humanities.  She suggests that relative 
notions of truth were being used by the left to further political agendas.
83
  In an even 
more recent example Charles Colson, in his series Do the Right Thing, posits an ethical 
crisis in America that is as a result of cultural relativism.  This reminds us that the 
concern over this issue is not dead, but very much alive and those many of those who are 
concerned carry cultural influence.
84
   It is not only Bloom’s incitement, but the fierce 
acceptance or its rejection, the effect his seeming message regarding the deplorable state 
of our higher educational institutions has wrought among his fans and opponents that 
partially impels this project.   
 But where does this leave us in terms of understanding openness?  It will not be 
the purpose of this inquiry to answer all the particular fears and concerns over the alleged 
or real problems associated with that of cultural relativism, nor to defend Bloom from his 
critics.  But it will be of interest to re-examine the question of openness in light of 
Bloom’s use of the terms and the considerable controversy it has generated.  His ironic 
play on the terms an ‘opening’ that ends up being a ‘great closing’, suggests a potential 
problem not only associated with relativity but with a certain tradition that might be 
referred to as continental philosophy.   That tradition which brought us Nietzsche and 
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Heidegger as well as others, has produced concern over their ideas in regard to relativity.  
Central to this inquiry will be to articulate another understanding of the terms openness 
and closedness and in so doing use the thinkers of the continental tradition, those 
mentioned above whom Bloom sees as causing the loss of value distinction.  As such, it 
is the hope that an understanding from within the continental tradition can shed light on 
how openness and closedness might look, and that concerns over relativism might fade as 
the thinkers we use will inevitably show great concern for truth and how we may be open 
or closed to such possibilities. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
REIFICATION AND CLOSEDNESS 
 In our initial questioning we began by asking what an open or closed mind is.  
Openness and closedness in referring to the mind is so far only a metaphor used to 
express a comparable way to understand how a mind is thought to behave in regard to 
experience and ideas.  We might note from the preceding discussion that openness, 
whether in Bloom’s ironic pejorative use, or in a more positive account used by both 
Bloom and his critics, generally refers to openness and closedness apart from the mind 
and generally in terms of a dispositional state or condition of a person’s approach to 
knowing.  While it was not Bloom’s project to define openness as such, the reference to 
what method or curriculum or set of values was appropriate to insure an approach that 
would open minds, rather than hinder them, was at stake.   
 We however intend to examine in a more specific way the problem of openness.   
But it is perhaps important to note that we are not reproducing Hare’s account that 
explicitly defines open-mindedness as a dispositional state over and against a disposition 
of dogmatism.  Our intent is to approach the subject by the route of an unlikely concept, 
that of reification.  Reification as a concept has had a time honored ubiquity in literature 
throughout history.  In what follows I will show some of its uses and flesh out a 
definition that will aid in our understanding of the larger issue of openness and closeness.  
I suggest that the use of reification is an unlikely concept for our examination as, to the 
32 
best of my knowledge, has never been explored as such.  With this hope then the inquiry 
will proceed with the hope of amplifying the concept of reification specifically in terms 
of “closedness” and it is phenomenal explanation in the philosophies of Immanuel Kant 
and Martin Heidegger, two thinkers important to the continental tradition that has some 
reference to the first chapter. 
Reification 
 What then is reification? The term derives its origin from the Latin res meaning 
thing, object or actual matter, while its suffix, -ication or facere,  means “to 
make/take/turn into”.1  In German the word for reification is Verdinglichung, or 
thingifcation.
2
  Literally then, reification means making or turning something into a thing.  
We might then ask “who” is doing the turning or making in the case of reification.  We 
may easily grant that the making or turning into a thing is not a divine act, one that occurs 
out of nothingness, but a human action.  If reification occurs, we might infer that it is a 
human phenomenon, one that implies we are already working in a medium, with 
existence, creatively, as the term making or turning suggests. Is this making/turning 
simply an artistic endeavor changing the form of matter that already exists?  When 
looking at basic definitions of reification, one immediately understands that in terms of 
making/turning, the process is mental.  The Oxford English Dictionary specifically 
defines reification as a “mental conversion of a person or abstract concept into a thing,” 
indicating that reification is indeed a human phenomenon and one that is performed by 
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the mind.
3
  So then what is the nature of this mental conversion?  How is this 
turning/taking/making into a thing done?  What is implied in this mental conversion?  Is 
reification an error or is it simply a creative act? Are reifications inappropriate in their 
converting or is it something necessary in the process of abstracting?   
 We might quickly note the distinction of reification in terms of persons or 
abstractions.  According to the definition it would seem both have the potential to 
become reified.  In terms of reification of persons, the Marxist tradition takes this 
problem quite seriously and gives it a great deal of attention.  I will address Marx in due 
time, but let it be understood that converting a person into a thing is generally understood 
as a value reduction of a human being, or reification understood as dehumanization.  But 
we must note that in the case of the definition in as much as people are objects of 
perception, they are in fact subject to abstraction.  That is to say that the process of 
abstracting from our experience is more primary regardless of whether we are involved 
with inert objects, or animals or persons.  Therefore we will concentrate on the issue of 
abstraction.  How is it that an abstraction gets converted and is it appropriate?  This may 
beg other issues such as what are abstractions? Are only certain kinds of abstractions 
prone to reification, while others are not?  Is it possible to have an abstraction that can 
remain unreified?  Again, is reification a necessary correlation to abstracting or is it 
inappropriate to abstracting? 
 Aside from merely identifying reification as a human act, other sources, such as 
the Philosopher's Dictionary, consider reification a “mistaken way of thinking about some 
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abstract notion as if it were a thing”.4  If reification can be reduced in part as a human 
taking of an abstraction and turning it into a thing, then some views consider reification 
as a mis-taking.  Early citations of the term suggest the same issue.  Grote writes, 
“Boiocalus would have had some trouble to make his tribe comprehend the reification of 
the god Helios”.5  Grote seems to suggest that Greek tribes were mistaking events or 
situations and explaining them in terms of positing a deity.  In other words, if the wind 
did not fill their sails of their ships, the Greeks thought the gods were not happy.  While 
we might note that Marx's conception of the mis-taking or turning is usually in terms of 
reduction, Grote and others see reification in terms of mental creations that are wholly 
fallacious.  Similarly J.S. Mill identifies this mis-taking in his text on logic.  Though he 
does not use the term 'reification', he does define what he considers a “natural fallacy” of 
ascribing objective existence to abstractions.
6
  Mill thinks there is a natural tendency in 
people to presume that whatever the mind conceives of must also have a corresponding 
object that exists.
7
  Whether it is Plato's positing of “The Good” or Grote's early Greek 
theology, or one’s inference of “Fate” or “Nature” or even one’s reference to the “State,” 
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there is perhaps a perennial problem of mis-taking the abstractions as a certain sort of 
real, existing thing.
8
   
 While there seems to be a vast difference between a Marxist notion of reification 
and of the above in terms of the subject that is affected by reification, error is still 
implied.  With Marx the error might simply be understood as a categorical mistake with 
the implication that that a human is not a thing.  But that is perhaps an over 
simplification, for the issue that arises is one of ethics.  Humans, while having real 
objective existence, are thought to have, or should be considered to have, intrinsic value.  
On the other hand, reifications of abstractions are troubling in another way.  It would 
seem that any mental conversion of an abstraction into a thing, understood as existing, 
whether it is a belief in a god, or lesser things, still suggests an error.  
 But in terms of reification, the phenomenon that we wish to clarify, there is 
another term that some have used to preserve the above distinction between 
taking/turning of abstractions and people into things. This term is Hypostatization and 
might be considered in origin as the Greek equivalent to its Latin other - reification.  
Hypo in Greek means 'under' or that which stands beneath, while statization means 
“causing to stand or stop.”9  Kant speaks of hypostatization as the moment our “outer 
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sense has something standing and abiding in it, which supplies substratum grounding”.10 
Here Kant speaks of our sense intuitions; the external world provides our concepts 
material from which we make determinations.  According to the OED hypostatization is 
defined as “to make into” or regard as a self-existent substance or person; to embody, 
impersonate.”  Note that the verb in the OED, “to make into...” is used similarly as in 
reification.
11
  It might seem that we have something of an equivocation of terms then as 
hypostatization seems much like the way we are defining reification, or at the very least, 
there are similarities to the mental conversions that we are trying to describe.  However, 
distinctions are possible.  The Dictionary of Philosophy defines hypostatization as a 
special sort of philosophical reification.  But these distinctions are not held hard and fast.  
In his article, “What is the fallacy of Hypostatization,” Morris Engel suggests that 
hypostatization occurs, “when we regard an abstract word as if it were a concrete thing.”  
Not only do the definitions seem to overlap, but even Engel sources some who use the 
term reify as an instance of the fallacy of hypostatization.  For instance, Engel quotes 
Gardiner's The Cool Arm of Destruction: Modern Weapons and Moral Insensitivity: 
“...through reifying the symbolic constructions of the imaginations, as if they had 
objective existence of their own;”12  But there are confusions of the two terms in other 
areas, such as secondary sources on Kant.  The German term Verdinglichung can be 
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either translated as reification or as hypostatization, such as in Hoffe's commentary on 
Kant
13
 or as in Guyer and Wood's translation of Kant's first critique.  One might ask, why 
then this issue of equivocation?  What does it tell us?  While the phenomenon is 
acknowledged as a problem, the similarity and equivocation with hypostatization 
suggests that it is not necessarily clear what the difference is.  At the very least, the need 
for clarity is part of the task at hand.  I am not interested in merely pursuing the term; 
rather I intend to focus on the phenomenon that stands behind such terms.  Furthermore, 
this will have implications on the methodological approach I will use.  This will not then 
be just philosophical analysis, but it is in a real sense a phenomenological approach. 
The Tradition 
 But if one is to examine the phenomenon of reification, then perhaps looking at 
the literature that gave rise to its modern usage is even more essential than looking at 
dictionary definitions rendered from sources such as the ones above.  One might begin 
with Georg Lukacs, who uses the term perhaps the most prominently in his seminal work 
History of Class Consciousness.
14
  It is in this text that Lukacs identifies reification in 
terms of how consciousness becomes set and affected by the social structures, most 
notably under the auspices of capitalism.  Capitalism by its very operations determined 
the terms and conditions regarding how one was to view himself in relation to others.  In 
other words, the economic force of capitalism set to reifying man’s consciousness in how 
he not only understood himself, but how he related to the rest of society.   Such 
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elaboration of reification was made possible by Karl Marx.  While Marx actually never 
used the term reification, he did lay the groundwork by addressing the phenomenon in his 
book: Capital.
15
 In terms of reification as the process of mental conversions, he uses such 
terms as “alienation,” “false consciousness” and “commodity fetishism” to identify key 
moments that describe the way in which the economic structure of capitalism dominates 
and determines the nature of social relations.  Marx points out that the language of 
capitalism uses such abstract terms as “value,” “labor” and “property”, which takes on a 
“phantom objectivity” and becomes a dominating factor in how the self and social 
relations are determined.  It was important for Marx to show that the assumed structures 
or abstractions created a “false consciousness” of how people understood themselves and 
their neighbors.  Marx understood that when people were viewed by and through 
economic structures, their value shifted from the qualitative sphere to the quantitative, a 
considerable reduction.  Lukacs strongly echoes this notion and spends considerable time 
in noting the way reification affects not only the working class but the entire social 
structure in terms of consciousness.  In other words, Lukacs develops Marx's ideas by 
arguing that what is essential in reification is not only the results, i.e. actual instances of 
dehumanization, but the process by which the consciousness itself accepts these terms, 
especially by those who are treated as things.  In other words, it is both the proletariat as 
well as the bourgeois consciousness that fall prey to the reifying affects of capitalism.  
Marx exposes an essential moment in how we see the phenomenon in dialectical terms. 
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Lukacs expands on this theme and concentrates on pointing out how modern capitalistic 
structures reify consciousness.
16
 
 But perhaps reification as a phenomenon can be found earlier.  Marx's 
predecessor Georg W. Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Spirit, shows how consciousness 
is formed through successive stages of development, i.e. sense perception, perception, 
understanding and self consciousness.
17
  Each stage comes to an end through the 
assertion of a contradiction, propelling the next step to be taken, in other words, the 
dialectic.  While Marx exploited this notion for his account of historical materialism, 
Hegel concentrated on the movement of conscious development and believed that our 
knowledge of the world came about through a mediated social and organic relationship.  
In speaking about Hegel's process of the dialectic, Herbert Marcuse refers to Hegel's first 
three sections of his Phenomenology of Spirit as nothing other that a critique of 
reification.
18
  Marcuse points out that the dialectic is nothing other than the process of 
reification at one moment only to be later subverted or de-reified by its antithesis.  This is 
clearly the larger implication used by Marx and his predecessors who focused not on the 
development of consciousness itself, but rather on the larger historical development of 
society.  In either case, the dialectic can be said to be an instance of the phenomenon of 
reification, whether on the point of the individual consciousness or the larger social 
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structures.  It might be noted that with each differing emphasis there exists a distinction 
between the reifying of consciousness and that of larger social structures.  What might 
also be noted is the distinction between orientations: reification as a macro-
social/institutional issue, and reification on the micro level of individual consciousness. 
 In a more contemporary articulation of reification, Berger and Luckmann pick up 
on this notion of the social structural approach in their text, The Social Construction of 
Reality.
19
  Here reification is understood in terms of human apprehension in taking social 
structures, institutions and ideas not as human constructions, but as in either super human 
or in non human terms.  In other words, there is a notion of error here, or as Berger and 
Luckmann suggest, “reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own 
authorship of the world” and that anytime man objectifies his social structures or 
institutions, reification is inevitable.
20
  So while Berger and Luckmann admonish us to 
see the problem of institutional reification on a large scale that is how it creates a de-
humanized world with the suggestion that dialectically de-reification is necessary.  What 
is unclear in Berger and Luckman, as well as many in the Marxist tradition, is the 
question “Is complete de-reification possible?” On this question it might appear that this 
Hegelian/Marxist tradition is somewhat divided by degree, some believing in the 
necessary de-reifying of capitalism in order to move positively into a unreified existence 
or later versions that suggest de-reification is going to be a continual process, that is of 
undoing the human structures that continually assert themselves.  
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 Another place relevant to issues of reification is the hermeneutic tradition 
beginning with Martin Heidegger, who suggests that man's appropriation of “Being” is 
part of what it means to be human. That man in terms of “Dasein”, an existential being 
set in history, “always already” with a static set of notions and beliefs about the world.21  
That to understand man in his hermeneutic interpretive situatedness is to see the potential 
relevancy of reification in this tradition.  If Hegel's dialectical moments are nothing but 
similar abstractions of the world, being subverted by the next step, then any hermeneutic 
approach is also bound to have reifying potential.  While Berger and Luckmann 
emphasize authorship of the world in terms of constructivism, hermeneutics affirms the 
same notion. That our appropriation of the world may be complete is to suggest 
reification is a constant threat to which we must always be aware.  In the hermeneutic 
tradition this is perhaps seen in its extreme in the figure of Jacques Derrida, whose 
deconstruction could be argued as the attempt at undoing all things which are held as 
reified.
22
  This might beg a question on the most basic terms: what then is the difference 
between de-construction and de-reification?  While that question might not get its answer 
here, it seems that constructivism might have its own views regarding reification.  Burke 
Thomason's Making Sense of Reification identifies the idea of dialectic and the possibility 
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of de-reification through an examination of Alfred Schutz's writings on constructivism.
23
  
That is, Burke argues from Schultz's ideas, that there needs to be dialectic between 
reification and de-reification.  But this is only acceptable if it is understood in 
methodological terms rather than an ontological error.  Burke develops this dialectic 
between what he refers to as a passive and active stance in interpreting the world.  
Reification is a process where reified constructions are allowed to be productively 
assumed, with the implicit understanding of their provisionality.  That is, one understands 
that the taking or turning into a thing is in fact a human construction.  The suggestion 
here is that if one approaches reification in terms of a methodological approach, then one 
attempts not to forget that these reifications are not to be ontologically set in the mind.  
The hope here, similar to the hermeneutic approach, is that one may get some mileage or 
explanatory power from these static constructions.  In her book The Human Condition, 
Hanna Arendt notes this similarity in terms of Schultz's positive use of reification.  She 
defines reification as one of the essential components of human creativity by explaining 
reification in terms of fabrication.
24
  This concept of fabrication, similar to 
making/turning, hearkens to the Greek concept of poiesi, or that idea of what man brings 
forth abstractly from the matter.  Arendt suggests that this process of making, i.e. man's 
labor, has a way of being essential to him.  Man creates and finds identity in transforming 
his world through his labor.  In other words, through labor man finds meaning.  But in 
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terms of our point, the making or reification, Arendt asserts that man is also just as free to 
undo his work. 
 Finally there is Timothy Bewes' book Reification or the Anxiety of Late 
Capitalism.
25
  Bewes develops an argument involving a modern fixation with the concept 
of reification itself.  Such concern over the issue of reification, Bewes argues, is a sign of 
our anxiety from living in an overly fast-paced society with all its excesses of market 
driven consumption.  Bewes traces how our concern with reification implies a desire on 
the part of society to find its ground or its obsession for the real or given.  Bewes spends 
time developing a thorough account of reification, with the intention of focusing on why 
it has become a topic or problem for modernity.  With an understanding of reification as 
inevitable, Bewes suggests that anxiety over the notion itself is a necessary correlation to 
this age.  But Bewes claims that any explicit notion of reification implies its possible 
liberation or the possibility of de-reification.  Bewes ends his text by suggesting that the 
implicit anxiety over this concept shows that we not only desire getting back to 
something solid, but that underneath this lack is a need for intimacy in light of our social 
conditions.
26
 
 To summarize then, the “terms” reification, and its relative, hypostatization, seem 
to have been understood as something more akin to an error or fallacy, that the mis-taking 
or mis-turning of either an abstraction or person into a thing ascribes an ontological status 
to the abstraction that is inappropriate.  But from the philosophical literature, the way the 
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phenomenon is dealt with suggests reification has larger implications.  Whether in the 
Marxist tradition, the hermeneutic tradition or constructivism, reification takes on 
implications for how human consciousness perceives the world.  In hermeneutics and 
constructivism, reification seems to have a constitutive element in terms of what it means 
to interpret or construct a world and so it might be pointed out that the turning or taking 
of abstractions is indeed the nature of our interaction with the external world, part of our 
interpreting.  In this sense reification takes on a larger significance than being just a mere 
fallacy.  This suggests possibly that reification is part of what it means to interpret, but if 
we understand reification as an ascription of thing-hood or ontological stasis to those 
interpretations, the reification becomes understood as a problem of holding or statisizing 
one’s interpretations such that they become a performative closure.    
 In what follows, I want to examine this problem of reification as a form of 
closedness.  If we’ve understood the concept of reification to be a problem of 
interpretation, rather than simply a mistaking of an abstraction as a disparate thing, then 
understanding how interpretation in general maybe prone to this problem is extremely 
relevant.   However, it is hard to speak about closedness without reference to openness.  
With the emphasis regarding reification as closedness we will focus on this rather than 
adding the burdensome task of also defining openness.  But in speaking about one, it will 
be hard to not suggest the other, even if by implication.  In this sense, openness will be 
referred to as the general problem.  In this way then I wish to concentrate quite 
specifically on the idea of closedness, particularly in terms of the very phenomenon itself 
and how it occurs in light of reification.  Even so, I will make a distinction and departure 
from what has been broadly understood in terms of closedness as indoctrination and 
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retain the concept of openness as the ability to consider new possibilities, via Hare.   
Instead I will examine the phenomenon of a closed mind under the concept of reification 
in a hermeneutic paradigm rather than through a traditionally Marxist understanding of 
the term.  When understood in its fullest sense, reification can be thought of as the mental 
stasis of interpretations or concepts, i.e. abstractions.  This of course includes statically 
reducing people to things as understood by Marx’s followers.  My use of reification is to 
enlarge and exploit this term beyond the ethical implications as used by Marx’s 
followers, most notably Lukács.  These statically held abstractions can be as little as 
disparate concepts, or people and as well as larger sets of interpretations; i.e. worldviews.  
Relating how reification is a problem of mental stasis will be directly related to how one 
should think of a certain sort of closedness of mind.  Additionally, I suggest that 
reification has never been used to describe closedness.  There are perhaps many terms 
that have been associated and used to describe closedness, such as “bias” and 
“dogmatic.”  Regarding these terms, and perhaps others, I will show how reification is 
distinctive in its use toward amplifying our understanding of what it means to have a 
closed mind.  
 Additionally and perhaps as importantly, I will assert that the problem of an open 
or closed mind is essentially and foremost an educational issue.  First, the question of 
what an open or closed mind is and the question of its value rightly falls in the purview of 
educational theory.  For who should better attempt to understand, define and discuss the 
condition of student’s minds and their potential receptivity than our educational leaders? 
Who is better suited to the task of how an open or closed mind is to be rightly understood 
than those who claim to define the nature of educational aims, purposes, processes and 
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ideals?  If educators are not involved in knowing and discussing such issues, it is to their 
and our detriment.  As we’ve already seen in William Hare, educators have already been 
about this business.  In that spirit then, I hope to add or amplify our understanding of 
such terms, albeit even if it be in a small way.   
 Secondly, to the educator, whether a mind is open or closed has special 
significance.  For if such a term points out a meaningful problem or elicits an imperative 
ideal, the teacher will be the professional who must deal with its positive or negative 
manifestations in the most immediate sense.  If imparting knowledge to students is in any 
way helped or hindered by the phenomenon in question, then the teacher has much to 
gain by being not only knowledgeable on a such a topic, but also by understanding how 
to practically engage and interact with students who might be hindered by closedness.   
Lastly and perhaps most importantly, I would suggest that the very examination and the 
definitions that will be exposed in the relevant literature and this study on the subject of 
openness or closedness are essential to the process of education itself.  Without giving an 
adequate argument here, I hope that the following pages will show in bas-relief that one’s 
disposition to being open or closed will qualitatively make a difference in the process of 
learning. It is a major assumption of the examination itself that the degree or condition of 
openness on the part of the person will necessarily affect their quality of education. 
 Specifically then I will examine several thinkers from the continental tradition 
who have much to add to the discussion on how we think and interpret specifically in the 
light of how we assigning ontological status to our abstractions, human or other.  In other 
words I intend to show through these thinkers where and how reification begins to play a 
part in human consciousness and as a human phenomenon.  Examining reification then 
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through these continental sources, it is hoped that a new elucidation and amplification of 
reification as closedness becomes clear.  Second, that some misperceptions of the 
continental tradition are at least shown to not lead to an auto-closedness, such as Bloom 
suggests, because of the subjectivity that is to some degree is embraced in this tradition.  
Moreover, I hope it becomes apparent in light of the issue of relativism indicated by 
Bloom that reification as an instance of closedness will expand our awareness regarding 
the problem of openness and that one does not need to concede and hence surrender to 
the type of closing that Bloom suggests. 
 In terms of method then, understanding the issue of reification, or that of a closed 
mind, is to stipulate that the inquiry will concern itself as a study of the phenomena of 
reification.  Because reification is a human act, an act of consciousness with regard to 
how it “takes” the world, we may rightly call the investigation a phenomenology of 
closedness.  Our examination will begin specifically with Kant with special note of his 
distinguishing of idea of phenomenal character of perception.  With the addition of 
Heidegger, this initial orientation develops into a full-blown idea of phenomenology 
understood as the study of how things appear to consciousness.
27
 Certainly this is a 
conceptual study as theory warrants, but pursuing the object of our investigation will 
occur via the continental tradition and as such approaching it in its own language and set 
of concepts, namely that of phenomenology, will be essential.  Part of the thematic 
tracing of the idea of reification from this tradition through certain thinkers is to show 
that given certain philosophical developments, reification is an eminent and perhaps 
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necessary occurrence that is indeed already operating and leads/suggests the possibility of 
a closed mind in a way that not only amplifies Hare’s account, but also a fundamental 
account of openness.    
 Hermeneutics or an interpretive assumption will then dominate the study.  The 
continental tradition largely ascribes that man is de facto a subject, and as such is 
thoroughly constituted in this manner, embracing human finitude.  The implication of this 
is that his epistemic orientation is necessarily one of being an interpreter.  While 
correspondence theories may be compatible with phenomenology, we will see why being 
limited in our cognitive capacities will mean that hermeneutics is more primary and 
appropriate to understanding human being.  
 There is of course an imminent sense of irony that any conceptualization, 
including any established by this examination, can also be prone to reify effects.  It is 
exactly this problem that the study wishes to expose and clarify so that if one’s 
interpretations or conceptualizations are so prone, one may keep an awareness of the 
inherent pitfalls, i.e. reifications, of holding them too rigidly.   
 In Chapter One having introduced the problem of openness via Bloom’s 
controversial portrayal, we approached closedness as a problem of relativity, a problem 
Bloom and much of culture still see as an issue and one that is thought to stem from the 
continental tradition.  In this chapter we explicitly intended to exploit the term reification 
as an example of closedness.  Giving an initial account of what reification is sets us up 
for a more in depth account of its relevancy in relation to the problem of closedness, 
especially as it pertains to the continental tradition.  Chapter Three will examine some of 
Kant’s basic contributions and how his Copernican revolution has provided the basis for 
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a transcendental idealism in our approach to understanding.  In Chapter Four, we will 
examine Heidegger’s existential phenomenology of Being and round out how reification 
is implicitly involved in his phenomenological investigation of human consciousness.  
Reification will be understood as hermeneutically as static interpretations or disclosures.  
Reification understood as static closures will imply a concealing of other possible 
interpretations, or in other words, the closing of what should ideally remain open.  In the 
final chapter we draw out Heidegger’s notion of disclosures as also concealing process 
that constitutes the cognitive process. This will be explained by a rethinking of the 
relationship of open and closed as a dynamic as it affects human knowing, rather than 
simplistic binary notions.  Additionally, with the help of Aristotle, we will make a 
distinction between an inactive cognitive stasis as reification over and against the idea of 
one having an actively held stance or concepts that are not reified.  Lastly will examine 
some modes where reification appears with the clarification that between the difference 
of reification on the basic primary or personal level and to larger instances and results of 
how reification occurs at the larger social structural level.  
 Additionally, we hope that it will become apparent from the above and the 
following examination that from a continental perspective we will show that with 
reification and closure comes a concern for an implicit openness to the truth that is 
ardently assumed and operationally relevant to the entire subject.  While it is not the 
purpose of this project to engage much of Bloom’s thesis, we will indirectly engage that 
part he identifies as partly responsible, the “Nietzscheanization of the university’s left”28  
that he suggests has resulted a problem of cultural relativism or the opening that is a great 
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closing.   Upon the completion of this task of examining reification that exists implicitly 
in the continental tradition we will spell out the implications and connections and how it 
informs our understanding of closeness.  Additionally, and hopefully, the very process 
will also expose a sympathetic portrayal and reading of the continental tradition that is 
appropriate to rejecting the claim that these thinkers have led us to the doors of relativism 
and therefore a closedness that Bloom and others have asserted. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
KANT: THE HUMAN PREDISPOSITION TOWARD METAPHYISCS AND THE 
LIMITS OF REASON 
 In chapter 2 we noted that the definition of reification implied a fallacy or mis-
taking, an error that consists of ascribing an existence to a concept that is inappropriate.  
Again, when a mental abstraction on our part is turned into a thing, the turning into is the 
active part of giving the abstraction concreteness.   We might say then that when it attains 
thing-ness by our part, we have a case of conceptual statization.  When such an 
abstraction or mental representation is held statically as if it were an existing thing as 
such, we have an instance of reification.  It may be that while a general definition of 
reification is apparent throughout literature, partially shown here, its philosophical 
explanation is still lacking.   In hopes of achieving a reasonable showing of reification 
philosophically, we hope to not only show its immanent possibility but its explanative 
power regarding the issue of “closedness”.  From the above notion that a reified concept 
is an inappropriate metaphysical positing, we will begin our investigation of reification 
with Immanuel Kant, that pivotal figure who addressed the limits of human reason.   
 We have chosen to begin with Kant because of his decisive position in the history 
of philosophy.  In some senses he is a key figure in several respects and I think offers a 
fruitful place to begin a philosophical elaborative account of reification.  First is that Kant 
was motivated to find a solution between two competing approaches to the problem of 
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knowledge in his day.  Secondly and more directly, is his answer, as indicated in his first 
critique, in which he investigates the limits of reason.
1
  Specifically, how he defines the 
limits of human reason will have relevancy in understanding the philosophical roots of 
reification.  What follows is not an intended comprehensive exposition of Kant’s entire 
project, but will draw out and concentrate only on those essential points especially as 
they pertain to the argument at hand of a philosophical grounded notion of reification.  
We will concentrate then on Kant’s concerns with the problem of metaphysics, as a 
current issue of his day, as the impetus that drives him and his solution to this problem; 
the Copernican revolution and its move towards idealism.
2
  Finally, we will give an 
account of how Kant understand the limitations of human reason, specifically how it is 
that reason desires that which it cannot attain and why it is prone to overstepping its 
bounds.  It is however the impulse for this overstepping that is our natural predisposition 
to ask and seek the metaphysical: 
But now this kind of cognition is in a certain sense also to be regarded as given, 
and metaphysics is actual, if not a science yet as a natural predisposition.  For 
human reason, without being moved by the mere vanity of knowing it all, 
inexorably pushes on, driven by its own need to such questions that cannot be 
answered by any experiential use of reason and of principles borrowed from such 
a use; and thus a certain sort of metaphysics has actually been present in all 
human beings as soon as reason has extended itself to speculation in them, and it 
will always remain there.
3
 
 
                                                 
1
 Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Guyer and Wood, 
Cambridge, 1998.  
 
2
 I will be drawing from Gardner and Redding’s idealistic reading of Kant, 
opposed to the more analytical approach. This distinction will be elaborated on in the 
remaining part of the chapter.  
 
3
 Kant, B21, 147. 
52 
 The above quote is taken from Kant’s Introduction to his Critique of Pure Reason, 
where he declares that to be human, it is impossible to be indifferent to the pursuit of the 
metaphysical.  The positive assertion here is that it is very much part of our natural 
propensity.  This is also true of reification for as we will see these are not separate issues.  
As Kant is suggesting, human interests are naturally propelled to seek the metaphysical, I 
will argue that it is in this same desire for attaining “the real” or the thing “in-itself” that 
the static concepts that imply reification becomes an imminent possibility.  The process 
of reification implies a metaphysical positing on the part of the subject whose abstraction 
has been turned in to a “thing-concept,” indeed it is how it becomes an identifiable entity 
for the subject.  While the interest or pursuit of the metaphysical does not necessitate 
reification, the mental abstractions we draw from and superimpose on our experience can 
very often become statically held in such a way as to be reified.  In Kant we will refer to 
how reason desires this very capturing of the thing itself is an instance of reason’s desire 
to stabilize its concepts or exceed its bounds. Later in Heidegger we will examine a 
different account of how we come to hold these realities or things that will provide 
further a explanation of the why and how abstractions become static and see it as a form 
of closure.  Prior to this however, we will examine those relevant philosophical themes in 
Kant and show where the legitimacy of such a phenomenon as reification arises in terms 
of human cognition.   
 Immanuel Kant began his career in an age when the idea of metaphysical 
knowledge, the limits of what we could know or what could be known, was under 
scrutiny.  Kant, having been steeped in Leibnizian-Wolffian rationality, was beginning to 
entertain doubts as to the credibility of its claims.  Kant throughout his early career was 
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coming to think that positions proposed by G. W. Leibniz and his mentor Christian Wolff 
were not as tenable as he had once believed. 
4
  As such, rationalist philosophy was 
beginning to taking on a dogmatic character in light of the skeptical challenges of the 
Empiricists, most notably David Hume, the Scottish empiricist.   In Kant’s own words he 
claims that it was Hume who had “awoken him from his dogmatic slumbers,”5  by 
arguing that our metaphysical beliefs about the world, whether it was empirical or 
speculative were not grounded on reason, but were founded on the associative functions 
of the mind or what Hume coined as customs and habits.  For Kant such skeptical 
conclusions were as unacceptable just as much as the lack of rational grounds of the 
rationalist that Hume had exposed.  To Kant it seemed that the “Queen of all sciences;” 
metaphysics, was in trouble and needed defending.
6
 It was this context that impelled Kant 
to pursue an examination of the limits of human knowledge in his work “Critique of Pure 
Reason,” in hopes of finding a path for legitimate knowledge between the Scylla of 
skepticism and Charybdis of dogmatic rationalism. 
 For our sake we might emphasize that Kant begins his examination with the 
question of asking a fundamental question, “Whether such a thing as metaphysics be even 
possible at all.”7 Accordingly Kant assumes that dogmatic rationalism and empirical 
skepticism are not going to be viable options along with the addition that we cannot be 
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indifferent to metaphysical speculation, but that our human existence is one of constantly 
seeking the metaphysical and asking questions about the nature of reality.  To Kant, the 
tendency toward the metaphysical is so basic to human reasoning that one cannot simply 
isolate empirical scientific judgments from the basic operations of common sense.  
Human reason in both cases operates on the same principles that “reason sees itself 
necessitated to take refuge in principles that overstep all possible use in experience.”8   
This is an important point in understanding Kant, as he is not asking in a skeptical tone 
whether metaphysics is at all possible, but is asking how it is possible.  Metaphysics is 
not in question in terms of its factual basis, which Kant is suggesting is already occurring 
in the operations of human reason, but the real battle over metaphysics, is to understand 
the how of its possibility or its rightful and legitimate employment.  Given that Kant 
understands the problem of metaphysics not so much a factual problem, but a question as 
to its legitimacy, he does not pursue the issue from a metaphysical stance, but instead his 
approach in the Critique takes on a reflexive stance focusing on how reason relates to 
itself, how it operates and functions, an examination of its limits. Hence Kant’s 
contribution is an investigation of the limits of human reason, and the conditions that 
make human knowledge possible.
9
 
 In preserving our natural propensity towards the metaphysical and examining 
reason’s limits in context of overcoming the problem between a rationalistic dogmatic 
positing and skepticism, Kant innovatively reverses the ancient epistemological formula 
of our mind conforming to objects.  Traditionally, prior to Kant, it was thought that the 
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mind was passively affected by objects in the world, and those objects were the cause of 
and produced our mental representations.
10
  This was and still is to some degree 
understood as a general account of correspondence theory of knowledge. Knowledge or 
truth is attained to the degree of the mind corresponding to the object.  In the Latin; 
“veritas est adequatio intellectus ad rem” or truth is adequation of the intellect to the 
thing.  However it is the tension between dogmatism and skepticism that provokes Kant 
to question this traditional understanding.  To solve the problem, Kant reverses this 
formula by asserting that objects we experience in the world instead conform to our 
mind.  This is referred to famously as his Copernican Revolution: 
Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; 
but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that 
would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing.  Hence 
let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by 
assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition…   then I do not see how 
we can know anything of them a priori; but if the object conforms to the 
constitution of our faculty of intuition, then I can very well represent this 
possibility to myself.
11
  
 
 Kant explains that his reversal is similar to the way Copernicus, who confronted 
with celestial evidence that contradicted the prominent and commonsense view, had to 
approach the theory from an entirely new perspective.  In order to understand his 
observations, Copernicus had to consider that what had seemed apparent before, that the 
sun revolved around the earth and that the earth was the center of the universe, was false 
as it seemed contrary to his calculations.  In other words, Copernicus had to rethink the 
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data from a completely and what seemed a nonsensical point of view, revolutionary stand 
point from what had been previously thought to be known. Copernicus had to imagine 
and apply a hypothetical model, a conceptual form, in Kantian language, to the observed 
data in order to understand that the earth was moving around the sun and spinning on its 
axis. 
12
  Because little had been achieved in the way of securing legitimacy to 
metaphysics, Kant was impelled to seek a solution via this sort of perspective reversal.   
Kant conceives of his project as beginning with a similar reversal of what can be 
considered as a rejection of the common sense view of object to subject relations.  His 
Copernican revolution begins by stating that objects are to now be understood in light of 
conforming to our mode of cognition.  This is a rejection of the old common sense 
realism and a strong move toward an idealist understanding of the object though with 
perhaps some significant qualification.  For Kant this means then that the subject is 
responsible for constituting the objects, that the subject takes an active role in its forming 
concepts.  This suggestion is significant as it allows Kant to assert the possibility of 
synthetic a priori concepts.  Concepts have a priori content in that they are not 
determined on the part of experience, but stem from supposed transcendental categories 
in the mind.  If these Transcendental categories exist, then Kant asserts we can have 
reliable a priori knowledge and avoid the pitfall of skepticism.  At the same time these 
ideal concepts are not simply being determined under the dogmatic rational paradigm, but 
rely on necessary synthetic experience.
13
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 The mention of transcendental categories of the mind or idealism in Kant leads to 
a relatively important point regarding Kant that will have an influence on how we are 
going to understand reification and openness. What is important is how Kantian 
scholarship has reacted to this issue, specifically as Kant is usually read one of two ways.  
This distinction is perhaps not only pivotal in how Kant is to be understood, but is 
essential in understanding the continental and analytical division already mentioned in 
light of the problem of openness discussed by Bloom.   
 This difference can again be shown with the approach of what may be considered 
the problem that Kant wants to solve.  With Kant’s transcendental idealism, or the 
transcendental ideality of our mental categories we are confronted with the possible 
limitations and conditions of our knowing, and hence we are possibly left open to a 
relativist reading.  Kant will try to escape the problem of skepticism by asserting all finite 
rational beings are subject to these same universal epistemic conditions, allowing one to 
claim objectivity in spite of our perspectivity.
14
 
 The analytical reading of Kant will focus simply on this aspect of overcoming the 
skeptical challenge.  Kant’s undertaking and contribution of explicating the basic 
structure of experience is interpreted as a path to putting metaphysics on its proper 
footing: as securing our knowledge claims.  In this way the analytic approach emphasizes 
the object of experience, or the “what” that is to be known. This is to assert the 
confidence of how metaphysics has been traditionally understood as an explanation as 
objects as they really exist independent of our sensuous experience.  In the context of 
epistemic skepticism, the analytical interpretation of Kant is valuable in that it provides 
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an account of the structure of experience that avoids skeptical conclusions and retains an 
account of those particular things we claim to know.
15
  
 Slightly different to this, the idealist, or continental, approach seeks a more 
fundamental and general account of Kant’s project.  It does not disagree that Kant was 
hoping to secure and provide knowledge some legitimacy.  But taken in light of the 
Copernican context, the idealist approach seeks a more fundamental approach to the 
problem of how knowledge is constituted by the subject.  Metaphysics is to be 
understood as the very structure of experience itself and therefore as a science of what 
human reason produces:
16
   
 Now metaphysics, according to the concepts we give of it here, is the only one of 
all the sciences that may promise… For it is nothing but the inventory of all we posses 
through pure reason, ordered systematically.  Nothing here can escape us, because what 
reason brings forth entirely out of itself cannot be hidden, but is brought to light by 
reason itself as soon as reason’s common principle has been discovered.17  
 In the idealist reading, metaphysics should be understood with an emphasis of the 
very structure of experience itself that is essential in our constituting objects.  Reason’s 
common principle, the unity of apperception or human consciousness is the structure for 
Kant that provides order on our sense experience.  
 Under the analytical approach the investigation potentially ends as the skeptical 
challenge has been resolved because the universality of our concepts is the answer to 
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providing legitimate grounds for our knowledge.   But the idealist approach is not 
altogether satisfied with the explanation of the structure of experience, the unity of 
apperception and its presupposed categories, but as such seeks a more fundamental 
understanding of how it was that we could have objects represented to us in the first 
place.  In his letter to Herz, written prior to the Critique, Kant was already struggling with 
the problem of wanting to identify “the ground of the relation in us which we call 
‘representation’ to the object.”18  In the old paradigm of relations, the object as 
“representation” was the external sensuous material that affected the passive mind.  For 
Kant this left unexplained that part of us that could access and thereby make possible an 
understanding of the sensuous.  Under the Leibniz-Wolffian rationalist school, the active 
component of the mind had been explained in terms of intellection of that which was 
sensuous.   For Leibniz the possibility of all objects of our experience hinged upon 
understanding the intellectus archetypi or the divine cognitions upon which all secondary 
human cognitions, intellectus ectypi, were grounded and made intelligible.
19
  In other 
words, the divine being the source of all reality meant that all objects were idealized in 
the same way we think of the how the Platonic Forms made appearances intelligible.  
Accordingly things have their sensuous reality grounded in the intellection of the divine 
and hence provided a secondary intellectual adequation of objects for us.  This “god’s eye 
view” is important in understanding how Kant distinguishes intellectual intuitions from 
sensuous intuitions by explaining that the active side of our intellect is as important as the 
role of the sensual world plays in providing material.  Kant expresses it later as “Leibniz 
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intellectualized the appearances, just as Locke totally sensitivized the concepts of 
understanding.”20  
 It is in this context that Kant identifies two distinct types of representations.  The 
first types of representations are those empirical a posteriori experiences of the world 
that we are receptive to, or what he refers to as sense intuitions.  Sense intuitions are 
those objects of immediate experience that are given to us that we experience every day.  
The second type of representation is that part we contribute. They are a priori concepts 
which are the means that allow us to think about the objects or sense intuitions given to 
us.  Kant describes the relation between sense intuitions and concepts as the minds 
receptivity of the representations of sense matter and the other, our cognizing about them 
as spontaneously arising concepts.   Accordingly the duality concepts and intuitions form 
the basis for our ability to think.  Matter supplies the possibility for sensuous input while 
the mind supplies the form or concepts on the part of our faculty of understanding.  Both 
are conditions for the possibility of any knowledge according to Kant.
21
   
 This distinction between the sensuous and the intellectual not only paves the way 
for his sense intuitions and concepts as two forms of representation, but his reliance on 
maintaining the validity of that part of us where representations are formed.  This shows 
respect for the rationalist position.  The notion of the divine or intellectus archetypi as 
that ground upon which all sense intuitions are possible, so too are the representations 
provided by the faculty of understanding.  This is important to Kant in light of the 
empiricists who had simply sensualized all representations.  Legitimate knowledge 
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claims would require an a priori rational basis.  This duel notion of representations 
provided a new combinational understanding of subject-object constitution.  The unity of 
apperception or consciousness, that being the faculties of the understanding, imagination 
and reason, worked together to provide a generalized a priori form/representation to the 
sensuous.  It was no longer understood that the object was the sole cause of our 
representation, but our consciousness acted harmoniously in such a way to also 
productive in the representation.  Therefore we had two distinct types of representation; 
sense intuitions and forms.
22
 
 Because of this twofold sense of representation, Kant then refers to those sense 
intuitions as the appearances of things, rather than the way they are, in-and-of-
themselves.  Only the divine intellect is able to have a completely intellectual intuition 
apart from the sensual material and therefore has access to the things as they are, while 
we are provided with categories that allow the possibility of appearances.  Kant will refer 
to this as his phenomena and noumena distinction.
23
  But what is essential is the role of 
the understanding which provides the generalized form for the sense material we receive 
from the external world; the appearances that we are presented with are phenomenal only.  
That is not to suggest that for Kant phenomenal content simply interpretive.  Kant is 
asserting that that a universality to the forms so that they are reliable. But he is also 
suggesting that we do not have access to things in themselves, but that our relationship to 
the world is mediated by our faculty of the imagination.  “For pure reason leaves to the 
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understanding everything that relates directly to objects of intuition or rather to their 
synthesis in imagination.”24 
 Thus far we have left out a fundamental portion of our examination as it bears 
relevance to reification, that being the problem of the speculative interest of reason.  The 
answer to this lies in Kant’s chapter on the Transcendental Dialectic and focuses 
specifically on the illegitimate uses of reason.
25
  After the preceding with an Aesthetic 
and Analytic account of the conditions for the possibility of experience, Kant turns to the 
examination of reason and the illusions produced by it.  But to understand the faculty of 
Reason, we need to identify the other faculties that it is relative to.  We have already 
alluded to what Kant refers to as the unity of apperception or human consciousness.  This 
is the locus where these faculties are unified.  According to Kant there are three, the 
understanding, the imagination, and reason.
26
 
 The Understanding, we’ve already pointed out, operatively provides categorical 
form to the sensuous content we are given in experience.  The primary active function of 
the understanding is to legislate or judge that which is accomplished by providing 
conformity of experience to the a priori generalized categories of the mind.  However 
this faculty does not act alone, the imagination is the faculty that allows appearances to 
be synthesized.  We are referring to the dualistic account of representations in terms of a 
posteriori sense intuition and of those a priori forms on the part of the understanding.  In 
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seeking a solution to unifying these two types of representations, Kant begins by 
identifying two types of judgments, analytic and synthetic.  Analytic judgments defined 
as instances when the predicate is contained within the concept itself.  In this sense 
analytic judgments are tautological and can be considered a priori as they can be 
understood without appeal to experience.  In distinction a synthetic judgment the concept 
does not contain the predicate, but is additional and connected to the concept.  As such 
these judgments are the sort that came from experience or a posteriori. 
27
 Kant desires to 
claims that synthetic a priori judgments are the only sort of judgments that have the 
certainty required for knowledge claims about the world and are at the same time 
amplitive.  Kant identifies mathematical and geometric judgments as synthetic a priori 
judgments. They are both knowable a priori and a posteriori.   By extension Kant will 
explain the possibility of a priori synthetic judgments by asserting the pure a priori forms 
of space and time.   Space and time as pure forms provide the conditions for the 
possibility of for these synthetic a priori judgments as well as all of human sensibility:
28
 
 If I therefore ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its 
intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this, and receptivity can make cognitions 
possible only if combined with spontaneity.  This is now the ground of a threefold 
synthesis, which is necessarily found in all cognition: that, namely, of the apprehension 
of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition: of the reproduction of 
them in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept. Now these direct us 
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toward three subjective sources of cognition, which make possible even the 
understanding and, through the latter, all experience as an empirical product of 
understanding.
29
It is the imagination that is the mediator that synthesizes both the 
apprehension of sensuous representations and our reproduction in terms of space and time 
as conditional of its representative possibility.
30
 If we are defining the understanding 
generally in terms of its legislative role, the imagination for Kant is responsible for 
providing the schema that allows the understanding to judge.
31
  Just as Kant indicates 
“Pure Reason leaves everything to the understanding – the understanding alone applying 
immediately to the objects of intuition, or rather to their synthesis in the imagination”32  
Understood in this way the imagination is the mediating faculty that navigates its 
synthesis on the conditions of space and time that provides a schema for the 
understanding to operate.  But what of reason, how are we to understand its function 
according to Kant? 
 We might recall that Kant has already indicated that reason’s problem is that it 
often exceeds its limitations.  In one of the most interesting metaphors Kant demonstrates 
reason’s interest:  
Encouraged by such proof of the power of reason, the drive for expansion sees no 
bounds.  The light dove, in free flight cutting through the air the resistance it feels, 
could get the idea that it could do better in airless space. Likewise, Plato 
abandoned the world of the senses because it posed so many hindrances for the 
understanding, and dared to go beyond it on the winds of ideas, in the empty 
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space of pure understanding.  He did not notice that he made no headway by his 
efforts, for he had no resistance, no support, as it were, by which he could stiffen 
himself, and to which he could apply his powers in order to get his understanding 
off the ground.
33
   
 
 Taking his cue from Aristotle, Kant views reason in terms of syllogistic 
construction.
34
  Given the a priori concepts provided by the understanding, reason looks 
for a middle conditioning term.  But in the case of transcendental concepts, no term can 
be provided apart from experience.  In the desire to attain certainty apart from such 
experience, reason must postulate beyond itself a conditioning term.   We might say that 
in its hubris, Reason is seduced by its own desire that it posits transcendental ideas.  
“Reason arrives at knowledge by means of acts of the understanding which constitute a 
series of conditions.”35  Ultimately reason in its transcendental employment, seeks the 
full extension and totality of its concept such that it desires the end of the conditioned 
series.  In other words, the transcendental ideas are an attempt to seek the unconditioned 
of that series, lest it fall into the absurdity of infinite regress.  It is in the Dialectic that 
Kant identifies three such instances; God, the soul and the world.  To be clear, the 
question is not whether such entities exist, but the legitimacy of reaching such ideas 
through reason is at question.  This, for Kant, is where Reason oversteps its bounds in 
that same Platonic posit of intellectual Forms beyond experience.  This he refers to as the 
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transcendental illusion.  Three transcendental ideas that are beyond reasons legitimate 
ability to produce.
36
 
 But this transcendental illusion is simply the paragon of examples where reason is 
motivated to posit unconditioned ideas so that its own syllogistic need is satisfied.  There 
are two abstract principles in how Kant will think about illegitimate transcendental uses 
of reason that are that are common to all experience.
 37
  In the first misuse of reason we 
are only accorded general knowledge apart from sensations. According to the 
Transcendental Analytic, the  
“understanding can never accomplish a priori anything more than to anticipate the form 
of a possible experience in general, and, since that which is not appearance cannot be an 
object of experience, it can never overstep the limits of sensibility, within which alone 
objects are given to us.”38 
   Just as reason seeks the ultimate end of a series, it also is tempted to posit the 
thing in itself as the condition for a particular instance of knowledge. This access to the 
thing itself is a reference to the noumena, something that Kant declares we have no 
legitimate access.
39
  The argument is not whether this conditional, the object itself, exists 
in so much as we have already asserted that it is the source that provides content for 
sensuous experience, but that it is an illusion of reason that makes us think we have direct 
access.   A second transcendent mis-use of reason ends with the same result as the first in 
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that it supposes that it has knowledge of the thing itself.  Reason transcends its ability by 
claiming to have determinate knowledge of a thing as it corresponds to the Idea.  Reason 
supposes that an object must exist in itself in its corresponding to the transcendental 
categories.  Again the faculty is easily motivated into supposing it has a claim to knowing 
the object in and of itself.
40
  Kant indicates that hypostasis occurs in the attempt to 
capture the thing in itself: 
One seeks to give the appearances of having a deeper insight in to the nature of 
things that the common understanding can have, rest on a mere semblance, 
according to which one hypostatizes what exists merely in thoughts, and - 
assuming it to be a real object outside of the thinking subject. 
 
And again, 
 
…we hypostatize outer appearances, no longer relating them to our thinking 
subject as representations but rather relating then to it in the same quality as they 
are in us as things external to us and subsisting by themselves… 41  
 
 Kant is exposing the two facets of illegitimacy of reason above that are prone to 
produce illusions which he specifically refers to as the hypostatization of the thing itself.  
This is related to two conditions that provide the possibility of all experience, space and 
time.  Kant identifies these two transcendental conditions in the human consciousness as 
an outer sense; space and inner sense; time.   The misunderstanding that occurs by way of 
hypostatization or reification are affected by the conditions of our inner (time) and outer 
sense (space), each having its correlate.  First, the transcendental use of hypostatizing the 
thing in itself via an internal illusion of generalized knowledge that is prompted by the 
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categories and the second, external transcendent hypostatization of determinate 
knowledge of the thing itself.  
 It is no mistake that in our use of Kant that we should end with the moment of 
hypostatization.  Identifying this over-statization is the main relevance of Kant’s 
contribution to the notion of reification, its relatable term.   Kant’s articulation and 
identification of the roles that make up human consciousness, the understanding, the 
imagination and reason, provide ample explanation for the occurrence of reification 
starting with our need or drive to ask questions and seek the metaphysical, where reason 
additionally encourages not only our will, but by its very principle ‘desires’ the 
unconditioned of its logic.
42
 
Summary 
 Kant’s concern is not the dismissal of metaphysics.  Kant rejects both Humean 
skepticism and what he claims to be dogmatic positing of the rationalist schools.  Kant 
clearly wants a firm footing, or at least an honest telling of what is accomplishable, for 
human reason.  Kant’s assertion that we as beings are motivated, that it is a part of our 
nature, to pursue the metaphysical, is to say that regardless of the philosophical 
arguments and problems that might arise, we  have and will always be in pursuit of the 
metaphysical in spite of the controversy that it produces.  This is an important point as I 
am arguing that reification occurs along with this human impetus that Kant rightly 
identifies.  Human beings are driven, not just to know reality, but to push beyond the 
limits of experience and reason towards those answers whether or not legitimate 
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knowledge is possible.  This is an essential point in understanding reification, as it is the 
positing of a reality that by definition is an abstracted-thing that is distinct from the thing 
itself identified by Kant.  The fact that Kant identifies this natural predisposition in 
human nature as a fact provides, at least momentarily, the grounds for the parallel motive 
of turning an abstraction into a thing.  The clue in Kant at this juncture is that human 
reason seeks this in its very principle.  Our natural interest in understanding reality is so 
great that we are prone to posit the thing itself, a mistake that lies on the part of our 
reason.  As part of the same process, reification appears to be an illegitimate use of 
reason, desiring the thing itself. 
 But in Kant’s project it is not enough that he identifies our perpetual proclivity 
towards the metaphysical.  Kant also has a desire to establish metaphysics legitimately in 
such a way as to avoid skepticism and dogmatic positing.  As we’ve noted it is in his 
Copernican revolution that we see an innovative solution.  This solution of reversing the 
ancient formula of objects affecting the mind to objects having to conform to the mind is 
also relevant in understanding reification.  The activity of reifying is a cognitive 
“taking/turning or making”; verbs used to describe how cognitive activity converts the 
abstraction into a thing.  The “thing-hood” of the abstraction is not a reference to the 
mind creating an object in the external world, such as when we think of the divine 
creativity ex nilho or creating out of nothing.  In the same manner that Kant refers to 
Leibniz’s use of the divine intellectus archetypi as providing purely intellectual 
intuitions, and therefore access to noumena, the thing as it truly is. However it is the 
human intellectus ectype that is dependent on material or sensuous intuitions that provide 
the content to the forms.  The faculty of imagination along with the understanding 
70 
synthesizes the conceptual form to the material.  While reification is not explicitly shown 
in Kant’s Copernican formulation, it is easy to show its relevancy in explaining how 
reification is occurring philosophically.  In Kant the unity of apperception is understood 
as the combination of imaginative understanding and categories of human consciousness 
and is where this entire process of mind and matter combines to produce knowledge.  In 
terms of reification it is the same abstractions on the part of sensuous intuition are then 
“taken and turned into” thing.  This is a problem on both accounts as reification has 
already been defined as a type of error.  Accordingly, in Kant we can understand this 
error to reify as the mis-taking of appearance as the things in themselves.   
 This is one reason Kant’s contribution serves so well in defining the problem of 
reification, especially as he identifies the part of coming to know which is constituted by 
the mind.  This has already been mentioned as a distinctive turn towards idealism.  There 
are at least two ways in which we might understand this idealism.  The first sense can be 
referred to as a weak version of transcendental idealism in the sense that there is a desire 
to continue the project of securing some universal notion of objectivity.  Kant’s account 
of the transcendental categories of the mind implies that all cognition is subject to the 
same conditions and could be considered reliable.  We have already identified this 
approach as part of the analytic tradition of interpreting Kant.  The second might be 
referred to as a strong transcendental idealism in that its concern is with the structure of 
human experience and what can cognitively be produced on the part of reason.  The 
71 
emphasis here is on human reason, its limitation and how it constitutes experience itself 
and is therefore more akin to the continental school.
43
   
 The point of this difference is to emphasize the particular commitments of this 
project.  Already focused on the continental tradition, we are reading reification in light 
of a human abstraction being constituted of “making and turning into” a thing.  The first 
sort of weak transcendental idealism is weaker in that it stands against the skeptical claim 
in attempting to maintain an assertion of grounded scientific objectivity.  This is a weak 
position of idealism, which by its very term suggests that which is composed or known 
via the intellect.  Stronger transcendentalism however comfortably accepts the human 
side of object constitution and as such de-emphasizes the desire for certainty.  In as much 
as it pursues this, it seeks to delve further into how and in the way the human part of the 
equation of object constitution is possible.  This is easily seen in hermeneutic philosophy 
which we will examine in detail in the next chapter. 
 This is pointed out here for the express purposes of not creating a digression on 
how Kant is to be read and understood, but to point out that one: there are two strong 
traditions that differ significantly and, second, we are not taking Kant where his project 
leaves off.  The aim of this project is not to defend one view over the other or defend a 
new view of Kant’s transcendental categories of the mind.  Rather the import at hand is to 
show moments in Kant’s philosophy that have lent and aid in making clear the process of 
reification.  This allows us to dispense with many questions such as, the actual status of 
transcendental categories and how much objectivity they may or may not lend us.   
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 Accepting the basic principles of Kant’s transcendental idealism in either case 
does, however, provide a basis for accepting his distinction between appearances and 
things in themselves.  As we’ve noted he identifies this as phenomena and noumena.  As 
such, noumena is a negative concept in which it is asserted to be completely unavailable 
to us, but which is important as it provides appearances, the representations of sensuous 
intuition.  These sense intuitions are the matter by which abstractions are produced on the 
part of the synthesizing imagination and legislate to categorical forms.  This phenomena 
or abstractions are that which can become reified.  To the extent human consciousness 
seeks the thing itself, so will it mis-take its abstraction for a thing.   
 Reason and its illegitimate uses not only serve as the coup de grace in defining the 
mistaking error of reification, but define its process of statization.  In Kant’s critique we 
see the motive for reification in the motive for wanting to have the thing in itself.  The 
Copernican revolution explains nicely the matter of the creative activity of the 
imagination, the legislative understanding and the desire of reason as it affects our 
experience.  We can easily see how human consciousness is involved directly in the 
turning abstractions into things, or “taken” as the things themselves under the faculty of 
understanding.  This idealist move in Kant paves the way for a type of phenomenology, 
though Kant may have not thought of phenomena as so interpretive.  We are now ready 
to see how Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology further demonstrates the reality of 
reification. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
HEIDEGGER  
For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the 
expression “being.”  We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now 
become perplexed.
1
 
 
 Similar to the problems that prompted Kant to seek the fundamental questions 
concerning the possibility of metaphysics, Martin Heidegger sought a fundamental re-
questioning of the meaning of Being, the categorical manifold sense introduced by 
Aristotle in his metaphysics that predicated its use regarding reference to any specific 
instance of ‘beings’ or entities.2   Kant’s innovation was a reversal of the ancient formula 
of entities as causing/producing representations in the mind to suggesting that the entities 
instead conformed to the mind, this being his Copernican revolution.  Heidegger’s entire 
approach to philosophy is affected by an early introduction to Franz Brentano’s 
dissertation, “On the Manifold Meaning of Being according to Aristotle,” and the 
problems introduced there in.
3
  Aside from Brentano, Heidegger realized that any account 
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of the question of being must be informed by the retrieval or revival of Aristotle’s 
original concern with the subject.  “The Following question concerned me in quite a 
vague manner: If being [Seiende] is predicated with manifold significance, then what is 
its leading, fundamental signification?  What does Being [Sein] mean?”4 
 Similar to Kant, Heidegger asks fundamental questions regarding Being in its 
most general sense and its import in our understanding metaphysics in terms of ontology.  
For the remainder of the chapter there will note two types of Being we are referring too.   
Any capitalized notion of “Being” is to be understood as that general categorical notion, 
while “being” in small case is the being of entities, persons or objects encountered in the 
world. 
 It is through this lens, the problem of Being, that we come explicitly to the 
question of reification through the very work of Heidegger.  In this chapter I will briefly 
summarize Heidegger’s project in light of his fundamental examination of the manifold 
sense of Being, with concentration on specific elements as they relate to and amplify an 
understanding of reification.  However it is noteworthy to suggest that for Heidegger the 
very positive content of understanding Being, prompts the problem of reification of 
which he seemed quite aware.  In his preparatory analysis to Being and Time, his seminal 
work, Heidegger speaks early of the problem of “reification of consciousness”5 as “The 
Thinghood itself which such reification implies must have its ontological origin 
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demonstrated if we are to be in a position to ask what we are to understand positively 
when we think of the unreified.”6  The sense of Being that Heidegger seeks to examine is 
that ‘which stands under’, the meta – of physics, and makes possible any reification of 
Being, or static concepts.  Heidegger’s examination is concerned with exposing the way 
in which Being becomes meaningful.  That is to say that Heidegger is not so concerned 
with the problem of reification as he is with an analysis of “Being.”  The problem of 
Being, how it becomes meaningful, is a primary issue only after which one may, in a 
secondary sense, ask about reified being.   This becomes even more apparent when after 
much considerable effort in explicating the problem of Being in his work and its 
implications, Heidegger ends his text with another reformulation of our issue. 
 “It has long been known that ancient ontology works with ‘Thing-concepts’ and 
that there is a danger of ‘reifying consciousness’.  But what does this “reifying” signify?  
Where does it arise?  Why does Being get ‘conceived’ ‘proximally’ in terms of the 
present-at-hand and not in terms of the ready-to hand, which indeed lies closer to us?  
Why does this reifying always keep coming back to exercise its dominion?”7  
 Heidegger’s work is clearly not engaging in or answering the problem of 
reification.  But reification is clearly a framework that concerns his investigation as the 
very phenomenon of reified consciousness that is suggestive to how “Being” and our 
relationship to it is essential.  I will begin by introducing his project and key themes that 
will show how his articulation of his inquiry into Being sheds light on the problem and 
function of reification.  Consequently, in my examination of Heidegger’s contribution, I 
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will clarify the manner of reification in such a way that, openness and closedness will be 
exposed as essential to understanding the issue itself. 
 The inquiry then begins more formally with Heidegger’s project as a whole 
asking how and why it is that he is invoking a notion of “Being” in the first place and 
where this leads.  As already suggested, Heidegger is motivated by research, both 
ancient, primarily Aristotle, and the more contemporary problematization of Being 
articulated by Brentano, who indicated that ‘Being’, the most fundamental category of 
metaphysics, has been neglected specifically as it concerns its field of inquiry: 
metaphysica generalis or ontology.
8
  In the same manner that Kant attempted to lay forth 
a ground work for metaphysics, Heidegger desires to inquire into the inherent vagueness 
in the very concept of Being. 
9
 This is to suggest that the scholastic and modern tradition, 
according to Heidegger, has either taken a vague concept of Being for granted, or that the 
concept has never been thought rigorously through, after Aristotle’s initial articulation of 
the differing meanings of Being.  Kant, in his critique, begins to ask about the limitations 
of human beings’ ability to secure an adequate ground for metaphysics as well as 
attempting to lay a foundational concept for Reason.  For Heidegger all this is taken as a 
cue to ask the question that has not been asked for some time: What is understood by 
“Being” that is prior to any attempt at laying bare the grounds of human knowing as a 
more primordial issue.
10
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 In his seminal work Being and Time, Heidegger begins by declaring that Being 
has been thought to be “the most universal and emptiest of concepts. As such it resists 
every attempt at definition.”  In fact, Heidegger thinks that a certain sort of dogma has 
arisen in the acceptance of such a lack or inability to define Being adequately, that to ask 
this fundamental question one is often “charged with an error of method.”11   It is with 
this lack of clarity and result that Heidegger is impelled to pursue the question, to make 
an understanding of Being explicit, perhaps in the same spirit that we note in Kant’s 
desire to investigate and lay bare the limits of reason.   In the case with Heidegger, he 
notes three important historical suppositions regarding how Being has been understood 
and as such leads to what he asserts as a forgetting of the question itself.  The three 
assertions by Heidegger include translations in quotes either from Greek or Latin and are 
as follows: 
1. First, it has been maintained that Being is the most universal concept: ‘An 
understanding of Being is already included in conceiving anything which one 
apprehends in entities. 
2. It has been maintained secondly that the concept of ‘Being’ is indefinable.  This 
is deduced from its supreme universality, and rightly so, if ‘Being cannot indeed 
be conceived as an entity. 
3. Thirdly it is held that ‘Being’ is of all concepts the one that is self evident.  
Whenever one cognizes anything or makes as assertion, whenever one comports 
oneself toward entities, even one self, some use is made of ‘Being.12 
 
 Not only is it important to give credence to the history that has obscured the 
question of Being according to Heidegger, but in the assertions we recognize that it has 
been indeed a problem to define and helps us understand Heidegger’s essential starting 
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point when he declares: “every inquiry is a seeking (concern – suchen).  Every seeking 
gets guided before hand by what it sought.  Inquiry is a cognizant seeking for an entity 
both with regard to the fact that it is and with regard to its Being as it is.”13   
 This means that the any field of inquiry will presuppose an implicit understanding 
of Being that makes its investigation possible.  There is no better example of this problem 
than expressed by Plato’s Meno:  
Meno: And how will you enquire, Socrates, into that which you do not know?  
What will you put forth as the subject of enquiry? And if you find what you want, 
how will you ever know that this is the thing which you did not know? 
 
Socrates:  I know, Meno, what you mean; but just see what a tiresome dispute you 
are introducing.  You argue that a man cannot enquire either about that which he 
does not know; for if he knows, he has no need to enquire; and if not, he cannot; 
for he does not know the very subject about which he is to enquire.
14
   
 
 It is this “tiresome dispute” that points to the problem that Heidegger wishes to 
take up in the way any inquiry must take up an understanding of Being in order to have 
an investigation.  Every inquiry is a seeking and as such is guided by some content of 
what is sought. 
 In his reflective rigor Heidegger makes perhaps what might be his own sort of 
Copernican revolution.   Rather than looking for an externalized definition of “Being” 
given its vagueness, he comes to an essential insight: we are the type of beings that are 
concerned with such an investigation.  That is, it is only our being that is asking and 
seeking meaning to the question in the first place.  Seemingly we are the only being that 
asks such a question and as such we are, even as indicated by Kant, beings that are to be 
                                                 
13
 Heidegger, 24. 
 
14
 Plato, The Meno, The Great Books vol. 7. (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, 
1952), 179.  
 
79 
understood as always involved and in pursuit of the metaphysical regardless of its rigor or 
demonstrability.   This has a profound consequence for how Heidegger is going to 
concentrate, not on “Being” itself so much, but he will turn his focus on the user, the 
being who is concerned with the question, the locus of its concern.   Heidegger’s 
examination is now rightly understood as concerned with the existence of man and is 
therefore referred to as an existential analytic
15
 of the kind of being and how this being 
uses and has an invested interest in pursuing an understanding “Being.” Essentially, that 
Being cannot be examined without first considering that its origin of reference is always a 
human asking.  As with Kant, we have no access to the things themselves, but that they 
are mediated by concepts.  With Heidegger we recognize that this Kantian understanding 
is fundamental in pursuit of making clear how we are to understand Being.  But in a 
reflexive moment, Heidegger turns the question back on to the questioner, realizing that 
the question, the seeking is itself a unique point of origin.   Any attempt at answering the 
question of Being then will always have as its locus, an understanding that will have a 
distinct human interest/character/signature.  Heidegger famously uses a German idiom to 
express this particular characterization of the kind of being who asks the question about 
Being in general as Dasein or Da-sein, translated as “there-being”.  That is a being that is 
in time, not eternal, but finite, located in a particular right “there - da” moment.16   
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 What is then distinctive about Dasein according to Heidegger is that it already 
brings ontology with it.  He is clear in saying that having ontology or an understanding of 
Being is what it means to be Dasein.  But in distinction, Heidegger does not mean to say 
we all have a worked out field of beings called “ontology”, but if you will, a pre-
ontological conception of being that makes inquiry possible.  Heidegger is pointing out 
that prior to an explicit ontology, we are constituted with a pre-ontology.  One can 
determine the nature of the entities in their Being without necessarily having the explicit 
concept of the meaning of Being at one’s disposal.17   
 
 Dasein in seeking is guided by its content is tantamount to saying that an ontology 
is presupposed by the inquirer, Dasein itself.  If we are speaking about an explicit notion 
of worked out ontology, a field of investigation such as a particular science, the field is 
already laid out in terms of its basic guiding concepts, necessarily as determinative limits 
to what is to be sought.  In a pre-Kuhnian moment,
18
  Heidegger suggests that it is only 
when a crisis occurs in a particular field of thought do the basic concepts come under 
question and are then perhaps reformulated.   In this way, we are to understand basic 
concepts as those grounding, foundational concepts that set the conditions for the 
possibility for the investigation.  In other words, an ontological priority is “always 
already” present in one’s seeking.  A pre-ontological is required to set the conditions for 
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the possibility of an explicit ontological investigation.  If Being is indeed such a vague 
and abstract, even tiresome notion, it is important if we wish to provide explicit 
ontology.
19
  
 However this vague notion of Being is what propels the theme of Heidegger’s 
investigation.  The desire to examine and show a rigorous conception of Being, results in 
his desire to lay bare an examination of that being, Dasein.   While this attempt to expose 
the ground will result in the necessary examination of Dasein, Heidegger rightly asserts: 
 Basically all ontology, no matter how rich and firmly compacted a system of 
categories it has as its disposal, remains blind and perverted from its own most aim, if it’s 
has not first adequately clarified the meaning of Being, and conceived this clarification as 
its fundamental task.
20
  
 This is a way of prompting that, while there is a necessity of ontology bringing its 
own set of concepts, the fact remains that such an examination to be clear and rigorous 
must expose its very foundational assumptions.  This is what Heidegger means when he 
speaks of “laying bare the ground.”  There is only one being whose type of existence has 
as its  concern the specific task of asking about the meaning of Being, whether in its most 
general and abstract sense, or in more specified ontological explanations or fields of 
inquiry, or in daily living.  It is Dasein that Heidegger rightly identifies as that being 
which brings an ontology with it.   In this way Heidegger declares that “Dasein is 
ontically distinctive in that it is ontological”21   By introducing this the term ontic, 
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Heidegger is pointing out that Dasein is the type of being, its mode, that ‘operationally’ 
brings an understanding of the world, “always already” with it. To say that Dasein is 
ontical is to say that its mode of being is constituted as bringing with it a particular 
understanding of history and tradition, hence an articulation of Being, or as sometimes in 
terms of its totality, Dasein brings with it a world.
22
 
Implications of Dasein’s type of being 
 This approach to Heidegger’s investigation reveals four important elements to 
regarding Dasein.  First, Dasein’s or human being23 is a type of being whose fundamental 
characteristic can be described as a being as existing.  Dasein already mentioned is that 
an analysis of the being that brings about ontologies or worlds with it.  Therefore, 
Heidegger considers the examination of Dasein as an analytic that is existentia’ in scope.  
Reminiscent of Shakespeare’s Hamlet’s famous line, “To be or not to be” ontically 
implies that “dasein always understands itself in terms of its existence – in terms of a 
possibility of itself: to be itself or not to be itself.”24  An examination of a being whose 
existence is ontical, one that is already bringing or having an understanding of the world, 
then has fundamental importance in understanding how existence constitutes this type of 
being. 
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 Secondly, Dasein’s existence is understood as a mode of being implying 
temporality.  This is a being in time, one that is also understood as whose constitution is a 
historcality; having a history, tradition and culture from whence it comes and the ability 
to reflect back on itself and history as well as projects its possibilities into the future.  
“Dasein has grown up into and in a traditional way of interpreting itself” and as such, this 
history can be explicitly studied and preserved in a tradition.
25
  Heidegger’s seminal work 
entitled Being and Time, might be rightly understood as being is time. 
26
  
 Thirdly, Dasein, or human existence, in bringing its ontologies with it, suggests 
that its being is ontically hermeneutic in constitution.  Perhaps what might seem apparent 
here is not to be confused with a traditional conception of hermeneutics, which would see 
a doctrine involving how we may decide to employ interpretations of the world.  Rather 
Heidegger means to point out the more fundamental and primordial necessity of our 
existence being possibilized by interpreting.  “In hermeneutics what is developed for 
Dasein is a possibility of its becoming and being for itself in the manner of an 
understanding of itself.”27  Similarly, in the way Kant describes space and time as 
conditions for the possibility of any experience, so too Heidegger points out that 
understanding Dasein’s essential constitution is to understand Dasein as a unity of 
actualizing the entities that are  seen and grasped, and hence are communicated or 
expressed in terms of concepts.   
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A “concept” is not a schema but rather a possibility of being, of how matters look 
in the moment [des augenblicks], i.e., is constitutive of the moment – a meaning 
drawn out of something – points to a forehaving, i.e., transports us into a 
fundamental experience – points to a foreconception, i.e., calls for a how of 
addressing and interrogating – i.e., transports us into the being there of our Dasein 
in accord with its tendency to interpretation and its worry.  Fundamental concepts 
are not later additions to Dasein, but rather ex-pressing it in advance and propel it 
forward: grasping Dasein and stirring it by way of their pointing. 
28
  
 
 The important point to understand in Heidegger regarding the essence of 
hermeneutic constitution of Dasein is to not confuse interpretation as a simply 
methodological approach.  As something we employ among other possibilities in coming 
to objects.  Hermeneutics is the condition of our relating.  From the very first moment, 
we are enmeshed in the process of interpreting, making sense of our world. 
 Fourthly, Heidegger means to employ a method and to make special significance 
to an examination of Dasein itself.  He will call his investigation a phenomenology.  
Understanding this, we might take a cue from that of his mentor, Edmund Husserl, who 
specifically used the term as a method as a way of getting back to the “things themselves” 
suggesting that the tradition had lost its way.  Certainly Kant had posed the problem in 
accessing noumena, or the thing itself, but his suggestion that the phenomenal 
appearances along with the transcendental categories of his philosophy provided much 
emphasis on the possibility of still attaining a solid ground for knowledge.  Husserl’s 
“Cartesian meditations,” was an attempt to revive a rigorous concept of philosophy in 
terms of a transcendental phenomenology – “a neo-cartesianism”29 was to be influential 
on his student, the young Heidegger.  Even though phenomenology as a method was 
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employed by both Husserl and Heidegger, what was to be understood as a getting back to 
the things themselves was radically different.  Perhaps it is suggestively plain that 
Husserl was attempting to secure philosophy as a science, grounded in the very way we 
noted the two ways one might approach Kant’s attempt at the same project.  It is this 
difference that becomes essential in understanding one of the most pivotal moments in 
the divide between what has become coined as the analytic orientation and the 
continental.  For Heidegger, phenomenology would not be so grand a project, but would 
instead indicate phenomenology as the study understood as that which appears to 
consciousness, and in the most primordial way in which this “presencing” of being was 
hermeneutically conditioned.
30
 
 As we’ve already indicated, “the things themselves” as an ontology had begged 
the prior notion of how Being is to be understood and drove Heidegger towards 
examining the unexamined life of Being that the tradition had not.  In his desire for 
conceptual transparency Heidegger understands phenomena “as that which appears,” or 
“is made manifest,”31 things as they show themselves to be or as “present-to-hand.”  
Additionally Heidegger purposely identifies the concept of logos in the suffix of the term 
phenomen-ology as discourse.   As such a discourse is an articulation or an assertion of 
being in language.  This means that any interaction with phenomenon is to be understood 
in Being’s most original sense as having a historical content that is brought with the 
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things in things becoming present, a “letting themselves be shown.”32  As we’ve 
indicated, phenomenology is the appropriate method to an inquiry of Being.  The inquirer 
is the type of being that is concerned, invested with and is always already has a historical 
situatedness, an articulated understanding of Being, that sets the conditions for the 
possibility for things to appear AS thing-values to consciousness.  The term descriptive 
phenomenology then for Heidegger is somewhat redundant because it is  
 The character of this description itself, the specific meaning of the logos, can be 
established first of all in terms of the thing-hood… of what is to be ‘described’ – that is to 
say, of what is to be given scientific definiteness as we encounter it phenomenally.
33
  
Dasein’s world 
 To fully appreciate the relevance of Dasein in respect to the phenomenon of 
reification we need to highlight several of its characteristics, some of which have already 
been mentioned.  First, Dasein is that kind of entity that brings with it a set of pre-
understandings or world-hood and therefore brings with it a certain totality of “Being.”  
We have already attempted to show that Heidegger understands that this having a world 
provides the conditions for Dasein to engage and interact meaningfully with “things” or 
their existence in order that they can “appear” in particular themes.  Heidegger describes 
this pre-having as being attuned or attunement.   
 This does not mean that we receive information about something, about some 
eventuality that would otherwise have remained unknown to us.  On the contrary, Dasein 
sets us ourselves before beings as a whole.  In attunement precisely makes beings as a 
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whole manifest and makes us manifest to ourselves as disposed in the midst of these 
beings.
34
  
 Heidegger will call this attunement as Dasein having “world-hood.”  Not only are 
considered things, the appearances of which come in certain terms, but they do so as a 
result of the total ontological discourse, the articulation of being that is necessarily a 
priori.
35
  As such, Dasein’s Being in-the-world or having world-hood means that it is an 
entity that is also alongside, dwelling with other beings.  Dasein is a being that Heidegger 
refers to as an existence that is involved with Being in their determinate sense, beings that 
are appear as “present-to-hand.”36   
 But this way of existing is generally not the type of explicit awareness of the type 
of examination Heidegger or we are now making explicit.  Rather Dasein’s existence is 
one of daily living and going about one’s business without consideration of how Being is 
understood. Dasein in every singular sense brings its own ontology as part of what it 
means to bring a cultural set of values and perspectives with it and this is what Heidegger 
means by having a world.
37
  Beyond the constitutive analysis, Heidegger understands that 
to understand Dasein as existing is to examine the ‘how’ of its existence.  To elaborate on 
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this how Dasein exists, Heidegger will refer to man as having an “ek-sistence,” a standing 
forth in the world.  As such he refers to this temporal “ek-stasis” of Dasein as its being-
in-the-world.  “Being-in-the-world designates the essence of ek-sistence with regard to 
the cleared dimension out of which the “ek-“ of ek-sistence essentially unfolds.”38  The 
temporal implications point out that Da-sein’s being as one as ek-static is to reinforce the 
Da or Da-sein.  Man as standing forth in the world is a being that is not simply static, but 
ek-static.  We may see implications in terms of man as an being that can be described as 
one of ek-stasis and how reification as stasis is problematic for a being as ecstatic.  There 
might be other synonymous terms to describe it, such as man as developing, evolving, 
becoming or life longer learner.  But there are other implications of how Heidegger sees 
the import of this distinction.   
 Thought in terms of ek-sistence, “world” is in a certain sense precisely “the 
beyond” within existence and for it.  Man is never first and foremost man on the hither 
side of the world, as a “subject,” whether this is taken as “I” or “We.”  Nor is he ever 
simply a mere subject which always simultaneously is related to objects, so that his 
essence lies in the subject-object relation.  Rather, before all this, man in his essence is 
ek-sistent into the openness of Being, into the open region that clears the “between” 
within which a “relation” of a subject to object can “be.39 
 Heidegger uses this phrase “ek-sistent into the openness of Being” to indicate that 
Dasein way of being is ontical, meaning that it is one that is always and already engaged 
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with other entities, objects and other Daseins.  As such this type of existence with all that 
it includes is not an existence that is a constantly engaged in the kind of descriptive or 
analytical reflection as we are currently.  Rather Heidegger describes our daily existence 
as being caught up in and involved with things as “average everydayness.”40  Perhaps a 
most important feature of our being is that is marked by care or concerns, that directly 
affect our immediate involvement or relating to the beings of everyday living.  This 
general care that Dasein brings to its living produces a distinct way we are involved with 
Being.
41
  As a being that brings pre-understanding of a World, marked by concern or 
interest, we relate to things in their phenomenal appearance as a sort of presence.  
Heidegger calls this “presence-to-hand” to indicate how “entities are grasped in their 
Being as ‘presence’; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of 
time – the ‘present.’”42  This presencing is to signify the very interpretation to being 
giving in its immediacy, which the ontology that we bring in our pre-understanding, is a 
phenomenological “making present” in the most pure sense of letting being appear.43 
 This everydayness includes or is characterized by a presence-to-things, an 
immediacy of being that does not necessarily imply that we are, in such a common mode 
of living, asking in every moment about the ontologies we are bringing forth.  
Everydayness is the living without the explicit questioning about its existence.  As such 
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there is a certain “taken for grantedness” that characterizes our being.   There are two 
essential ways that Heidegger will describe this ontic-ontological priority of being as it 
occurs without our being mindful of it.   First, everydayness implies what Heidegger calls 
the forgetfulness of being.
44
  This is to recall his assertion the fact that the tradition has 
not dealt with the question of Being and left it ambiguous or empty.  This taking the 
question of Being for granted Heidegger thinks is endemic of Dasein’s existence.  Our 
daily living is commonly unreflective and as such we operate with immediacy to Being.  
We take things as, bare fact, as if the objects before us have an immediate presence, as 
though, in Kantian language, we had the “thing itself” at hand.  But Heidegger has 
already claimed that we bring with us an ontology, an understanding of the world, one 
that is always already constituted with an understanding of being, that is an interpretation.  
Heidegger calls this aspect of relating somewhat forgetful of what we are providing and 
its limits, this operatively assumed immediacy as presence-to-hand.   This term simply 
serves as a way to specify the casual way that a certain articulation or interpretations of 
things are imbued with on a daily level.  As it were presence-to-hand is a static and 
mostly implicit concept of which every particular entity is in Dasein’s scope.  As such, it 
doubles as a suggested “thing as such” static reified concept. 
 With Heidegger’s general project, or those relevant themes laid bare, we can 
begin to grasp its relevancy toward reification and why Heidegger himself, mentions the 
issue both at the beginning and the conclusion of his work Being and Time.  
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Concerning reification 
 “It has long been known that ancient ontology works with ‘Thing-concepts’ and 
that there is a danger of ‘reifying consciousness’.  But what does this “reifying” signify?  
Where does it arise?”45 
 With this in mind, we will continue to explain in Heideggerian tones, how we 
might understand the structure of abstracting, and how reification is a derivative problem 
of our involvement of everyday Being-in-the-world.  Additionally we will keep in mind, 
that the entire scope of this project is to investigate how these philosophers, and more 
broadly the continental tradition can inform and enhance our understanding of what an 
“open-mind” is and its contrary, how closedness occurs.   With the hope of success, all 
such concerns should intentionally be wrapped up in what follows.  With the assumption 
that Kant has some provided a relevant addition in understanding our cognition, the 
remaining will be a modulated and perhaps refined review of Heidegger’s insights.  My 
own additions, to which this inquiry is aimed, will show how Heidegger’s project sheds 
light on reification and is especially relevant to understanding the problem of openness 
and closedness.   
 Though Heidegger does not specifically define reification, we have already 
defined the traditional concept as “the turning/making/taking of an abstraction into a 
thing.”  We have added that abstractions are understood as conceptual determinations.  
Whether it be in terms of a Kantian formulation of transcendental categories of the mind 
imposing form on the matter of our sense intuitions or in terms of the a priori ontology 
we provide such as a being Dasein signifies, abstractions must be the mental 
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comportment of human experience that are “taken and turned into…”  These verbs 
indicating actions that can only be the actions of a human being, whose being, noted by 
Heidegger, is the kind of being that brings a pre-understanding  account of Being and 
thereby provides the conditions of making present abstraction, or “giving” them thing-
hood.  In this way it is easy to see how this “taking” and “turning” of a mental abstraction 
is converted or given a certain sense of “thing-hood” that is implied by reification.  In 
Heideggarian terminology this would be the moment of being appearing as a thematized 
“thing” or relations of things; larger sets of interpretations.  On the level of immediate 
living, Heidegger coins the phrase for those abstractions as themed things in terms of that 
which appears “present-at-hand.”  This is his way of articulating, naming the kind of 
involvement we have on the immediate daily moments.  To say things are present-at-hand 
is to suggest the phenomenal immediacy of appearances encountered “take on” 
characterizations on the part of a being that is looking.  Dasein, that kind of being, who 
brings an always already conception of being.   But in terms of everydayness, our daily 
involvement of being-in-the-world, we go about our living not aware of our “giving” 
abstractions particular themes or interpretations.
46
  
 When such abstractions are “made” into things, and that this thing-hood, or 
presencing occurs, we must pause to consider that in some sense or degree that 
presencing is a moment of statization.  To understand this stasis we might pause for a 
moment and ask why it is that Heideggarian language relies on idiomatic expressions, 
whether it be “Dasein” or “Being-in-the-world”, or “present-at-hand.”  Part of 
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Heidegger’s strategy is to remove the reifying affects of language.  Heidegger famously 
states “that language is the house of Being,”47 in order to point out that our very concepts 
or interpretations become set and statisized in a linguistic form.  In this sense what is 
thought and spoken become mutually reinforcing of a statization.  It is no wonder that 
then words themselves are not only indicators of reified concepts, but as referent to 
concepts themselves, they also have the potential to become reified.   In other words, at 
times a concept may be static, but one may also fixate on a word or phrase itself as 
indicative of meaning, such as those in political discourse have associated “social justice” 
as a term as “code words”.48  Clearly such utterances have statisized language to such a 
degree that they see language being an indicator of set meanings.  This means that 
reification is indeed operating as such.   Likewise Heidegger is concerned about why this 
“reifying consciousness continues to exercise its dominion.”49  Heidegger’s use of 
language is an attempt to upset the stasis that is occurring conceptually, in trying to 
invoke us to think beyond the bounded stable categories of how the tradition, or of how 
our perspective might be seduced into capturing an “essence.”  In the end, while it may 
seem frustrating or obscure, Heidegger means to get the reader, outside of his 
metaphorical box.  Perhaps Shakespeare’s Hamlet says it best when he declares, “O God, 
I could be bounded in a nutshell, and count myself a king of infinite space—were it not 
                                                 
47
 Martin Heidegger, “Letter on Humanism”, Basic Writings, 1993, 217. 
 
48
   Steven Benen, “Beck Targets Churches that embrace ‘social Justice’”, The 
Political Animal:The Washington Monthly, March 9th 2010, 
 http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/acrchives/individual/2010 
03/022774.php (Accessed April 2012). 
 
49
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 1962, 487. 
 
94 
that I have bad dreams.”50  Heidegger seeks to break convention and stable language in 
order to break stasis, the domination it has over us, so that we might come to understand 
things differently or perhaps more deeply.   
 Furthermore in defining reification in terms of the cognitive stasis of 
interpretations, we might reflect back on the type of being that is Dasein, the being whose 
abstractions are being statically held as “present things.”  While an initial definition of 
Dasein has been proffered, showing another way of interpreting and understanding 
Dasein can illuminate the process of stasis that is occurring.  It is by no mistake that 
Heidegger in his idiomatic use of language refers to Dasein’s as “ek-sisting.”  Heidegger 
is using language to point out the how and the way of Dasein’s ek-sistence should be 
understood in terms of temporality.  Dasein’s existence is itself as an ‘ek-stasis’ or in that 
we are ecstatic beings.
51
  That is a concerned being in time, moving, becoming, in its 
whole as a being that always already brings a history, such that the present is made 
manifest in specific terms and also a being that projects itself into the future.
52
  If man is 
then rightly understood as an ecstatic being then the stasis of abstractions or concepts can 
certainly be considered problematic.  We might venture a question at this point by asking 
then if there are degrees of stasis. Or is some stasis, and hence reification necessary? 
 Seeing Dasein as ecstatic beings, we are reminded that reification was understood 
primarily as a mis-taking.  To be sure we’ve indicated that it is a human undertaking, to 
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interpret and give meaning to the objects we encounter.  Additionally these objects are 
not understood as interpreted or imbued with meaning, but can have a kind of presence to 
the interpreter that they are taken as a Kantian grasping of the thing itself or even in a less 
explicit sense, simply as a Heideggarian present-to-hand.   In either case, both 
philosopher’s terms, the thing itself and present-to-hand, are indications that this kind of 
“stasis” is a mis-taking of the abstractions for a thing as such.  While there are certainly 
objects before us that make abstracting possible, the mis-taking is the ontological 
assumption of having them in their complete totality and is a problematic stasis.  It seems 
clear that human hubris in terms of certainty of having the “things themselves” and this 
assumption is a stasis that is a mis-taking.  Heidegger has rightly reminded us of the 
problem that reifying consciousness seems to keep “exercising its dominion” over us.  
There does, however, seem to be some justified concern whether or not the stasis of 
abstractions are unavoidable.  After all it is Heidegger who shows us that everyday 
existence is one of operating constantly with a presencing of things at hand.  If reification 
is something to be avoided, then how is in our abstracting we can avoid it?  At this point 
reification, or at least stasis, seems a necessity in our coming to know, having concepts or 
interpretive process.  How can we understand reification as stasis and yet, it does not 
become an inevitable problem for human ek-stasis?  To understand this problem 
Heidegger has some other relevant considerations.  
 In Heideggarian literature it has been quite popular to interpret “Da” as “there,” 
giving this type of “sein” a notion of its spacio-temporality.  There are other ways, 
however, to understand “da”.  “Das da” in German can be translated, as “the open.”  So 
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Dasein itself can be rightly interpreted as “openness”.53  Heidegger has made a case that 
we are the beings that bring an articulated ontology already, and are therefore the kind of 
being that brings meaning to the objects we encounter.  To understand Dasein as “the 
open” is to say that it is the locus of where Being or beings become necessarily manifest 
and “take” on theme.  In other words human existence or Dasein as the open place is a 
way of expressing that ecstatic and essential temporal character of our being.  We are the 
beings that are open to interpreting experience and always in certain ways.  As the kind 
of being that Dasein is in seeking the meaning to such questions, is to say that we are the 
open place of inquiry, of seeking.
54
  The idea that “consciousness is consciousness of 
something,” is also a suggestion that consciousness is the open place for Being or beings 
to take meaning.   To say this means that openness is in fact the way to understand how it 
is, even in a Kantian sense, we bring form to our material experiences.  We are the 
openness.  While an open mind generally has been understood as a metaphor describing 
an activity of the mind, Dasein as openness is really the conditions for the possibility of 
any knowing or interpreting.  Instead of a metaphor, openness is an adjective that 
modifies our self- understanding.  We are the open place, the “there” where meaningful 
articulation of beings occur or abstractions take or are given meaning.
55
  But this is not 
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the kind of openness that Bloom is concerned with, where openness means making no 
discriminations and that all is acceptable.  Rather Heidegger’s openness must be 
understood essentially as an openness that is indicative of the type of being man is, to be 
aware and open to objects taking on meaning.  We are that place where such action 
occurs and is characterized by an always already pre-understanding of Being.  The point 
is akin to Kant’s metaphor of the light dove previously referred too. Like the dove, 
human openness often desires to soar more freely in open space with the promise of little 
or no resistance.  But this is not the case, for human reason or in Heidegger’s case, the 
open place.  It is the resistance, or our subjectivity that provides the conditions to being 
open.  
 Being then is considered an essential topic for Heidegger’s investigation with the 
additional understanding that Dasein is also essential, as the type of being that is driven 
toward the investigation itself.
56
   The last essential component is how being is manifest 
to Dasein in respect to reification.  With these aspects of Heidegger’s project articulated 
we now will emphasize an important aspect of how Heidegger thinks of Being’s 
manifestation to Dasein.  We’ve certainly spoken of this in the context of method and 
hermeneutics and in the way Dasein operates in its everyday world.  However we want 
look at Heidegger’s specific theory of disclosure as it pertains to our subject of 
reification, stasis and closedness.   
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 When we consider the idea of our subjectivity as the place where Being shows up 
and takes or is given meaning on the part of Dasein, we might accurately consider the 
above as a significant account of Heidegger’s theory of truth.  But if we look closely at 
his account of truth, Heidegger will direct us back to the ancient Greeks and their 
understanding of truth in what he considers its most primordial sense, which may sound 
foreign to modern ears.  This word Heidegger identifies as indicative in understanding the 
ancient idea of truth is Aristotle’s usage of “Aletheia.”  Here in the context of his 
understanding of phenomenology he defines it as unconcealedness. 
 What occurs for the phenomenology of acts of consciousness as a self 
manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek 
thinking and existence as aletheia, the unconcealedness of what is present, it’s being 
revealed, its showing itself.
57
  
 Lethe is a word of Homeric origin as it names the river one must pass over in the 
afterlife to enter Hades.  The river Lethe means literally “forgetting” as an indication of 
what occurs when at the end of human earthly existence.
58
  In this way, Aristotle takes up 
in contrast the notion of “a-letheia” as the revealedness or unconcealment of Being that is 
manifest in its most primordial sense.  Likewise Heidegger will use many multiple 
synonyms to express this essential character of aletheia, such as the “un-hiddenness” of 
being, the “un-forgetting” and “disclosure.”  Heidegger’s retrieval of this Greek concept 
of truth is to point out that before we come to understand truth in terms of 
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correspondence or of an accord between things or even truth as propositional assertion, 
the first and most primary sense, Beings in their being, are always already revealed, 
unconcealed/disclosed as such.
59
   
 Truth then as the un-concealment of Being, as showing itself, gives special 
meaning then to the first sentence of Being and Time when Heidegger says of Being that 
“this question today has been forgotten.”60  Not only has it been difficult to ask this 
question or that the tradition has left it largely undefined, but the question of its having 
been forgotten takes on special significance when understanding Being in terms of a-
letheia as the un-forgetting of Being.  In other words it might seem that the primordial 
sense of Being is often forgotten for the beings that meaningfully appear.   In thinking of 
this unconcealment as revealing of beings as their presencing, Heidegger reminds us that 
this coming to a presence is also from an absence.
61
  That which is being revealed in such 
and such terms, its theme, is also at the same time concealing of being.  When a 
disclosure of being occurs, it is understood as a particular presencing, as one among 
many possible ways of its Being revealed, in its particular being.  In the everyday of 
being-in-the-world of Dasein’s ecstatic hermeneutic existence, aletheia as a presencing 
must also have its contrary, an absencing of being, of other possible interpretations.  That 
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is to say that for every dis-closing of being, there is also a concealment, a forgetting of 
other possibilities and in this sense, the Being of beings is forgotten.
62
 
 In terms of reification, one static concept as dis-closed, closes off other 
manifestations.  To be sure, Being always shows itself, but for Dasein or human 
existence, its showing is affected according to the content and concern that Dasein brings 
with it.   In a seeking that brings about the direction of the inquiry itself, Dasein requires 
a specific meaningful disclosure.  That which is being revealed, or abstracted from the 
phenomenal manifestation of Being is taken as some specific being.  If this disclosure is 
taken and turned into a thing as such, then we have reification.   When disclosures 
become held as static concepts and hence are reified then there is the possible denial and 
hence concealment of Being in terms of its other possible interpretations.   
 Here we come to understand a more amplified and fundamental understanding of 
reification and hence the way in which reified or static concepts pose a threat to the mind.  
By applying Heidegger’s project as it relates to the question of Being, Dasein and its 
disclosure of being that conceals at the same time, we can understand how in an everyday 
operative level of existence our tendency is to “capture” and statisize being on a practical 
level that we either forget or remain unaware that such statically held concepts keep us 
from potentially more informative understandings.   In light of Heidegger’s project, we 
can see that reification is essentially a disclosure of being that is held statically.  When 
this sort of conceptual stasis occurs, we are closed off to other possible manifestations of 
being.  Reification, as statically held interpretations, then, is essentially to be closed.  
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 If we understand reification in terms of the ethical application made popular by 
Marx and more specifically by Lukacs,
63
 we see immediately the ethical consequences 
that reification has in reducing humans as being mere things to be used by an industrial 
capitalist society.  Here people had been abstracted, turned into things for mere use.  Such 
ethical applications allows us to see that such moments of reductive disclosures of human 
beings, explicitly denied and concealed their humanity.  Clearly reified static abstractions 
that are disclosed have meaningful implications both in a positing, and in the case of 
reifying humans, drastic ethical consequences.  When a person is reified, their reduction 
in humanity is tantamount to a closure on the part of the one who does the reifying. 
 With the example of human reification we have introduced, we can see the 
implications of how reification can occur.  In fact reification is generally understood in 
this context.  However several things can be considered in light of our arguing that 
reification is something that is a human phenomenon that primarily concerns cognition.  
We’ve shown that human abstraction is a necessary component to human cognition.  This 
was made most proximately by Kant showing us in his Copernican revolution that as we 
bring form to the material world that understanding can occur, and also in Heidegger’s 
focus on Dasein as the open place where Being becomes manifest.  We can see in both 
philosophers that openness is what it means to be a locus of meaning, that human being is 
an essential openness to the world.  Consequently, this openness as the condition for 
meaningful interpretations of the world, has the danger of becoming closed.  Reification 
as static concepts implies that disclosures  have been given a static thing-hood that is 
inappropriate.  We must keep in mind as indicated by Heidegger, that our interpretive 
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abstractions are always at best an approximation or provisional articulation of being.  
When we hold these disclosures as things present to us, we close off other possible 
understandings, often unaware or forgetful that the reification exercises a dominion over 
us.  
 This is suggestive of one last important consideration mentioned above.  To what 
extent is stasis necessary for understanding?  Is it not the case that in our openness, even 
as Bloom suggests in the first chapter, that openness requires a stable, static place from 
which to operate?  Do we not need some stability in our interpretations in order to 
operate? And even so, doesn’t such stability provided productivity in fields such as 
science and therefore shows static concepts to be in some high degree desirable?  The 
initial answer to this is rightly positive.  On the contrary we might ask, how can we avoid 
the extremes, if we are to think reification in the extreme is a closure, a stasis that is 
unproductive to further understanding, while on the other hand, it is an operational stasis 
that allows us to move forward in pursuing an inquiry.  This has already been alluded to 
in Heidegger, by the fact that every investigation is already guided by a seeking.  
Dasein’s openness to a disclosure is only in fact possible such that this openness has 
brought previous understandings with it that sets the conditions for openness.  In a very 
different understanding of the issue of openness that Bloom mocks, an openness that is so 
open that it is an emptiness. Heidegger shows us that closedness and openness are 
working in tandem.  For us as well as Heidegger, we wish to avoid the pit falls of 
reification, in remembering or un-forgetting that the concepts we hold as “things as 
present to hand”, are always held as abstract provisionality and we must not forget this 
problem of stasis.   
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 In the next chapter we will attempt to answer the above questions, particularly in 
light of whether stasis is desirable.  Additionally we will note some modes in which 
reification appears in our experience.  Lastly, we will attempt to summarize the entire 
project in total and present an explicit set of instances in how we might apply and think 
of reification as closedness in an educational context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
REVISITING THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN OPENNESS AND CLOSEDNESS 
 We started this inquiry with the problems surrounding what openness or 
closedness of mind means.  As the investigative impetus, this question and the problem it 
poses is extremely broad. So we have intentionally narrowed that question to examining 
the concept of reification as a type of closedness pursued through two particular 
philosophers.  As a theme, reification itself begs an attribution on the part of the mind, in 
other words what the mind attributes or adds in the process of coming to “know” its 
world is an interpretive process that can potentially become static.  It was argued that this 
is essentially how we need to understand reification, as the stasis of mental interpretations 
or also in terms of concepts, such that they form closures.  If we understand 
interpretations as disclosures, then reification of those concepts or interpretations can be 
easily understood as static closures, or in common parlance, a closed mind.    
 But having focused on the question of reification through the lens of Kant and 
Heidegger has borne fruit in pointing out, or at the very least provoking, a positive 
indication of understanding the entire issue of openness and closedness generally.  As we 
have noted in Heidegger, “openness” or the “open place” has a special significance for 
the type of being we are, a consciousness relating with in the world.   
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 Openness is understood as an essential characteristic of Dasein or human beings 
in that they are the “open place” for Being, in its many and various ways of becoming 
manifest.
1
  To understand Heidegger rightly means that being human is constitutive by 
being open to and for an interpretive understanding of the world.  Openness then 
describes our most primordial moment and condition of relating to the world.
2
  What is 
opened up and what becomes disclosed are the particular themes beings take, a process 
we see in Kant as partially dependant on the material component of the world and the 
form given on the part of the mind that attempts to make sense of its experience.   
 Additionally we’ve noted that our being open to and for is made possible by a 
bringing of an “always already” history, a set of pre-understandings of tradition and 
cultural content that provides that open place, a human location, with the possibility of 
being open.  As we’ve suggested Heidegger’s project in Being and Time is to show 
fundamentally that all inquiry is already guided by a prior seeking.  That is every specific 
inquiry, however vague it might be, provides an orientation that impels the seeking, and 
so constitutes and directs the inquiry.  This observation noted in Plato’s Meno3 and is 
employed on the part of Heidegger as a constitutive indication of our being open.  This is 
not dissimilar to Kant’s view that the mind must actively provide form to the material of 
experience in order to make sense of the world.  We understand this then as a 
fundamental constitutive element of how things are opened for us.   
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 Thus having pursued reification as an instance of closedness has lead to or 
exposed a strong relationship to what openness is regardless of our attempts to narrow 
our investigation. One can hardly refer to a closed mind without reference to openness, 
especially as it occurs in Heidegger’s understanding of the interpretive process.  In some 
sense the issue of openness as it appears in Heidegger must be elaborated simply because 
for him, any open place that can have disclosure of the world is also a concealing of other 
possibilities.  The implications then are that an opening that allows for something to be 
revealed is also simultaneously a sort of stance with the immanent possibility of 
reification.  We will have to make sense of how this works and what it means. 
 According to Heidegger, every disclosure is at the same time a concealment of 
being.  To identify a particular phenomenon as X is to distinguish it from Y or Z.  For all 
practical purposes, this is a positing of Being as X, or a particular descriptive 
manifestation of a particular being as such.  What is important for us in Heidegger’s 
account is that this naming of an abstraction, into a thing, has other implications.  First, is 
that any account of X, will be understood to be partial and the concealing factor may 
continue to inhibit further revealing or being open to a better or different understanding 
of the phenomena.  Second, and perhaps more importantly, this disclosure that is at the 
same time a concealing, suggests that part of being open-minded is at the same time a 
sort of closing.
4
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 We are reminded of Bloom’s rhetorical assertion reported in the first chapter that 
student minds in American education had become so open, that they were in fact closed.  
This is not what we mean however, though perhaps in all seriousness there is a strong 
connection between both states of being open or closed that Heidegger’s account 
provokes.  Perhaps avoiding the binary disjunction of whether a mind is simply open or 
closed, a look at the origin of the concepts shows some perhaps more fundamental 
relationship between the two. 
 In our examination of reification as a closed mind thus far, we’ve accepted these 
terms as an adjective “closedness” or its verb form, “closed”.  But in conveying an idea, 
looking at its noun form, “a close” gives us a broader understanding of the term.   The 
definition of a “close” in the Oxford English Dictionary reveals that the vernacular uses 
of close over and against to that of open has perhaps been over simplified in terms of its 
verbal use when referring to the mind.  A close in old English commonly referred to an 
enclosure, a spatial reference such as a court yard or at other times referring to the 
entrance to such a space, or a covered way that led to such a space serving as a ‘close’ in 
reference to keeping out of the weather.
5
 We might extend the understanding of a close 
then as putting on limits on a certain space, giving or creating dimensionality, thus 
creating spatial form.   In this sense, the creation of spatial form is a result of the closing 
off, or setting limits to a space such as it is at the same time a creating an open place.  
Consider space without limits and we will literally speak of nothing.  Or consider the 
                                                 
5
The Oxford English Dictionary, (New York: Oxford University Press), 
http://www.oed.com.flagship.luc.edu/view/Entry/34604?rskey=JpNPPu&result=1&isAdv
anced=false#eid (accessed July 2012). 
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imposition of limits, albeit physically or cognitively, and we can understand a close as 
creating a simultaneous opening.  On the other hand the act or occurrence of disclosure is 
a distinguishing from other forms.  To enclose something is to set it apart from other 
things.  To declare a thing X is to suggest a difference from Y and Z.  Such disclosing 
stipulations of Being then are the necessarily concealing of other themes which Being 
might take.  By this then we might better understand Heidegger’s thesis that a disclosing 
is concurrently a concealing, that is a defining and limiting in that it creates an 
interpretation thus providing sense to the thing revealed.
6
   
 Perhaps an essential element in understanding open and close in this sense reveals 
that a mind, or a door for that matter, is not to be thought of simply as in a state of being 
opened or closed, but instead having as a dynamic relationship that is creating or a 
positing of something through the en-closing of limits.   At the very least this constitutive 
dynamic is the process of our coming to know and relate to the world that involves being 
open for disclosures and that these closures are productive both intellectually and 
practically in that they reveal or open us to the world. So in some very real and important 
sense, our being open is a condition for disclosures, the revealing of being in Heidegger’s 
language so that our abstractions of the world necessarily are limited into specific 
meaningful interpretations or concepts. We have only to think of what Heidegger means 
by referring to the interpretive as a circular process.  In our case we are simply suggesting 
                                                 
6
 Aside from the elucidation given in his Essay “On the Essence of Truth”, 
Heidegger devotes considerable time in discussing phenomenological method in light of 
the basics the simultaneity of phenomenological reduction, construction and destruction 
in the introduction The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Hofstadter, (Indiana: 
Indiana University Press), 1982. 
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that opening and closing are to be thought of in the more holistic sense that Heidegger 
suggests in his metaphor of the interpretive process as a hermeneutic circle.
7
   Our 
concern in showing reification distinctly involved in the cognitive process is for the 
purpose of exploiting the problem when these disclosures become static and bar future 
possibilities to be open.  In keeping with the traditional definition of reification, when an 
abstraction then is turned or made into a “thing”, that thing-hood status becomes set in 
such a way as to potentially inhibit further understanding.
8
   
 So to summarize, this essential point is to make clear the distinction between 
disclosures and when these revelations become reified.  As indicated by Kant the mind 
provides the necessary form to the material of experience.  Interaction with the world 
means that Being is revealed to a being that is open, a being such as a human, and that 
revealing will imply limitations, whether it relies on something secure as Kant’s 
transcendental categories or something less certain, the import of human input is 
essential.  This disclosure of particularized being is equivalent to the moment our 
abstractions of our experience are given form.  These forms then have the possibility to 
be taken as or made into something more than merely interpretations, but can be 
statisized such that it becomes a thing, and as such, that it acquires an inappropriate 
metaphysical status in the mind.  Reification is that moment of thing-hood that obscures 
being open in several ways.  
                                                 
7
 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 1962, 194-195. 
 
8
 Heidegger in his essay “The Origin of the Work of Art”, not only gives a good 
description of the relation between disclosure and concealment as we’ve described in 
terms of opening and closing, but discusses the thingly quality that occurs in our relating 
to being in the process.  
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 So where or when exactly does this reification take place? In the next section we 
will review several ways reification can occur and how these can be thought to attribute 
to a closed mind.  
Modes of reification 
Naive or Direct Realism 
 Perhaps the most common instance of reification is best observed in the form of 
naïve or direct realism, or what is sometimes called “common sense realism.”  Naïve 
realism essentially holds that the world we take in through sense perception is to be 
understood at face value.  Any objects that we experience in the world are understood as 
existing and factual with all properties and characteristics perceived and understood as 
self evidentially true.
9
  As a formal philosophical approach to knowledge it has been 
argued that maintaining this approach has serious problems, the main being that variation 
in perception presents far too many instances that contradict this view.  However, if 
granted that this formal view contains such problems, it is the reality of the problem of 
variation that has lead to more sophisticated views on the problem of perception as such 
the nomenclature “naïve” realism suggests.  As such we are not here to argue for or 
against formal theories of perception, but to examine the relevance of reification.  The 
problem of naïve realism is that it operates among many in a less formal instance 
opposed to the explicit theory.  It would not be hard to show that many people naively 
operate in the world exactly as if what they see is to be interpreted as the case.  Much of 
the time this may be a normative and productive way of operating.  But where there are 
                                                 
9
 Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ (accessed July 2012). 
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exceptions, the naïve approach will present problems when what appears as “obviously” 
true is in fact not.  But those of us who do not hold a too naïve realism are not surprised 
to discover that some of our perceptions of the world are not always accurate and that it 
can be problematic to assume that what you see is in fact is not always the case.  Our 
prior reference to the Copernican revolution again serves to remind us that it was 
common sense perception that made it appear that the sun was revolving around the earth 
from our perspective.  Perhaps the most important point is that naïve realism is an 
immediate suggestion of perceptual fallibilism, that one may in fact be wrong.  It is 
through errors of concepts we have about the world that we begin to understand the 
importance of reification as it relates to holding erroneous concepts or interpretations. 
 That people have naïve or even erroneous views of reality has immediate 
consequences in how we understand the occurrence of reification.  What was understood 
as common sense among those prior to Copernicus was accordingly shown to be false.  In 
terms of reification the concept they held about the sun’s movement to their own location 
was a disclosure regarding the nature of the world.  What is then disclosed about the 
world, or the truth of what we perceive is then at issue in light of how concepts or 
interpretations become reified.  Certainly we can expect that in coming to understand the 
world many of our interpretations will sooner or later be challenged and in need of 
modification.  Reification in these instances becomes a potential problem as the 
conceptual stasis creates the immanent possibility of new, more evidentially relevant 
disclosures, or so we are arguing.   
 At this point a stipulation and distinction between two types of cognitive 
stabilities that occur when we arrive at interpretations or concepts is needed.  Certainly 
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we can assert that upon any disclosures or interpretation arrived at there is, in some sense, 
an understanding, and as such would seemingly suggest a cognitive stability. To declare 
that the sun revolves around the earth indicates stability in the sense that both the 
understanding and the declaration are not in flux, but describe the case.  In the discussion 
of naive realism, we must clarify the sense in which the concepts we do hold are stable 
and are distinct from static holdings and hence closure.  After all, not all thoughts are 
reifications.  The point of distinction will be to expose the difference by degree that this 
stability will be such that it does not become reified and statically frustrating a more 
comprehensive or complete understanding.   In the first sense, the base stability that 
seems necessary in order to have concepts or interpretations we will stipulate as having a 
stance.  This is the type of stability already indicated in the word “under-standing.”  As 
such we will assert that having this type of stance at once has stability and is not so static 
that it is closed to other or new evidence.  In Heideggarian language these interpretations 
are understood as held as provisional and proximately.
10
  On the other hand when a 
stance becomes hardened to such an extent that it impedes its own modulation in light of 
new or better evidence we will stipulate this as a moment of stasis, or as we’ve asserted 
earlier, as statically held concepts, i.e. reification.   The primary difference that we will 
exploit here is when reification occurs; the stasis that impedes conceptual reformulation 
is essentially an in-active stasis opposed to stance as an active holding.  
                                                 
10
 Heidegger uses these terms “provisional and proximate” throughout his works 
to suggest this very type of having interpretations with and in light of the problem of 
concealing and forgetting about their status.   
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 To understand this idea of an active holding verses a static reified holding, we 
might already find ourselves reminded of Heidegger’s existential phenomenal approach 
that meant to elaborate on these very issues.  As such, Heidegger’s language is full of 
new idioms and often uses verbs to denote active conditions of human knowing, such as 
Dasein, the being who is ‘there’ in time and is defined as ek-static in essence; a being in 
movement. 
11
   But it wasn’t Heidegger and the existentialists who first rejected the idea 
of perception and knowledge as passive, but both Plato and Aristotle who understood it 
essentially as an active process.
12
   
 Aristotle teaches us in his Ethics that developing virtue, whether they be of the 
moral or intellectual type, is a result of having an active state denoted by the use his use 
of the Greek word: hexis.  The word has presented some problems as it has been 
translated as “habit”, and has therefore suggested to readers that Aristotle thinks that to 
achieve virtue one must simply perform mindless activity.  But this is the opposite of 
what Aristotle intended in explicating his view of virtue.  Aristotle is clear in Book Two 
in the 4
th
 chapter that virtue is to be understood as an active condition distinct from 
passive states such as feelings and predispositions.  Aristotle reminds us that in achieving 
virtue we must perform in a certain way, “first of all knowingly, and next, having chosen 
them and chosen them for their own sake and third, being in a stable condition and not 
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 See Chapter Four on Heidegger’s concept of Dasein as there-being and the 
discussion of his use of ek-stasis as denoting the idea of man in time. 
 
12
 In both of Plato’s Theaetetus and Meno Socrates makes a point of describing 
knowledge as an active holding that comes from attentive seeing and concentration.  For 
further explanation see Sachs commentary in his introduction to Aristotle’s Nicomachean 
Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs, Newburyport MA: Focus Publishing 2002. 
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able to be moved at all the way out of it.”  Joe Sachs in his commentary and translation of 
Aristotle’s Ethics,13 suggests that we understand this stable condition as a “state of 
equilibrium” that denotes the stability we have already referred to in terms taking a 
stance.   However we are reminded that achieving this virtue presupposes the intellectual 
virtues suggested in Book Four implied in the quote, that knowingly and actively 
choosing are not passive states.  Like moral virtue, Aristotle is “emphatic that we are only 
open to the world by the effort of holding ourselves ready.”14 
 Being-at-work is the term Sachs uses to denote Aristotle’s employment of hexis 
not as mindless activity, but that a hexis that is made manifest by an energia.  Central to 
Aristotle’s notion of human being is the idea that our being in the world is an active 
being-at-work, one that is coming to know and actively knowing its world in such a way 
that it remains open to this work.
15
   
 What Aristotle and Sachs describe for us is a view of knowledge that is an active 
holding which suggests a stability and yet is not so static as to be reified.  To have a 
stance is an appropriate stability in terms of the activity of the mind.  If we oppose the 
popular notions of perception as merely passive and the negative notion of habit as such, 
then we can see comparatively good reason to make a distinction between an active 
stance that is a conceptual holding and reification.  On the other hand, once passivity of 
acceptance of a concept or interpretation is taken as “the case,” or in our terms turned 
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Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs, 2002. 
 
14
 Aristotle, .xii. 
 
15
 Aristotle, xv. 
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into a “thing” as such, then we have a stasis or reification and an instance where the mind 
is not in an active holding itself open but, in lieu of stasis, closed.   
 Heidegger will additionally speak of Dasein or man as an ek-static being, a being 
in movement and that in this realization and examination of our own being, we realize 
that we have stances, belief commitments that we already posses.  It is Aristotle’s account 
of engeria or the power of the soul, the ability for that sameness (our being) that can 
change a human’s growth and development that is a being-at-work.  According to 
Heidegger, as one realizes that their existence is hermeneutical conditioned, one adapts 
one’s stance to holding those concepts or interpretations provisionally or proximately.16    
Dogmatism 
 What does it mean to hold one’s concepts or abstractions provisionally or in what 
sense do we mean that this is understood as an activity?  It might be that some of us 
thought something true but felt no need to be heavily committed to the concept.  But 
there are many times we experience the opposite of this, when we or someone we know 
feels the need to stick to their belief and are very much committed to the concepts they 
hold regardless of new evidence.  This begs Hare’s prior attribution toward the discussion 
in the way he defines openness as opposed to dogmatism.
17
  He defines open-mindedness 
as the ability to consider new evidence or experiences so that one can re-consider one’s 
stance.  This is opposed to the emotional disposition that sometimes accompanies static 
                                                 
16
 It is not by mistake that Aristotle or even Platonic thinking aligns nicely with 
that of Heidegger’s ideas.  Heidegger specifically research and was affected by the 
Greeks, particularly the works of Aristotle. For further discussion see David Krell’s 
“Introduction to Martin Heidegger,” Basic Writings, 1993. 
  
17
 See chapter one for a in depth presentation of Hare’s position.  
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beliefs such that they become rigidly held in spite of contrary evidence.  We casually use 
the phrase “in spite of,” but it is our clue to understanding the emotive element in a stance 
that is no longer actively held, but has become static.  This is the way that Hare defines 
what it means to be dogmatic and therefore close-minded.
18
  Clearly here we can see that 
a dogmatic holding is a stasis that is in-active, such that one, by definition, feels inclined 
to hold regardless of any relevant considerations.  Dogmatism then as an instance of 
conceptual stasis is also rightly understood as an instance of reification that therefore 
indicates a closed mind.  Consequently there may be an active holding to a concept or set 
of interpretations such that we might consider dogmatism as the activity of keeping the 
view in question static.  But this should not be confused with the activity of perceptual 
knowing as in the attentive seeing as indicated in Aristotle, the difference being the 
positive activity of holding concepts provisionally, stable yet always questionable and the 
inactivity of settling upon a concepts and being done.  In this later case the only activity 
is an actively being closed to any further understanding, such as commitment means in 
terms of dogmatism.  The difference here is to be understood as that which that activity is 
centered on.  In the positive sense one actively holds a concept open to review and the 
negative one actively refuses review.  The concept in the later case remains inactive, but 
the emotive or dispositional quality of the agent might be said to be actively refusing to 
re-active the concept in question. 
Operationalism 
 A third aspect of reification involves how we relate to the world.  As in 
Heidegger’s existential analysis, we have already noted this relation has been 
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 William Hare, “In Defense of Open Mindedness,” 1979, 8 . 
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characterized in terms of one’s Being-in-the-world or as one having world-hood where 
we find ourselves as “always already” having a set of pre-ontological judgments of the 
world.  For Heidegger this has a twofold sense.  The first is what he refers to as that 
which is present-at-hand and forms the ontological judgments that we may find ourselves 
already having beforehand or ontological determinations that we may yet make.  One 
might attempt to make a parallel here between Heidegger’s present at hand and a realism 
albeit naïve or critical and this would not be incorrect.  But what Heidegger wants to 
show us is that all ontological determinations, those things that are present at hand, take 
on the character of things “to fix in concepts which are categorical” and also “invested 
with value.”19  We have already elaborated on the importance of this in chapter four and 
its relevancy to the problem of reification. 
 There is however a second sense of having world-hood that Heidegger points to 
that is distinct from the explicitly ontological character of things present-at-hand.  This is 
Dasein’s ontic existence or is specifically the pre-ontological relationship with or having 
a world that is less explicit of categorical determination of “things” per se.  In our ontic 
existence Heidegger wishes to elaborate on the fact that in having a world, one is an 
always already relating to things in terms of their use, not just in terms of ontological 
determinations, but in a pragmatic sense.  Accordingly we find ourselves in existence 
with having already invested interests in things in-order-to do something. Heidegger 
refers to this way of relating as “readiness-to-hand.”  It is not that they are understood as 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time. 1962, 91. 
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entities themselves so much as they operate as tools, or equipment, that are means to 
achieving some end.
20
 
 Regardless, whether we refer to this as an ontic readiness-to-hand, or simply call 
this way of relating pragmatism, the point is, we are rightly concerned with the 
description that we are already involved with the world on an operational level, that is 
often prior to an explicit consciousness.  That we come at things, not so much as 
determined objects prior to our involvement, but use-value is a determiner in our 
relationship to these things.   As we have argued that cognitive determinations or 
disclosures limit my seeing an object differently in terms of concealment, so does seeing 
or relating to an object in terms of what it will accomplish for me.  In other words, the 
relevancy of our operational orientation to the world is as much a disclosure as any 
ontological labeling of being and therefore has potential to become reified.   Perhaps the 
most immediate example of reification in this sense is when we see someone who has 
creatively used an object that is typically used for other purposes, in a new way.  Such as 
when someone uses milk crates to provide supports for making shelves or the way in 
which books are used as supports for a coffee table.
21
   
 In these instances the use of these objects in ways other than what they were 
intended for shows us that they not only defy the ontological category, but that usage is in 
fact a determiner.  That many of us come up with a creative uses of such objects attests to 
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 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, 1962, 97, 101.  Section III of Being and 
Time, entitled “The Worldhood of the World,” gives an extensive analysis of the 
difference between ontological present-at-hand and the more prior ontic readiness-to-
hand. 
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 Heidegger, 98.  Heidegger’s famous example of how we relate to a hammer in 
terms of use and ‘equipmentality’ of things.  
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the possibility that we hold such objects as reified for limited use.  The main difference 
we here want to exploit is how reification can be of an explicit taking of an abstraction as 
a thing.  But Heidegger’s existential analysis suggests an existence prior to essence.  And 
in some sense this essence is already determined prior to an ontological determination. 
Enlightenment positivism 
 Finally, reification occurs perhaps in the most explicit sense when someone 
consciously seeks the thing-in-itself.  Perhaps there is no greater representation of this 
seeking than the hubris of ideals pursued by the Enlightenment thinkers.  The 
Enlightenment is generally understood, at least in terms of philosophy as the pursuit of 
scientific knowledge in its most positive form.  That is, knowledge was the discovery of 
the very nature and structures of the universe.  In many instances, claims made by 
scientist as well as philosophers, were the specific attempt to establish foundational and 
indubitable truths.   In many cases these truths sought were of the explicit sort that was an 
intentional pursuit of nature or objects of study, as identity of the thing-it-self. 
 In terms of Enlightenment thinking and ideals, especially as they pertain to 
knowledge, we might consider Kant as we have already made some of his thought 
familiar.  We might recall that he identifies Plato as a significant start to this grand 
pursuit of knowing by abandoning the realm of the senses in order to pursue the ideal of 
the intellectual immediacy of the Forms.
22
  Kant, in a previous quote, speaks of this 
hubristic attempt on the part of Plato and Enlightenment ideals through the metaphor of 
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 Immanuel Kant, What is Enlightenment?” 
 http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/kant-whatis.asp (accessed July 2012).  See 
this essay for a treatment of enlightenment ideals. 
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the light dove that thought it might fly better in space.
23
  While we might immediately 
recall Kant’s limiting of this possibility, the ideal of identifying the thing as it is in-it-self 
was, and perhaps still is, a prominent approach to knowledge.  While naïve realism is a 
simplistic acceptance of things as they are, the desire for discovery of the things 
themselves has driven much of our history of philosophy and scientific endeavors and to 
no small success.  I will not argue here against a more sophisticated realism or positivism 
out of respect to those views which are sufficiently defended and held by notable 
scholars.  We have already accepted the idealistic reading of Kant over and against the 
analytic tradition who read him as attempting to posit a secure foundation for knowledge 
claims.  Certainly in this way Kant serves as a pivotal figure for us and the entire tradition 
as it concerns the values and ideals in the pursuit of knowledge.
24
   In this inquiry we 
have chosen a more interpretivist position, which additionally makes accounting for 
issues concerning reification more apparent as I have and am attempting to address.
25
  In 
light of this then, any position that seeks attainment of the thing-it-self can be nothing 
other than reification de facto.  In other words, to think that one has attained the thing in-
it-self is already assumed as an impossibility and so any attempt must then be understood 
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 Recalling this quote of Kant’s metaphor of the light dove is most helpful and 
relevant in showing how the limitations of the mind were the very things that made 
knowing possible.  The phrase often associated with Kant is “the conditions for the 
possibility of,” ascribing necessary limits of human reason. 
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 The fact that Routledge has commissioned both an introduction to Continental 
philosophy as well as an introduction to Anglo-American philosophy attests to the 
moment difference in Kant.  In his Introduction Cutrofello identifies Kant just so.  
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 Reification as defined and discussed in Chapter 2 of this dissertation, finds 
itself more easily aligned in terms of reification as an action of the mind in the process of 
turning an abstraction into a thing.  As it was suggested earlier, this is action of the mind 
begs the mind appropriating the abstraction.  
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as a static concept. While the Enlightenment thinker may have been diligent and rigorous 
in analysis, such a conclusion of having the thing is to fix it not in terms of simply being 
a stance, but to declare it absolutely and certainly known, which suggests that no further 
activity is required to understand it.  The abstraction is literally taken as a thing and 
becomes statically held.  
 However if one could indeed obtain the thing-it-self, which suggests clear and 
perfect knowledge of the thing, it might be argued that closure is appropriate as the 
abstraction will be perfectly adequate to the thing.  In other words the traditional 
correspondence theory of “veritas est adaequatio rei et intellectus,” truth is the adequation 
of the thing to the intellect, means there is a perfect accord between the thing and the 
concept, or a one to one correspondence.  Traditionally this type of accord was reserved 
for an infinite Being and is therefore seemingly hard to come by for lesser finite minds.  
Kant accounted for such a possibility and referred to these as intellectual intuitions or 
noumena, as distinct for our sensual intuitions or phenomena.  These sense intuitions 
were reserved for us, as we require sense matter, which applies to the forms while God’s 
thought was equal to the thing as it is; the thing-in-itself.
26
   
 The result of which is to say any attempt to claim a one to one correspondence 
epistemologically is a violation of Kant’s claim that sense matter is necessary for human 
cognition.  While a debate may rage regarding the existence and reliability of 
transcendental categories, much of contemporary philosophy has rejected the 
Enlightenment ideals of perfected knowledge demonstrated so adequately in Kant’s 
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 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans Guyer and Wood, 1998, 354. 
Kant discusses this key distinction in  light of setting noumena as a distinct 
negative and limiting concept for us in that we are incapable of intuiting the thing itself.   
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hubristic metaphor of reason as a dove that would project itself to fly beyond the 
possibility of its own conditions.  However, Kant’s use of making the phenomena and 
noumena distinction would suggest that reification would not be a mistake from a god’s 
perspective, but that a one to one correspondence between the thing and the concept 
would be expected.  In other words in the mind of a god, that abstraction is equivalent to 
the thing.  
Examples of reification in the world 
 Certainly by now we have identified reification, shown its prominence 
philosophically and shown that it can be understood as a conceptual stasis and how it 
functions as a cognitive closure.  Additionally we spoke of the dynamic relationship that 
exists between openness and closedness of mind that is more complex than an over 
simplified oppositional binary understanding of those terms.  Given this cognitive 
dynamic of how openness and closedness of interpretations are related, we distinguished 
a difference in two types of cognitive holdings.  Every understanding will presuppose a 
stance, which is taken and stabilized.  This stability can be an active stance or holding of 
an interpretation and therefore open, or it can become in-active and static, reified and 
therefore closed.  When a concept is taken and turned into a thing as such, we have a 
stasis and therefore reification.   This might beg the question, can one avoid reification or 
are we prone to constantly reify things on a daily level?    
 It would seem that reification is something we are all prone too.  It would seem 
that everyone could recall a moment when a cherished idea or fundamental belief they 
held eventually broke under closer scrutiny.  In Plato’s “Meno,” Socrates continually 
questions Meno on his definition of virtue.  Socrates pursues Meno’s ideas and shows 
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that they are full of contradictions.  Finally in exasperation Meno tells Socrates that he 
has become immobilized and can no longer give an account of what he thinks.
27
 This 
moment is often equated with the beginning of Socratic wisdom: knowing that you don’t 
know.  Educationally, this is often seen as a profound moment when one may realize that 
other thoughts, concepts and interpretations that one holds are indeed now possibly open 
to question.  Or in another sense what was thought to be the case, has become de-
stabilized and one is now possibly open to further disclosures.   
 What does this mean then in terms of reification and its relevance for education?  
We may speak of how closedness and openness should be considered and how they relate 
and function in a cognitive dynamic, but this leaves us still wondering at a more general 
relevance and applicability.   It was argued initially that if any profession should have just 
concern regarding what and how a mind functions in respect to its being open or closed, 
the educational theorist is the most immediate candidate.  To this end then, the inquiry 
has thus far been pursued and what remains is application to those educational 
practitioners who may greatly benefit from understanding the clarity, relevancy and 
function of reification that will hopefully provide insight into practice. 
 To begin with, our examination of reification and its connection to a closed mind 
has been an inquiry that has focused largely on what is the most basic and fundamental 
moment of its occurrence.  I will refer to this as cognitive or content reification.  It is the 
singular moment where a concept or set of interpretations become statically held, such 
that they either are explicitly thought of existing things or as such function as though they 
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 Plato, Meno. Trans. G.M.A. Grube, (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 1992, 70.  
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were, and therefore obstruct new disclosures indicating cognitive closure.   On way to 
think about this then is that reification is a personal issue, or at the most primary level, its 
manifestation is on the level of the individual level.  All other examples of reification that 
we will examine are subject to this basic moment of reductive stasis.  In other words, 
while the application and effects may be diverse, in the following cases, reification is still 
operating on a cognitive individual level as indicated by this prior investigation.  So what 
follows from the examination of this reification on the level of the individual, we will 
look at larger applications that have social implications.  We might refer these larger 
instances as institutional reifications, either singular or sets of ideas that have become 
reified and in some way have been applied socially.  
 Secondly, we will examine reification as it pertains to teaching.  Rather than re-
examine a teacher’s concepts for the possibility of content reification, we will look 
specifically at reification in terms of method.  In other words, how methods can become 
reified and hence obstruct or frustrate student learning.  Reification here is extended from 
the conceptual stasis which is also operating with the addition that the stasis has 
employment in terms of practice that not only affects the teacher, but students as well.  
The import here is to realize that the effects of reification will have impact beyond 
individual considerations.    
 Our next application of reification will be what I will refer to as human 
reification, or rather when humans have been reified.  This will prompt us to consider 
Marx’s contribution the discussion of reification as it applies to human relationships and 
has important ethical implications.  It will also have significance to the classroom setting 
and education structures as a whole.  But we must keep mindful that in any moment of 
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reification is always a result of the most constitutive elements, the static reductive 
concepts.  We say this, however, as a point that this sort of reductive categorization of 
concepts, whether in terms of racism, sexism or even specific educational profiling of 
students, is a subset of this basic issue of reified concepts.  To the extent and degree that 
reification indicates a misappropriation of the subject in question is to the degree to 
which it can be understood in ethical terms. 
 With the consideration of Marx and Human reification we will be prompted to 
examine reification at the policy level.  Another way of thinking about this, or as it occurs 
by degree, is what I will refer to as institutional reification.   At this level, what has 
become reified is a set of methods and ideas, applied at the level of policy and by 
extension has become instituted in terms of a set of procedures, in some cases incarnate 
in the form of brick and mortar, albeit a school or simply a building that is dedicated to 
those ends.  Several factors present problems here as not only may the intuition be 
dedicated or intentionally static in reality, but on a second level, such institutionalization 
can create a habitualization or sedimentation of practices that can misappropriate the 
original aim in that those reified practices becoming an end in itself rather than the means 
for which they originally were established.
28
   This at once presents an interesting 
possibility in the first instance as to the fact that reification maybe seen as a desirable 
end.  In other words such communities, perhaps religious or even ideological, can 
become so committed to certain ideas, that they are in fact intentionally reifying their 
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 For an extended discussion of this see Berger and Luckmann’s The Social 
Construction of Reality, (New York: Doubleday, 1966), 50, 63 – 67.where 
institutionalization includes habitualized practices as well as objectified sedimented 
ideas.  
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content.  In religion, this would simply equate to the dogmatic form of reification, a set of 
fixed beliefs that are rigidly held to and that define that community. In this sense then we 
will also have to account for the reification of ideology.  One may judge for themselves 
as to whether that is a desirable end, but in any case, such institutions or communities are 
in fact closed.  In the second instance, institutions can be so codified that their behavior 
becomes directed towards self preservation over and against original practices that were 
intended towards other ends.  One might consider how a church, in seeking converts to its 
faith, over time begins to reify its existence such that it instead seeks to preserve its 
traditions and culture.  We often equate these moments as nostalgic attempts to recapture 
or preserve the past, or reified ways of doing things  
Content Reification 
 We have already given some indication as to how reification may be on work at 
the level of the student in referring to the torpifying of Plato’s Meno.  In Meno’s case, his 
reifications, or at the very least his pretentions of what he thought he knew, had been 
undone.  This is the moment that is essential in understanding the relevancy of reification 
to the classroom or in any instance where a student is already operating with a fixed of 
set concepts.  We might recall the relevancy of Heidegger’s contribution that we all 
approach an inquiry with a guiding concept.  In other words, the students in our 
classroom come to class with some fixed concepts in terms of what they expect or what a 
thing is or how it is thought to work.  This is equivalent to saying that we all have 
disclosures of the world and we bring these disclosures with us.  Students having the sort 
of understanding that we have identified as a stable stance as actively held is the ideal.  A 
teacher’s end is to teach students and in doing so, establish stable content.  But the 
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teaching profession needs additionally to realize with this distinction in mind, they are 
also teaching a student a sort of disposition of having concepts as actively held as 
opposed to becoming static reifications.  Accordingly, when a student maintains an active 
stance in this way, he or she can have a set of concepts but is at the same time open to 
new evidence, thus having the ability to critique their own and others positions and 
synthesize the necessary elements that further understanding.  Opposed to this, however, 
is the possibility of a student whose ideas are static and reified and any new evidence or 
teaching content is lost to them.  One only has to recall the adage “thinking you know the 
answer is the surest obstruction to learning.”  By way of personal example, I had a 
professor that attempted to explain a theological theory to me in a classroom setting.  I 
asked if what he was explaining was a part of special revelation or natural revelation, a 
distinction created by Thomas Aquinas.  I had understood the distinction to be sound 
such that my questioning presupposed the disjunction; one or the other. The professor 
looked at me quizzically and tried to re-explain the theory without answering my 
question.  We were both somewhat confused.  I was at a loss to understand his point and 
he at a loss to understand why I had asked about natural and special revelation.  Later I 
realized that the concepts special and natural revelation were so set, reified, that I could 
not make sense of the new or even completely different information the professor was 
trying to instill in me.  I was functionally closed at that moment and the static concepts I 
was depending on to understand the professor were in fact creating an obstacle in my 
understanding him and the lesson he was attempting to convey.   
 Content reification is the most fundamental and basic moment of reification and 
the examples perhaps legion.  If one cannot think of a personal moment of having reified 
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concepts, one might think of a time when one’s ideas were either dispelled, like Meno’s 
indicating a prior reified concept that had been undone or a time when something simply 
didn’t make sense due to the categories you held.  Perhaps some of us who have 
undergone the educational process have experienced having concepts or theories dear to 
us only to find out they can no longer be held.  In fact it often seems like the case that we 
reflectively look back on ideas we once held and wonder how it was were able to 
maintain them.  In some cases, these ideas, the currency of our thoughts, functioned to 
block a new and better understanding of things.  The impetus of this moment, the 
moment we come to realize that static concepts we’ve held on to have frustrated a more 
qualitative account and understanding is one of the main lessons that this inquiry has 
sought to identify.   
 Popular culture is full of such moments of over-coming reified concepts.  One 
may consider the song “Lola” by the band The Kinks.  The song narrates a story of a 
young man who comes across an exotic woman at a bar.  In the verse we understand a 
moment of confusion as he sings, “Now I am not dumb, but I can’t understand how she 
walks like a woman but talks like a man.”  A few stanzas later, the singer discovers the 
truth that “I know what I am and I’m a man and so is Lola.” Perhaps it is more in the 
moments of de-reification that we discover that we had static concepts in the first place, 
that what was before did not entirely make sense.  The singer declared he had met a 
woman.  It might easily be assumed that to his surprise “she” was in fact a man, the static 
acceptance of an identity created the surprise.
29
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 Davies, Ray.  “Lola”, Lola Verses Powerman and the Moneygoround, Part 
One. RCA Records, released In the UK June 1970.  “Lola,” a song written by Ray Davies 
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 In terms of classroom application a teacher must simply remember that cognition 
is prone to such reifications.  We might invoke Piaget’s theory of cognitive development 
noting that concrete thinking is a stage prior to the development of abstract thinking and 
the reification of concepts at the level of the concrete may be even more desirable if not 
necessary by definition, but can soon obstruct development.  In other words if we assume 
prominence to Piaget’s account of cognitive development, we can assume that reification 
is akin to concretization in thinking and therefore unavoidable.  But the development to 
the stage of abstract thinking requires the distinction of content from material.  
Reification now becomes a potential problem in terms of maturity of cognition.
30
  The 
goal in the classroom setting will not be to identify concepts that are reified in the 
students’ minds, though awareness of this issue can help determine the cause of 
misunderstanding.  The larger issue surrounding reification and its linking to a closed 
mind is to strive to teach and instill a disposition in the student of conceptual active 
engaged stances that allow potential future modulation.   The educational ideal is the 
creation of minds that can remain open to further learning.  
 Another popular example we draw from is from the movie The Karate Kid. The 
main character, Daniel, is a young kid who is being bullied at school.  Determined to 
defend himself he decides to pursue the martial arts.  Fortunately the local maintenance 
man, Mr. Miyagi, is experienced, knowledgeable and offers to teach Daniel.   Daniel has 
a certain set of beliefs or expectations as to how martial arts training should occur.  To his 
                                                                                                                                                 
of the Rock band The Kinks, where a young man enters a bar in Soho London and 
unknowingly meet a Transvestite. Lola was released In the UK June 1970.  
  
30
 For an development of Jean Piaget’s theory of cognitive development  see his 
Construction of reality in the child, (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. 1957). 
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dismay Daniel is subjected to an intense list of chores such as painting and cleaning 
around Mr. Miyagi’s home. Daniel’s expectations of what his training ought to be are 
reifications to the extent that they are static notions of what he thinks the training is.  
There is a moment we see Daniel’s utter frustration of having worked hard for several 
days and feeling used by his master as free labor.  In a dramatic moment for those of us 
watching the story, Daniel vents his frustrations verbally to his master.  Mr. Miyagi yells: 
“wax off!” while simultaneously throwing a punch at his young student.  In response 
Daniel quickly blocks the punch, with the very same “wax off” motion Mr. Miyagi had 
insisted Daniel use in cleaning.  Daniel’s eyes are opened as much as his mouth is closed 
in stunned silent realization that he had been learning the basics all along.  Daniel is in a 
sense stunned like Meno was under Socrates’ relentless questioning.  Daniel was brought 
to utter frustration partially due to having suffered under reified notions of the kind of 
training he supposed.  Daniel’s eyes are, however, dramatically opened when he 
understands that the work he has done was the teaching he had desired all along.  In other 
words Daniel was closed to the fact that he was, in fact, training, instead of simply 
working.  When we use such words in referencing Daniel’s expectations did not 
correspond to Mr. Miyagi’s method of teaching, we are clued to the fact that Daniel was 
operating under reified notions and for a time was unable to see the lesson at hand.
31
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 Robert Mark Kamen, John G. Avildsen, The Karate Kid, Columbia Pictures, 
1984.  
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Reification of Method 
 We consider our example of the Karate Kid as a positive example of how method 
can be used to overcome reification of content, specifically Daniel’s.  As such students’ 
ideas, as much as our own, can potentially suffer reification and inhibit clearer 
understandings.  Once Ralph understood the application of his work, his interest is 
enlivened.   Mr. Miyagi’s method or that of a teacher can have a deleterious or amplitive 
effect on a student’s motivation as well as ideas.  In the case of Daniel and perhaps for 
the sake of the plot, we as the audience are to learn that we all have reified concepts or 
expectations.  We along with Daniel, have ideas of what the martial arts training are and 
we are brought along with Daniel to think he is being used.  The dramatic surprise is, 
however, that Mr. Miyagi’s method of teaching was not simply training Daniel in the 
physical aspects of martial arts, but showing that there is also a cognitive element to the 
training that Daniel must appreciate.  At the very least, in this case, it seems that in 
trusting your master or teacher would be in your best interests in mind regardless of first 
having a complete understanding.
32
   
 But the above is an example of method as it is used to positive effect.  What if a 
method itself becomes reified on the part of the teacher to deleterious effect?  Here we 
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 One thinks it a common problem that the students and in most cases the parents, 
bring concepts and expectations of what will be accomplished on the part of their local 
educational institutions.  Most educators will appreciate the sense of what it means 
having to suffer under these sorts of reifications.  There has always been an irony in that a 
student, which is by definition a position of ignorance, will chose and dictates the terms 
of his education to those who are in the profession.   
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understand method “as a procedure for attaining an object” or in this case a desired end.33  
By object or end we understand that these are the base-line concepts being sought and are 
distinct from the path or approach to attaining them.  It would seem that in either case the 
ends sought or the method used both have potential to become reified.  In this case, we 
simply need to think of instances where the “old tried and true” methods seem not to 
produce the desired results.  In the case of teaching we often find that one method that 
was effective at creating understanding among our students can in other times or 
situations be less or completely ineffective.  Insisting that our methods are proven and 
effective can sometimes themselves be obstacles to understanding the reified prejudices 
we hold.   One such program put forth with the intent to mitigate this problem is National 
Board Certification.  This program was instituted as a process of getting teachers to 
reflect critically and rigorously analyze their methods and demonstrate their 
effectiveness.  In this way the program initiates a set of standards that must be met that 
has the effect of having teachers consider the effects of their methods. This reflective and 
analytical process is a method to de-reify practices that have become routine or habit with 
the hope of stirring teacher effectiveness.
34
 
Marx’s Contribution 
We have thus far avoided a specific Marxist analysis of reification in order to concentrate 
on identifying reification phenomenologically.  Before we move on to Marx we might 
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 The Oxford English Dictionary, http://www.oed.com.flagship.luc.edu/ 
(Accessed July 2012). 
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 What follows is the website for NBC, but reviewing the requirements of 
certification will show the claim indicated above. The National Board Certification 
process is in a real sense a method that causes reflection on methods that have been or are 
to be employed.  
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point out that our process of examining reification was to look at from the level of human 
consciousness, how the individual reifies things.  As we move towards ways in which 
Marx understood reification, we recognize an explicit social application.  This is 
important simply because while reification has been in use by many traditions,
35
 its 
largest and most sustained development and application has been on the part of Marx and 
his followers.
36
  In all due respect, Marx and his tradition have given us a powerful 
analytic to understand the reifying affects as it effects all of society, especially as it 
pertains to political structures.  We can hardly then, in seeking some application of the 
way in which reification shows up in educational structures, avoid reference to the work 
done on the part of Marx, nor would we desire to avoid this.  In fact to show an 
application of reification, the phenomena as the way we’ve identified it here, we must 
consider that our interpretation and concepts are prone to statization.  The structures built 
on the part of these interpretations are even more likely to promote literal concretizations, 
hence, policies and institutions as existing entities that are testaments to these 
statisizations and therefore explicitly encourage their own perpetuation.  When this 
occurs the policies and structures tend to re-enforce those static concepts.
37
    
 And yet, we have pursued reification in the context of Kantian and Heideggarian 
philosophy in order to expose its cognitive static element with the aim of showing how 
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 In chapter 2 I attempted to not only show a historical account of the concept, 
but pulled from sources from differing traditions. 
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 Lukacs furnishes us with perhaps one the best examples and was discussed in 
Chapter 2. 
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 Considering the prior reference, we might again refer to Berger and 
Luckmann’s analysis of institutionalization that relies heavily on a Marxist or dialectical 
materialism. See page 5 of the introduction to The Social Construction of Reality, 1966. 
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reification functions as a closure on the level of the individual and therefore informs our 
understanding of what we mean when we speak of an open or closed mind.  In this 
respect, Marx can contribute to our understanding how this closure of static concepts 
affects educational policy and institutions.  Let us then proceed to give Marx his due and 
by extension see to the extent to which reification has profound implications beyond the 
closure of our concepts.  As that cognitive closure functions in reified social structures, 
we will see its implications in terms of method as it concerns the student, educational 
policy, institutionalization and ideology. 
 We might begin with Marx’s account of the phenomenon of reification which 
found expression in his application of Hegel’s concept of Alienation38 along with Marx’s 
analysis of the fetishization of the commodity form.  Specifically as this abstraction 
“commodity” takes a form, it is reified as such.39  Similar instances, Marx notes, are other 
such abstractions as “labor” and “capital” as instances of cognitive reifications.  But to 
understand Marx’s notion of reification we need to begin with his assessment of the 
capitalist economy and the way it determines social consciousness, structures and 
relationships.  Marx argued that under capitalism, man had become one more economic 
factor of production, in terms of labor value, one abstraction of his being that reified him 
as a thing and therefore resulted in the reduction of his humanity.   
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 G. W. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, trans. A.V. Miller, (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1977), 111. 
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  In Capital Vol 1, Chapter One, section four, Marx gives a complete account of 
the power the commodity form takes. http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ 
(accessed July 2012). 
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Capital employs labor. The means of production are not means by which he can 
produce products, whether in the form of direct means of subsistence, or as means 
of exchange, as commodities. He is rather a means for them, partly to preserve 
their value, partly to valorize it, i.e. to increase it, to absorb surplus labor. Even 
this relation in its simplicity is an inversion, a personification of the thing and a 
reification of the person, for what distinguishes this form from all previous ones is 
that the capitalist does not rule the worker in any kind of personal capacity, but 
only in so far as he is "capital"; his rule is only that of objectified labor over living 
labor; the rule of the worker's product over the worker himself.
40
 
 
 In the quote above we can identify three forms of reification.  First, reification in 
the most basic sense that of the cognitive content being taken as a thing in-itself.  In this 
particular case it is human beings that are reified in to “labor-things,” or humans as 
“objectified” labor.  Not only is cognitive content reified, but the reduction of humans to 
things is the second instance of human reification.  Lastly this is made possible by the 
larger reification of Capitalism as an ideology.   In this case “capital” or “the capitalist” is 
what employs labor, and we see the ideological implications to reification on the larger 
scale in terms of class consciousness and implications of capitalism affecting social 
structures, social policies and institutions.   
 For our purposes, the importance of Hegel is that human consciousness manifests 
itself in a series of stages identifiable in particular forms of consciousness and as such 
can be explained as reifications.
41
  Marx identified these stages in terms of their 
ideological significance.  Capitalism according to Marx as was one of these reified 
sociological forms and was supported by such terms as wage value, forces of 
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  Marx’s Economic Manuscripts of 1861-63, “Part Three Relative Surplus 
Value, k) Productivity of Capital. Productive and Unproductive Labor.”   
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/ (accessed July 2012). 
 
41 Marcuse’s Eros and Civilization: A Philosophical Inquiry into Freud, (Boston: 
Beacon Press, 1955), 112-113 We have already noted this in Chapter 2
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industrialization, “Laws” of supply and demand had profound effects on how humans 
perceived and understood themselves.  Human consciousness was affected in terms of 
identity on the level of the individual and affected social relationships as well as political 
structures that maintained and perpetuate the reified ideological forms.  Capitalism as a 
larger concept included a system of interdependent concepts.  In other words, an ideology 
of reified notions such as “capital”, “labor” and “commodity” themselves imposed on in 
the structures of society as a naturally occurring phenomenon.  As such that these reified 
forms affected human consciousness at all levels. 
 Marx believed this and several other factors caused man to become alienated from 
himself, the things he created, as well as from others.  Not only was man reduced to a 
thing, a equation in terms of labor ratio, but abstractions such the ‘Free Market’ 
suggested such a ideological reification that Georg Lukacs, one of Marx’s followers, 
coined the phrase, the “reification of class consciousness.”42 Class consciousness is the 
point when reified terms have taken a prominent ideological form, such that those who 
operate under its assumptions believe falsely that the reified forms that the system of 
value has determined for them are actually the case.
43
   
 In light of Marx then we will proceed to examine the remaining examples of 
reifications as they affect humanity, policies, institutions, and ideology.   First, we will 
identify some examples independently and then, lastly, show the prominence in the 
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current policy of “No Child Left Behind,” focusing mainly on the implications of how 
assessment pertains to reification.  
Human Reification 
 Human reification, as we have seen in Marx, can have an ethical impact as it 
involves the reduction of humanity into things.  In that people are turned into things, we 
might equate the moment of closure we’ve identified earlier to be akin to what is meant 
by reduction.
44
 We must note, as in Marx, that we can clearly see people are turned into 
things in terms of social relations.  One might simply note suggestive contemporary terms 
such as “human resources” or human capital.  There is a distinction to be drawn between 
the content reification of a person and its actualization.  We might think it, but to act on 
this reduction is quite different.  Marx is clear on both accounts and so must we be as it 
affects not simply socio-economic relationships, but the very way in which we conceive 
of people.  We’ve mentioned above that content reification is the fundamental 
constitutive moment that is present in any activation of that static concept.  From the 
hermeneutic and phenomenological perspectives we see this from a good vantage.  The 
implication then from this perspective is that any instances of racism or any ethnic 
reduction, limiting people in terms of ethnicity, culture or race, is a reification that takes 
this form of de-humanization.  This is just as true in the case of sexism where conceptual 
reifications in sexual differences are reductive and often result in terms of objectification.   
This is then similar to what Marx identifies in terms of the reification of workers as 
“labor value.”  Human workers are reduced to use values in relation to overall capital and 
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 By associating this reduction to closure we are at the very least equating the 
notion of a limit being put on the concept or person, such that the value of the thing is 
lessened.  
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market values.  In this way, we have generally understood reification as a distinct 
problem, ethically, as not treating humans as ends, but as means.
45
 
 This same issue of human reification has equivalent issues as it affects the 
classroom.  As reification is a human phenomenon, we can easily infer that a teacher’s 
view of a student can likewise be reductive.  Consider the issue of tracking as a way of 
putting students on a course of education that is deemed appropriate to them.  Certainly 
the teacher must engage in the process of evaluating and assessing the student and, in 
labeling the student, presupposes the possibility of reifying the student.   Obviously such 
assessment occurs as a means to get students the kind of education they need.  But the 
danger lies in reified reductions that are a part of putting those students in certain tracks 
in the first place.  While this may not be equivalent to de-humanization on the level of 
racism, it is, however, a categorical reduction that can devalue the student’s potential.  If 
we accept that this is especially important in cases where students have been “mis-
tracked” to lower performative expectations, then we must accept that reified reductions 
can be problematic.  Much of this relies on the belief that testing will accurately indicate 
the capacity of the student, rather than the level of skill or knowledge acquired.  Certainly 
there may be pragmatic situations where testing is the method that determines the future 
of a student, but a conceptual reduction of their capabilities does not need to follow.  And 
it seems that this is often the case.  When it does, that student has been reified by the 
teacher, the program or institution, and potentially the society.  This is especially true if 
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the larger society accepts the label as an authoritative determination applied by that 
educational structure as indicative of capacity and value.  Additionally the student will 
often accept the reification as determination of their identity.  Often students will declare 
that they are not an A student material thereby accepting a reified reduction of their own 
identity.  
 The example of tracking suggests the larger issue of assessment.  While we have 
noted the fundamental importance of content reification we perhaps need, in the 
educational context, to also stress the importance of the impact on human reification.  
Tracking begs a larger issue of assessment on the part of education.  Assessment, the 
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of students, teachers, methods and policies, is 
perhaps a core example.  The question that we will need to keep in mind is what is being 
measured and in what sense is that measurement taken as a form of adequation of the 
person.  
Institutional Reification 
 Let’s begin with introducing one of the most recent and prominent policies 
enacted under the Bush administration which continues to have significant impact, the No 
Child Left Behind Act of 2002(NCLB).  It was partially motivated by the intent to 
increase the achievement of disadvantaged students and promote equity but was also a 
way of addressing accountability in education as a whole.  The essential elements of 
NCLB act was to establish and promote an increase in student achievement which meant 
that the federally mandated act would hold states, schools and teachers accountable for 
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their outcomes.  The accountability and improvements would be achieved through 
multiple levels of assessment.
46
 
 These assessments are indicated in some of the policies set forth on the part of 
NCLB:  Annual testing- tests designed to measure student progress determined by state 
standards. Academic Progress- states requiring schools to show certain amounts of 
achievement which could affect federal funding of their schools.   Report Cards- states 
are required to give report cards as assessing the effectiveness of any given school or 
districts.  Teacher Quality- an incentive programs for teachers to become “highly 
qualified” by seeking recertification and secondary education. 47   
 While there are many components to NCLB, it is clear that assessment is a 
primary issue. Assessment of schools, teachers, school administrators, and above all, 
students, being conducted in the name of quality, accountability, performance and 
achievement, with an end to not only improve educational opportunities for those 
disadvantaged but improvement of the entire system.  NCLB as a policy instituted name 
by the U.S. the federal Department of Education provides us ample opportunity to show 
reification as it potentially relates to issues of assessment, measurement, outcomes or any 
other similar term.    
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 To begin with, we need to understand what is meant by assessment.  In the most 
basic sense, assessment is defined by Webster’s as “The action or an instance of 
assessing value or appraisal.”48   In the educational context, assessment is perhaps a most 
basic element of determining knowledge, skills or abilities of individuals, or perhaps 
effectiveness of the institutions. The OED indicates:  “The process or means of 
evaluating academic work; an examination or test.”49  Some educational institutions 
define it as follows:  
 “We define assessment as follows: Assessment is the process of gathering and 
discussing information from multiple and diverse sources in order to develop a deep 
understanding of what students know, understand, and can do with their knowledge as a 
result of their educational experiences; the process culminates when assessment results 
are used to improve subsequent learning.”50  
 Regardless of the myriad definitions set in language to appeal to our best and 
highest intentions, assessment, which has always been a part of education and is 
essentially a determinative judgment.
51
  We may rightly invoke Kant, if not already in 
reference to Webster and the OED that assessment, originally meant to bring a set of 
particular cases under a universal.  In the case of educational assessment, this ideal of 
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50
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knowledge of a student is to set a procedure, an exam, which can measure those 
particular cases that are to be subsumed under the universal notion of what is meant by 
proficiency.   In short, in education we test people in order to determine their level of 
competency according to some accepted standard.  
 Now let it be understood, that assessment seems to be an unavoidable necessity, if 
not imperative and operational good, that institutions as well as individuals should desire 
for the sake of self examination, reflection, identity and development.  Assessment or 
judgment is essential in what it means to be a rational being.
52
   What we wish to identify 
in terms of assessment, or perhaps more essentially in judgment, is the possibility of 
reification.  This is not surprising given that much of what has been discussed in terms of 
a definition of reification implies judgments about concepts and their ontological status as  
such and such determination.  Likewise any judgment that is determinative has a way of 
making a descriptive claim regarding the content that it is assessing.  All assessments are 
processes that attempt to identify and make a determination.   
 The question will be begged to what extent are assessments adequate determiners 
of its ends?  Invoked here is the concept of adequation as it’s understood in the epistemic 
conditions for knowledge.
53
   If assessments are tools to make determinations, then their 
success will depend on some degree of adequation.  It is important to point out that 
adequation is achieved partially, but it is problematic if we think we can have “complete” 
adequation.  If adequation is achieved, then we have a 100% reliable means of making a 
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determination.  Given that we’ve already sided with those philosophically that any claim 
of perfect epistemic adequation is beyond our ability to achieve, it would follow that our 
determinations must be of a lesser degree.   To think then that an assessment is adequate 
is to think that it achieves a thing-in-itself quality, or a static reification. 
 It is worthy to note that policies, if not the methods themselves, are intentional 
procedures with a pragmatic end toward determining, through assessment, the abilities of 
a certain sample of students.  We would agree that assessment must be performed, but 
what is the claim being made regarding the assessment? What does it signify?  In the case 
of human assessment, the ecstatic being we have defined above, assessment at best can be 
a particular momentary claim of performed achievement.  In other words, we can make a 
pragmatic claim that Johnny on this day, all things being equal, scored a 70% on his test, 
and as a result we can suggest that he must achieve this standard in order to move to the 
next phase of his education.  This way of thinking about achievement is pragmatic in that 
it sets the standard to be achieved.  But if we look at Johnny and claim he is only a C 
student and is therefore average, we’ve generalized from this test that he is of a certain 
quality.  We have reified Johnny’s potentiality.  If this determination follows Johnny, 
many at admission boards and human resource departments are likely to make a quick 
and similar determination of Johnny’s adequacy.   
 Grades then or other sorts of achievements, such as certificates and degrees, can 
re-enforce a reified notion of adequacy.  For instance, Chris may have his Ph.D. in 
education with years of experience teaching and working with undergraduates, but 
without a certificate of academic advising he may not be considered for a job in the field 
of advising.   We may not know to what extent Chris is or is not adequate for such a 
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position, even though his experience and training excels in those areas that can be 
considered basic for an advising position.  Yet, if Chris does not have the certificate, an 
indication of ability, the easy conclusion is that he is not adequate for the job, even 
though he has a higher degree of skill and experience.  In such things and to some extent, 
those assessed determinations, certificates, degrees and even grade point average serve 
rightly as indicators of proficiency.  But often these indicators, or ways of assessing, end 
up limiting or closing off opportunities due to reified notions of assessment as adequate 
indication. 
 In the above cases, in the context of education, reification affects the individual 
most powerfully.   But as much as individuals are prone to reify their own concepts, so 
are they often likely to reify others.  Policies and institutions do not necessarily cause the 
problem of reification.  But, in that they are set by those human agents that reify, the 
power of reification can be to an extrapolated and in practice can re-enforce reifications. 
 How, then, does this affect closure or what we have been inquiring about 
regarding a closed mind?  In as much as reifications occur on the individual level and to 
the extent that this is magnified on the policy or institutional level, these reified static 
notions operate to close off possibilities.  In the case of content reification, the individual 
or institution that reifies Johnny as an average student is in a real sense closed off from 
Johnny’s being more than such a determination.  Institutionally, such reification also 
closes off Johnny from attending certain schools, getting certain jobs etc.  Consequently, 
Johnny, confronted with constant affirmation of his reified self, learns to accept himself 
in such terms.  This example is not unlike Marx’s claim that the social structures that 
operate in Capitalism create and reinforce reified concepts of the self.  The acceptance of 
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these structures as “naturally” given is what Marx will refer to as false consciousness and 
in effect, ideological influence as a whole.  
Ideological reification 
 We might infer then that, where institutions are served by these labels and 
determinations for pragmatic ends, they become reified to the extent that they seem like 
natural and inevitable conclusions.  If we were to take Marx in his full application to the 
social structures we would see that ideological reification, potentially a redundant term, 
as Marx used it implied a the "production of ideas, of conceptions, of consciousness," and 
all that "men say, imagine, conceive."
54
  Ideology served as a grand narrative that 
encapsulated the entire culture in terms of setting the discourse for the society.  
 Consider the ideological implications of the “free market” as a reified concept.   
Much of society believes in the actual existence of this concept.   Defined in terms of 
laws of supply and demand, this reification determines how relations are expected to 
occur within the market place and it is supposed, purported and actively believed that 
there is, in nature a free market to which we must conform.  There is no better example of 
reification than taking this abstraction as a literal existing thing.  The reified notion of the 
free market as an ideology has profound influence in determining our patterns of 
thinking, on our public and social discourse, on our values and influence on our 
institutions.   In a recent Department of Education initiative, part of the requirement to 
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become an evaluator is experience in “decision making and human capital.”55  Here, 
reification of persons has been easily accepted and perpetuated by our leadership, 
showing the profound influence of economic ideology in determining our thoughts.  
Humans are reified as capital and perpetuated by one of our largest educational 
institutions setting policy and discourse for the entire nation.  As if this weren’t enough to 
furnish an example of ideological reification, we have only to look at our local schools 
and colleges, where the business models reify the presidents or superintendents as CEOs, 
the teachers as service providers, and parents and students in terms of customers and 
schools as purchase locations.  In this case, while this might not provide us an example of 
human reductions, it does show us the way in which ideology can be reified and so sets 
the terms of relations which has profound consequences on those in the system.   
 Similarly this ideological reification can be seen in the language and concepts on 
the part of the NCLB.  Diane Ravitch, former assistant to the secretary of education and 
once noted proponent of NCLB has become a harsh critic indicating that NCLB has 
introduced the free market model to the educational sector by introducing competition 
and incentives as well as punitive measures for those not meeting requirements.  Ravitch 
argues strongly that a push toward privatization with the emergence of charter schools 
and vouchers has put the entire system in jeopardy.   Those schools that don’t meet the 
federal standards stand to lose funding and in some cases will have been or will be shut 
down.  As it so happens in these cases, most of the “at risk schools” are in low income 
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districts.  With some irony the notion of no child left behind as reification has seemingly 
subverted its own end, by leaving many a child behind.
56
 
 Part of Ravitch’s dismay was the way assessment was used and perceived to push 
ideology.  As an educator she understood “the complexity of assessment is a far more 
difficult issue that is being presently received.”57  In other words, while the savvy 
professional educator may understand the difficulties in assessment, those in the main, 
politicians and the public, do not, and take and turn those abstractions, scores, into 
indicators of certain realities.  In other words the desire to know and draw conclusions 
often outweighs caution and wisdom and reification, the static capturing of the thing-
itself, is supposedly measured, as such words as “outcomes” suggest to us. 
 In one last example of how assessment is reified in the case of NCLB, the 
promotion of teacher quality and accountability is seen as a desirable end.  In an almost 
naive realistic sense, one of the main initiatives on the part of many states at the direction 
of The Department of Education, teacher performance is now being assessed in 
connection to student test performance.  Regardless of parental or community support, 
regardless of income and such material factors that are considered basic, apart from 
human agency on the part of a student where engagement finds its source, teachers are 
being determined as the responsible agent.  Linking teacher evaluation directly with 
student testing ensures a reification that will most likely perpetuate itself in the teachers 
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teaching to the test ensuring good reviews, regardless of whether this testing is indicative 
of the quality of education we desire for the individual.   
 While these cases can be argumentative and present complexities of their own, the 
issue of reification is a dire problem.  When concepts or ideas are mis-taken as realities, 
as things, the effect is already to have closed off other possibilities.  But when concepts 
or larger sets of interpretations are not only reified, but also acted on, the result can be 
exponential in proportion.  In one positive sense, the mere fact we have practioners who 
are critically speaking from the front lines attests to the reified forms that come their way.  
We might appreciate Ravitch’s notion that assessment is indeed complex and application 
is tricky.  The same can be said of those concepts we hold.  When they are static and 
taken as such, our tendency is to see that as the answer in spite of problems.  If we can 
attempt to hold an active stance and remain open, then we are more likely to understand 
the issues or address the problems as they arise.   
Concluding Remarks 
 We have all experienced moments where we could not see or understand an issue, 
an idea or some effect that was before us.  It is usually in reflection that we look back and 
utter such statements, “I couldn’t see it,” or “How was I so misguided in my thinking?”  
These issues can result from family or personal issues that are so close to us, that makes 
self-diagnosis difficult.  Or sometimes, they are very simple problems, such as getting a 
rejection letter or a grade on a project that was not to our liking.  In these cases we are 
sometimes genuinely surprised at the negative result or what seems like a complete 
misnomer.  What did I miss? Or what possibly did I do wrong?  Often we then look for 
external explanations, blame or accusation to solve our conundrum.  But occasionally we 
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look back and understand that we could not in fact see the issue, the answer or our 
mistake, simply because we didn’t have an adequate understanding.  There are moments 
where we are simply confused due to the inability to make sense of what is before us.  
This is the experience of Plato’s cave.58  The moment when the prisoner breaks free of 
his bindings, turns and sees the source of light in the back of the cave and cannot see that 
for a better approximation of reality, but insists that the shadows on the wall are more 
real.  This is the moment of reification and its potential undoing that has propelled this 
inquiry.  All too often we look back and realize we lacked the understanding, the 
conceptual structures that would have provided clearer insight.  Reifications, static 
concepts or interpreted phenomena of the world held us in check, only later to look back 
to see that we were somehow held captive by our own, bias, prejudices, stereotyping, 
labeling - many words that indicate static reductions that signify abstractions that have 
been taken as real: reification.  Our minds literally holding concepts static and unable to 
see things before us, those things others may have been trying to tell us, or simply our 
inability to understand.  I have suggested that these moments of cognitive stasis, our 
minds are functionally closed. 
 This was not the issue of closed mindedness that Allan Bloom was concerned 
with that impelled him to write “The Closing of the American Mind.”59  Bloom was 
concerned that a certain sort of relativism was operating under the guise of openness and 
as such, inhibiting what is crucial in education: good rational judgment.  Bloom posed 
that this more diabolical sense of openness functioned as a closure in distinction to an 
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ideal of openness not unlike how Heidegger understood it or as we have likewise 
promoted.  It was, however, Bloom’s attempt to implicate a certain philosophical 
tradition that included Heidegger as causing this more devious form of openness.  
Bloom’s critics, however, have been strong in declamatory examples that relativism and 
its issues have long been present and pervasive, and, according to them, leaving us with 
the impression that Bloom’s fears are more alarmist than well founded.  
 This issue of what is understood and meant by the terms open and closed mind in 
its casual everyday use seemed only more remote due to the controversy initiated by 
Bloom’s assertions. Likewise the respondents and critics involved in the ensuing 
discussion were also from educational venues such as Bloom.  Understanding what was 
meant by openness and its relevance to education seemed apparent.  Hare seemingly 
understood the importance of the issue as he devoted some effort in defending the good 
version of openness for education.  And while Hare’s account is positive towards the 
concept of openness, his discussion of closedness reverts to a reliance on a dispositional 
account of the subject that manifests in closedness in terms of dogmatism.  In all 
deference to Hare, his work is essential, helpful and well founded. What seemed missing 
is an account of closedness of mind that was semi-mechanical rather than the emotive 
volitional element in his dispositional account.  Reification is an issue that is ubiquitous 
and pervasive to the extent that its use is everywhere and as such is a common mistake, 
such that it is often cited in terms of being a fallacy.
60
   Our attempt to give an account of 
reification in light of its affecting a cognitive closure, was to give an account of our 
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common experience elicited above, made in the appeal that we have all experienced 
ourselves “blinded” to certain ideas.   The supposition here is that at least some of these 
experiences are explainable as cognitive closures reified concepts of how things are that 
inhibit us from seeing better, or otherwise.  To this end, it has been argued that reification 
forms a static closure such that we are in some sense unable to see differing perspectives 
or even the relevancy of new evidence, simply because our minds are closed in this way.  
 To this end, this thesis was pursued as a path that had not been attempted in such 
a specific way of application.  To be sure, Marx and his followers, among the many who 
occasionally use the concept of reification, have done the most comprehensive structural 
functional analysis of the concept.  And though much is owed to this tradition, to my 
understanding, there has been no application of reification to the performative closure as I 
have attempted to show.  This was showing was intentionally meant to be a 
phenomenological account beginning with Kant, a significant and pivotal figure, and 
followed through the continental tradition, in this case best represented by Heidegger.  
Using both Kant and Heidegger, via a phenomenological account allows us to exploit the 
cognitive stasis that undergirds the more provocative ethical implications that obscure the 
mechanics.  
 To be sure, there is an entire tradition and some notable figures, such as Alfred 
Schutz and Burke Thomason, Berger and Luckmann who give a “conventional” account 
of reification and its import.  To this end, we wish not to dismiss the contribution from 
this side.  But showing the application and relevancy from the tradition that Bloom 
initially claims is problematic is a way of clearing some misconceptions by way of also 
providing new insight to the application of reification in terms of cognitive closures.   
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 Finally and perhaps most importantly, this inquiry has as its aegis the pretense to 
be a dissertation in the philosophical foundations of education.  An explicit, though 
perhaps not comprehensive, account of how reification would amplify our understanding 
of a closed mind seemed best-suited a subject for the educational theorist.  It seemed to 
me that those in the field of education, which rely on theory and its practice, are the ones 
that had most to benefit from such an issue.  
 Providing some specific ways we can understand reification as it affects the 
individual, particularly in the educational field, seems extremely appropriate.  In my final 
chapter I have attempted to make some distinctions and show some relevant applications.  
In summary I tried to show a different way of understanding how close relates to open, 
rather than in binary states, especially in terms of relativity, these ideas are best thought 
of as a dynamic mediation.  This prompted me to cite some modes or kinds of thinking 
where reifications are operating.  Particularly of note in naive realism we made an 
Aristotelian distinction between a cognitive holding that is an active engaged stance, over 
and against a passive and inactive static closure.  Finally, I attempted to elucidate some 
specific instances where reification occurs in educational contexts so that we can be more 
aware of its manifestation and the way it creates a closure.  The essential moment of 
reification was specified as content reification and refers distinctly to cognitive static 
closures we have concentrated on.  Additionally I examined reification of method, policy, 
institutions and ideology as larger effects of reification with the hope that for the 
educator, such closures and their negative effects can be avoided.  
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